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SUMMARY 
The current South African tax dispensation does not make provision for a system of 
group taxation, which gives rise to various tax anomalies. The Katz Commission 
recommended the implementation of a consolidation system of group taxation in their 
third interim report. This study investigates the issue of group taxation with the 
objective of commenting on the Katz Commission's recommendation. 
Chapter 1 explains the purpose of a system of group taxation and discusses the 
different forms of group taxation. Furthermore, the theoretical norms or canons are 
described which can be used to evaluate the current tax treatment of groups as well as 
the different forms of group taxation. 
Chapter 2 investigates the current tax treatment of groups by focussing on the tax 
implications of various intra-group transactions. It is found that the current tax 
treatment of groups does not satisfy the canons of equity, neutrality, efficiency of tax 
collection, low administration cost and certainty. Although the absence of a system of 
group taxation may contribute to technical simplicity, such an absence also leads to 
complex tax schemes that attempt to exploit favourable tax anomalies or avoid 
unfavourable anomalies. 
Chapter 3 exammes certain Issues which may render a system of group taxation 
unnecessary or undesirable, even if such a system leads to better compliance with the 
canons of taxation. The conclusion is reached that none of these issues will cause such 
a result. With regard to the issue of divisionalisation as an alternative to group 
taxation, it is found that section 39 of the Taxation Laws Amendment, No. 20 of 1994 
does not provide an accessible mechanism for divisionalisation. Furthermore, groups 
may be preferred over divisionalised companies for various commercial and legal 
reasons. With regard to the issue of limited liability of individual group companies (a 
benefit which is not available to individual divisions of a single company) it is found 
that group companies rarely abuse this benefit. In addition, a system of group taxation 
will complement the concept of limited liability in promoting economic growth. With 
regard to the issue of concentration of economic control and ownership, the 
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conclusion is reached that group taxation will not lead to further concentration of 
economic control, as the intra-group shareholding required for group tax treatment 
will greatly exceed the intra-group shareholding necessary for economic control. A 
system of group taxation may even lead to the broadening of economic ownership by 
enabling minority shareholdings in group companies which would otherwise be 
structured as divisions of existing companies due to tax considerations. 
Chapter 4 compares the loss transfer system of group taxation with the consolidation 
system, using the canons of taxation as a reference framework. Because a loss transfer 
system is similar to the current tax treatment of groups, in the sense that both 
dispensations treat individual group companies as separate taxable entities, the current 
tax treatment of groups is included in the above mentioned comparison by 
implication. It is found that a consolidation system will satisfy the canons of taxation 
the best. Although such a system carries the risk of undue complexity, it should be 
possible to design and implement a specific system which will fall within the 
administrative capabilities of both taxpayers and tax authorities. 
Chapter 5 examines key recommendations of the Katz commission with regard to 
group taxation. The writer expresses his agreement with the commission's conclusion 
that a consolidation system of group taxation should be implemented gradually. 
Certain adjustments to the commission's recommendations are suggested, which will 
facilitate quicker implementation and increased simplicity. 
The current tax treatment of groups leads to tax anomalies which are highly 
unsatisfactory. From a theoretical as well as a practical perspective, the 
implementation of a consolidation system of group taxation will represent a 
significant improvement to the South African tax dispensation. 
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OPSOMMING 
Suid-Afrika beskik tans nie oor 'n stelsel van groepbelasting nie, wat aanleiding gee 
tot verskeie belastinganomaliee. Die Katz-kommissie het die implementering van 'n 
gekonsolideerde stelsel van groepbelasting aanbeveel in hulle derde tussentydse 
verslag. Hierdie studie ondersoek die aangeleentheid van groepbelasting met die doel 
om kommentaar te !ewer op die Katz-kommissie se voorstelle in hierdie verband. 
In Hoofstuk 1 word die doel van 'n stelsel van groepbelasting verduidelik, en die 
verskillende vorme van groepbelasting bespreek. V erder word die teoretiese norme 
beskryf waaraan die huidige belastinghantering van groepe en die verskillende vorme 
van groepbelasting gemeet kan word. 
In Hoofstuk 2 word die huidige belastinghantering van groepe ondersoek deur te fokus 
op die belastingimplikasies van 'n verskeidenheid intra-groep transaksies. Dit word 
bevind dat die huidige belastinghantering van groepe nie lei tot billikheid, neutraliteit, 
effektiewe invordering van die belastinglas, lae administrasiekoste en sekerheid nie. 
En alhoewel die gebrek aan ' n stelsel van groepbelasting bydra tot tegniese eenvoud, 
lei dit terselfdetyd tot ingewikkelde, belastinggedrewe skemas wat poog om gunstige 
belastinganomaliee te benut en om ongunstige belastinganomaliee te vermy. 
In Hoofstuk 3 word sekere aangeleenthede ondersoek wat moontlik 'n stelsel van 
groepbelasting onnodig of onwenslik sal maak, selfs al sou so ' n stelsellei tot 'n meer 
gebalanseerde bevrediging van die teoretiese belastingnorme. Die slotsom word bereik 
dat geeneen van hierdie aangeleenthede we! so 'n resultaat sal he nie. Met betrekking 
tot divisionalisering as 'n altematief vir groepbelasting, word beslis dat artikel 39 van 
die Wysigingswet op Belastingwette, No. 20 van 1994 nie 'n toeganglike meganisme 
daarstel vir die divisionalisering van bestaande groepe nie. Uit 'n kommersiele en 
regsoogpunt bestaan daar boonop verskeie redes waarom groepe bo 
gedivisionaliseerde maatskappye verkies word. Met betrekking tot die beperkte 
aanspreeklikheid van afsonderlike groepmaatskappye ('n voordeel wat nie tot die 
beskikking is van divisies van 'n enkele maatskappy nie), word bevind dat groepe in 
praktyk selde hierdie voordeel misbruik of selfs benut. Voorts sal 'n stelsel van 
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groepbelasting die konsep van beperkte aanspreeklikheid komplimenteer in die 
bevordering van ekonomiese groei. Met betrekking tot die konsentrasie van 
ekonomiese beheer en eienaarskap, word beslis dat 'n stelsel van groepbelasting nie 
die verdere konsentrasie van ekonomiese beheer sal aanhelp nie, aangesien die 
kwalifiserende aandeelhouding wat vir groepbelastinghantering vereis sal word, die 
aandeelhouding wat nodig is vir ekonomiese beheer ver sal oorskry. 'n Stelsel van 
groepbelasting mag voorts hydra tot die verbreding van aandeeleienaarskap, deurdat 
buiteaandeelhouers direkte belange sal kan opneem in ondernemings wat andersins 
gestruktureer sou word as divisies van bestaande maatskappye. 
In Hoofstuk 4 word verliesoordragstelsels en gekonsolideerde stelsels van 
groepbelasting in die algemeen vergelyk, met die belastingnorme as 'n 
verwysingsraamwerk. Aangesien ' n verliesoordragstelsel soortgelyk is aan die huidige 
belastinghantering van groepe, in die sin dat albei bedelings groepmaatskappye as 
afsonderlike belastingentiteite hanteer, word die huidige belastinghantering van 
groepe by implikasie ingesluit in die vergelyking. Die slotsom word bereik dat 'n 
gekonsolideerde stelsel van groepbelasting die mees bevredigende stelsel is in terme 
van 'n gebalanseerde voldoening aan die belastingnorme. Alhoewel 'n 
gekonsolideerde stelsel die risiko van kompleksiteit inhou, is dit moontlik om 'n 
spesifieke stelsel op sodanige wyse te ontwerp en implementeer dat dit wel 
administreerbaar sal wees. 
In Hoofstuk 5 word sleutelaanbevelings van die Katz-kommissie met betrekking tot 
groepbelasting ondersoek. Die skrywer spreek sy instemming uit met die kommissie 
se voorstelle vir die geleidelike implementering van 'n gekonsolideerde stelsel van 
groepbelasting. Sekere wysigings word aangebring aan die kommissie se voorstelle, 
ten einde verdere eenvoud en spoediger implementering teweeg te bring. 
W anneer die belastinganomaliee as gevolg van die huidige belastinghantering van 
groepe oorweeg word, is dit duidelik dat die huidige situasie onhoudbaar is. Uit 'n 
teoretiese en praktiese oogpunt, sal die implementering van 'n gekonsolideerde stelsel 
van groepbelasting 'n beduidende verbetering van die Suid-Afrikaanse 
belastingbedeling meebring. 
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1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF STUDY 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
At present South Africa does not have a system of group taxation - each company within a group 
is treated as a separate taxpayer. In this regard South Africa is out of step with the tax treatment 
of groups in most industrialised countries (South Africa, 1995: 96). 
The issue of group taxation has been considered frequently in the past. Several articles were 
published in local business and legal periodicals, arguing in favour of group taxation. The Margo 
Commission investigated the matter and recommended that a system of group taxation should not 
be introduced in South Africa. However, the recommendation of that commission was met with 
widespread criticism in academic and business circles. The matter of group taxation was again 
examined by the Katz Commission, which expressed the following opinion: "The Commission is 
mindful of the view amongst some that the issue of group taxation is not a priority. It disagrees 
with this view, and regards the current position as a structural defect in the syste~ that cannot be 
passed over in any serious tax reform process" (South Africa, 1995: 96). 
This study will examine the issue of group taxation in the South African context, with the 
objective of commenting on the Katz Commission's findings and recommendations in this 
regard. 
1.2 DEFINING GROUPS 
1.2.1 Introduction 
The debate in South Africa about group taxation still revolves around the question of its 
desirability in principle. As the debate has not yet progressed to the detailed design of a system of 
group taxation, no attempt will be made in this study to formulate a precise technical definition of 
groups. Rather, certain issues will be identified which must be considered when constructing 
such a definition. 
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1.2.2 The nature of groups 
A closely held group, although consisting of individual companies, each with a separate legal 
persona, may nevertheless constitwte a single economic entity for purposes of strategic 
management and financial planning (South Africa: 1995, 96). Because of the control over 
subsidiaries inherent in a group structure, the group's activities are directed in the interest of the 
group as a whole, rather than in the interest of individual group members. Inevitably, the question 
arises whether it is appropriate to split this single economic unit into various tax units. 
In economic substance a closely held group is very similar to a divisionalised company. Yet 
vastly different tax results may be obtained by employing these legal structures as alternatives. A 
system of group taxation addresses this anomaly by treating closely held groups in a similar 
fashion to divisionalised companies, thereby establishing a tax regime that more closely adheres 
to the theoretical principles of taxation. 
1.2.3 The definition of groups in the Companies Act and its suitability with regard to a system of 
group taxation 
The definitions of holding companies and subsidiaries (which together constitute groups) in 
section one of the Companies Act (1973) are based on control of business enterprises rather than 
on substantial ownership thereof. In terms of the definitions, one company can be the holding 
company of another without owning the majority of equity shares in that company. This can be 
achieved, for example, by merely being a member of that company and possessing the right to 
appoint or dismiss directors that hold the majority of voting rights at its directors' meetings. 
A definition of groups based on control, such as contained in the Companies Act, is inappropriate 
for the purposes of group taxation if one bears in mind that the main aim of such a system is to 
achieve similar tax results between closely held groups and divisionalised companies. Rather, the 
definition of groups should embrace the concept of substantial intra-group ownership. In other 
countries where group tax regimes exist, the required ownership interest varies from 66% in New 
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Zealand, 75% in the United Kingdom, 80% in the United States of America to 100% in Australia 
and the Netherlands. 
Given the South African sensitivity towards concentration of economic power, a system that 
requires 100% ownership within the group might not be acceptable. Minority shareholders should 
be accommodated within a group tax regime; however, to align groups with divisionalised 
companies, a minimum intra-group interest of 75% should be prescribed. In this way the holding 
company can single-handedly pass special resolutions, which will enable it to manage the 
subsidiary in much the same fashion as a division. Furthermore, a stake of 75% in the subsidiary 
would be substantial enough to qualify the holding company conceptually as the effective owner 
ofthe subsidiary's business. 
1. 2.4 The measure of ownership 
A critical matter that must be considered is which variable or variables will serve as a measure of 
ownership. Measures of ownership differ in foreign tax jurisdictions. Some of the variables 
employed include: 
• percentage of voting power held; 
• percentage of entitlement to profit distributions; 
• percentage of entitlement to capital distributions on liquidation; 
• percentage of total market value of all equity instruments held; and 
• a combination ofthe above (Australia: 1977, 19). 
A decision on the appropriate measure for a South African system of group taxation is beyond the 
scope of this study. Nevertheless, it must be emphasised that the measure selected must be an 
effective reflection of ownership of the particular enterprise. 
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1.2.5 Calculation of the required intra-group ownership interest 
Another matter that should be examined is the way in which intra-group interests will be 
calculated in the case of complex groups. Two methods will be illustrated by employing the 
following hypothetical information: Holdco holds 75% of the shares in Subcol, while Subcol 
owns 75% of the shares in Subco2. The required intra-group ownership interest for group tax 
treatment is 75%. 
The first method requires that the ultimate holding company's effective interest in a subsidiary 
must be 75%. According to this method, Holdco and Subcol constitute a group, while Subcol 
and Subco2 constitute a separate group. Subco2 cannot be included in a group with Holdco as 
Holdco's effective interest in Subco2 is only 56.25% (75% * 75%). 
The second method merely requires that the outside shareholding of each group member (that is, 
excluding the shareholdings of direct and indirect holding companies) does not exceed 25%. 
According to this method Holdco, Subco 1 and Subco2 will constitute a single group. 
The first alternative prevents group tax treatment in instances where the effective interest of an 
ultimate holding company in a subsidiary is too small to justify viewing the subsidiary 
conceptually as a division of the holding company. The second alternative avoids excessive 
elimination of minorities in order to qualify for group tax treatment. Whichever method IS 
selected will depend on a consideration of policy issues unique to each tax jurisdiction. 
1.2.6 Treatment of close corporations 
A final question that must be addressed is whether a group tax regime should be extended to 
close corporations. It is the writer's opinion that a system of group tax must be restricted to 
companies for three reasons. 
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Firstly, close corporations were devised as vehicles for small, relatively simple enterprises. It is 
therefore unlikely that these corporate vehicles will feature in inherently complex group 
structures- the domain of group tax systems. 
Secondly, according to section 29 of the Close Corporations Act legal persons are disallowed 
from being members of close corporations, thereby preventing close corporations from being 
subsidiaries within groups. (It should be noted that a close corporation may hold an interest in a 
company and can therefore act as a holding entity. The resulting group will most probably not be 
vast and complex, due to the relative smallness and simplicity of the holding entity. The 
application of a group tax system to such a group would therefore be inappropriate.) 
Finally, the Close Corporations Act imposes fewer controls on close corporations than the 
Companies Act does on companies. Disclosure requirements are not as onerous and a statutory 
audit is not required. One would prefer to introduce a group tax regime, being fairly sophisticated 
in nature, into an environment that is more controlled than that of close corporations. 
1.3 THE CONCEPT OF GROUP TAXATION 
I. 3 .I Countering anomalies 
When a single economic entity is treated as several tax entities, certain anomalies are inevitable. 
The most important anomaly arises when a group collectively earns no profit or even suffers a 
loss, but has to pay tax on the income of profitable companies within the group. Assume the 
following information: Holdco, which has income of RI 00 for a certain year of assessment, owns 
100% ofthe shares ofSubco, which has an assessed loss ofRIOO for that year. The group as such 
has earned no profit for the year. Yet because Holdco and Subco are regarded as separate tax 
entities, Holdco must pay tax of R30 (assuming a corporate tax rate of 30%), while Subco may 
only carry forward its assessed loss to the succeeding year of assessment. Although Subco may 
possibly utilise the assessed loss in future, there is a distinct cash flow disadvantage in the current 
period, as tax of R30 must be paid on an effective group profit of RO. This situation would never 
have arisen if the business operations of the group were conducted through the medium of a 
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single company. Thus, by merely changing the legal form of the enterprise without altering its 
economic substance, dramatically different tax effects can be achieved. 
Other intra-group anomalies that will be examined in Chapter 2 are timing differences between 
taxable and deductible amounts, capital/revenue mismatches and the manipulation of cost bases. 
Sometimes these anomalies are to the disadvantage of taxpayers, but often they are deliberately 
engineered by taxpayers to avoid, reduce or postpone liability for tax. A group tax regime 
counters the above-mentioned anomalies by reconciling substance with form through the 
alignment of tax entities with economic entities. 
1.3.2 Forms of group taxation 
Three different forms of group taxation can be distinguished, namely consolidation systems, loss 
transfer systems and subvention payment systems. 
1.3.2.1 Consolidation systems 
A consolidation system is the most satisfactory system conceptually, because it truly addresses 
the groups as the relevant taxable entities. Intra-group transactions are disregarded when 
calculating group taxable income, and only transactions with parties outside the group have tax 
consequences. The tax result of a group of companies will therefore be similar to the result that 
would have been achieved if it had been a single company with a number of separate divisions 
(Lugtenburg, 1990: 8). 
1.3.2.2 Loss transfer systems 
A loss transfer system counters the main anomaly mentioned in section 1.3 .1, namely that a 
group which collectively earns no profit or even suffers a loss during a particular year must pay 
tax because individual group members are profitable. As the name of the system indicates, group 
members with assessed losses are allowed to transfer such losses to group members with taxable 
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income. Compensation paid between members for the transfer of losses is disregarded for tax 
purposes (Lugtenburg, 1990: 8). 
The operation of such a system can be illustrated by the following example. Holdco holds 75% of 
the shares of Subco. Holdco earns taxable income ofRIOO in a certain year of assessment while 
Subco suffers an assessed loss of Rl 00. Subco may transfer its loss to Holdco, and Holdco may 
deduct the loss from its own taxable income. Consequently, Holdco will pay no tax in that year of 
assessment, while Subco will not be entitled to carry fmward the assessed loss to the succeeding 
year of assessment. To prevent minority shareholders in Subco from being prejudiced by the 
transfer of the assessed loss, Holdco can pay compensation to Subco equal to the amount of tax 
saved because of the loss transfer, namely R30 (Rl 00 * 30%). (As an additional refinement, the 
amount of compensation can be determined as the expected present value of the tax saving if the 
assessed loss were to be utilised by Subco in a future year or years of assessment.) 
Group profit attributable to shareholders of Holdco amounts to R25 (Rl 00 - Rl 00 * 75%). The 
effective loss to Holdco shareholders in respect of compensation paid to Subco equals R7.50 
(-R30 + R30 * 75%), which amounts to 30% of their attributable profit of R25. Minority 
shareholders in Subco are entitled to R7.50 (R30 * 25%) ofthe compensation, which equals 30% 
oftheir share ofSubco's loss, amounting to R25 (R100 * 25%). 
A loss transfer system therefore allows the immediate utilisation of assessed losses within the 
group. This ensures that no anomalous tax cash flows occur because of the carry-forward and 
future utilisation of such losses by individual group members. 
1.3 .2.3 Subvention payment systems 
The operation of a subvention payment system is similar to that of loss transfer system, but with 
one important distinction. A loss transfer system allows the transfer of the loss itself, and 
compensation paid for and received by group members because of the loss transfer does not have 
any tax effects. In a subvention payment system, a payment is made between group members, 
which is deductible by the payer and taxable in the hands of the receiver (Lugtenburg, 1990: 8). 
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Thus the payment serves to induce the tax effect and is not merely compensation for the transfer 
of the tax effect. In reality, a subvention payment is a subsidy from a profitable group member to 
a loss-making group member that attracts tax consequences. 
The problem with the making of subvention payments is that, where minority shareholdings exist 
within group structures, value will be transferred without the receipt of a commensurate quid pro 
quo (Wroth, 1982: 16). The reader is referred to the example in the second paragraph of section 
1.3.2.2 ofHoldco and its 75% owned subsidiary, Subco. Assume that Holdco makes a subvention 
payment of R1 00 to Subco, instead of Subco transferring its assessed loss of Rl 00 to Holdco. As 
both companies now have taxable income of RO, no tax will be paid by any of the group 
companies. Group profit attributable to shareholders of Holdco equals RO, and minority 
shareholders of Subco are similarly entitled to a profit share of RO. When this situation is 
compared with the situation in section 1.3.2.2, it becomes clear that value of R25 has been 
transferred from Holdco shareholders to minority shareholders in Subco without any commercial 
justification. This causes subvention payment systems seldom to be employed in practice. 
Consequently, they will not be examined further in this study. Significantly, the Katz 
Commission also did not consider subvention payment systems. 
1.3.3 Group taxation and minority shareholdings in subsidiaries 
The fundamental reason for a system of group taxation is that it brings tax entities and economic 
entities into alignment. However, the presence of minority shareholders within a closely held 
group potentially creates a problem. Although such a group clearly constitutes a single economic 
entity, the existence of separate and distinct ownership interests cannot be denied. 
Consider the example of a holding company, Holdco, which holds 75% of the shares in a 
subsidiary company, Subco. The extent of Holdco's shareholding in Subco clearly leads to the 
conclusion that the group, and not the individual companies, is the economic unit. Nevertheless, 
two different ownership interests can be identified. The first ownership interest is the 
shareholders of Holdco, who participate in 100% of the assets and profits of Holdco and in 75% 
of the assets and profits and of Subco (through Holdco's shareholding in Subco ). The second 
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ownership interest is the minority shareholders in Subco, who participate in 25% of the assets and 
profits of Subco. The question may be asked whether a group tax system which treats the Holdco 
group as a single economic entity will not prejudice the minority shareholders of Subco by 
disregarding them as a separate ownership interest. 
With regard to loss transfer systems, the example discussed in section 1.3.2.2 clearly illustrates 
how the payment of compensation for the transfer of assessed losses between group companies 
will prevent unfair treatment of minority shareholders in group subsidiaries. 
With regard to consolidation systems, it is possible to devise methods for the allocation of the 
total group tax liability between individual group companies which will not systematically 
prejudice minority shareholders of group subsidiaries. For example, the following alternative 
allocation methods, based on the consolidation system operative in the United States of Amgrica, 
may be employed: 
• The tax liability of the group can be proportionally allocated to individual group companies 
on the basis of the contribution of each company to the consolidated taxable income. 
• The total tax liability ofthe group can be determined as ifthere is no consolidated return. The 
ratio which the tax liability of each group member, calculated in this manner, bears to the 
total unconsolidated tax liability is then applied to the actual consolidated tax liability. 
• The group tax liability can be allocated according to any other method which is approved by 
the Revenue Service (Hurst & Stermer, 1994: 21). 
Under the above-mentioned allocation system, a group qualifying for consolidated group tax 
treatment will be allowed to elect the specific allocation method applicable to it. 
The first two methods will achieve a reasonable allocation of the group tax liability between the 
individual group companies. This does not necessarily imply that the allocation will result in 
different ownership interests bearing the exact tax charge that they would have borne if 
individual group companies were taxed separately. Consider once again the example of the group 
consisting of Holdco and its 75% held subsidiary, Subco. Assume that Holdco earns taxable 
income of R200 in both years 1 and 2, while Subco earns taxable income of R1 00 during each of 
11. 5. 
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such years. In arriving at the taxable of Subco for year 1, a loss of R20 on the sale of stock to 
Holdco has been deducted. None of this stock is sold by Holdco during year 1, giving rise to an 
unrealised loss ofR20 from a group perspective. All of the stock is sold by Holdco during year 2, 
causing the previously unrealised loss of R20 to be realised from a group perspective. 
The consolidated taxable income of the group for year 1 is R320 (R200 + R100 + R20). 
Assuming a tax rate of 30%, the consolidated tax liability amounts to R96 (R320 * 30%). If the 
consolidated liability is allocated to the individual group companies on the basis of their 
contribution to the consolidated taxable income, Holdco will incur a liability of R60 [R200 I 
(R200 + RlOO + R20) * R96], while Subco will incur a liability ofR36 [(R100 + R20) I (R200 + 
R100 + R20) * R96]. The tax charge borne by the shareholders of Holdco (as one of the two 
distinct ownership interests) will equal R87 (R60 + R36 * 75%), while the tax charge borne by 
the minority shareholders in Subco will equal R9 (R36 * 25%). 
If the group companies were taxed separately, Holdco's taxable income and tax charge would be 
R200 and R60 respectively, while the corresponding amounts for Subco would be R1 00 and R30. 
The tax charge borne by the shareholders of Ho1dco would amount to R82.50 (R60 + R30 * 
75%), and the charge borne by minority shareholders in Subco would equal R7.50 (R30 * 25%). 
Under the consolidation system the shareholders of Holdco incur an additional tax charge of 
R4.50 (R87.00- R82.50) during year 1, which represents their share of the tax on the unrealised 
profit (R20 *30% * 75%). The minority shareholders of Subco incur an additional charge of 
R1.50 (R9.00- R7.50), which similarly represents their portion of the tax on the unrealised profit 
(R20 * 30% * 25%). 
It can be demonstrated that the consolidation system results in a year 2 tax charge which is 
reduced by R4.50 and R1.50 for Holdco shareholders and Subco minority shareholders 
respectively. This is because of the subsequent realisation of the loss ofR20 outside the group. 
Although the cumulative tax effect for the different ownership interests over the two-year period 
is the same, whether a consolidation system is employed or not, timing differences exist within 
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this period. Minority shareholders in Subco are prejudiced to a certain extent, as they incur a loss 
of R5 (R20 * 25%) during year 1 arising from a transaction with a separate and distinct 
ownership interest, for which tax relief is delayed until year 2. However, it can be argued that in 
cases where Subco profitably sells stock to Holdco, the minority shareholders in Subco will 
benefit from the fact that taxation of such profits will effectively be delayed until the profits are 
realised outside the group. 
Furthermore, instead of allocating the group tax liability on the basis of the individual 
companies' contribution to the consolidated taxable income, the group can opt for a unique 
method approved by the Revenue Service, which will place minority shareholders of subsidiaries 
in the position that they would have been in if the group companies were taxed separately. Thus, 
R30 of the group tax liability in both years 1 and 2 can be allocated to Subco. This causes the 
minorit) shareholders of Subco to incur a yearly tax charge of R7.50 (R30 * 25%), which is 
equal to the tax charge which they would have borne if Subco was taxed separately. The 
remaining R66 (R96 - R30) of the group tax liability during year 1 will be allocated to Holdco, 
resulting in a tax charge ofR88.50 (R66 + R30 * 75%) being incurred by Holdco shareholders. In 
effect Holdco shareholders will assume an additional charge of Rl.50 (R88.50- R87.00) in year 
1 to compensate the minority shareholders of Subco for the consolidation system's disregard of 
separate ownership interests. Note that the year 2 tax charge borne by Holdco shareholders will 
be reduced by a commensurate amount, as they will receive the tax benefit of Subco minorities' 
portion of the now realised loss in return for accepting the full tax charge relating to the reversal 
of the unrealised loss during year 1. Shareholders in Holdco may be content to endure what is 
essentially a timing disadvantage so that the other advantages of a consolidation system can be 
enjoyed. 
Finally, in the absence of a system of group taxation, groups may shift income between 
individual group companies to accelerate the utilisation of assessed losses. Where the 
transactions through which income shifting is effected have scant economic rationale, the 
unjustified intra-group transfer of value will represent a far greater prejudice to certain ownership 
interests. 
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1.4 CANONS OF TAXATION 
1. 4.1 Introduction 
The canons of taxation are the general principles to which any system of taxation should adhere. 
These canons establish a theoretical ideal that will seldom be fully attained in practice (V an 
Schalkwyk, 1997: 7). Nevertheless, they provide a measure by which the shortcomings of an 
existing tax system can be identified, and by which proposals for reform can be evaluated. It is 
therefore necessary to elaborate briefly on the canons of taxation, as they will be employed to 
decide whether the present lack of a group tax regime in South Africa is tenable, and if not, to 
determine a form of group taxation that is suitable to our circumstances. 
Many classifications ofthe canons oftaxation have been attempted. For the purpose of this work, 
the following canons will be referred to: 
• equity; 
• neutrality; 
• efficiency of collection; 
• administrative cost; and 
• simplicity and certainty . 
1. 4. 2 Equity 
Equity refers to the distribution of the tax burden - each taxpayer should pay his fair share. Two 
notions of equity exist, namely the benefit principle and the principle of ability to pay. Following 
the first principle, taxes should be levied in accordance with the value of public goods and 
services received by taxpayers. Following the second principle, taxes should be levied in 
accordance with the economic well-being of taxpayers. The latter principle is widely regarded as 
being more equitable than the former, and consequently most taxes are levied according to it 
(South Africa, 1987: 51). 
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In addressing the question of ability to pay, it is customary to distinguish between horizontal and 
vertical equity. Horizontal equity requires that persons in the same situation be treated equally, 
while vertical equity requires that those in different circumstances bear appropriately different tax 
burdens (South Africa, 1987: 51). For the purpose of this study horizontal equity is particularly 
relevant, in the sense that a closely held group, which can be viewed as a single economic entity, 
should be treated in the same way as a divisionalised company. Our tax jurisdiction, however, 
often achieves exactly the opposite result by treating individual companies within a group as 
separate taxable entities. 
1.4.3 Neutrality 
Neutrality requires that people should not be influenced by the tax system to choose one course 
of action rather than another, solely or predominantly because their tax position is better under 
one of the options (South Africa, 1987: 50). Tax should not act as an artificial incentive to change 
business practices. If it does, the result will be reduced output and a less efficient use ofresources 
(Stoltz, 1987: 30). 
A tax jurisdiction that does not recognize a closely held group as a single tax entity may 
jeopardize neutrality. The reason for this is that transactions between individual group members 
will have tax effects, although they essentially occur within the same economic unit. Transactions 
between group members often do not have to be executed at arm's length, because their 
economic interests do not conflict. Consequently, intra-group transactions may be motivated by 
opportunities for tax avoidance instead of other commercial reasons. Conversely, otherwise 
commercially sound intra-group transactions may not be entered into because of the adverse tax 
effect that they will have from a group perspective. 
1.4.4 Efficiency of collection 
A taxation system is efficient if it succeeds in collecting the intended tax burden. To be 
efficient,the system should be reasonably equitable to ensure the loyalty and cooperation of 
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taxpayers (Stoltz, 1987: 30). Another requirement for an effective system is that it should not 
over-extend the administrative capacity of the tax authorities. Where this capacity is already 
strained, as is the case in South Africa, the system must be simple to administer. 
1. 4. 5 Administrative cost 
The matter of administrative cost should be considered in relation to the tax authorities as well as 
taxpayers. With regard to the tax authorities, administration costs are incurred in establishing and 
maintaining collection agencies and in dealing with offenders. With regard to taxpayers, costs are 
incurred in complying with the system and in optimising tax positions (South Africa, 1987: 51). 
The administrative cost of a system of taxation should be minimised as far as possible. As Adam 
Smith stated: "Every tax ought to be so contrived as to take out and keep out of the pockets of the 
people as little as possible over and above what it brings in to the public treasury of state" (Stoltz, 
1987: 36). However, a fine balance must be maintained between administration costs on the one 
hand and effectiveness on the other. If too few resources are devoted to the proper collection of 
taxes, avoidance will most likely increase, thereby reducing effectiveness (Stoltz, 1987: 36). 
1. 4. 6 Simplicity and certainty 
Taxes should be certain and simple both in concept and collection. Simplicity requires that a tax 
should be easily assessed, collected and administered. The more complex a tax system, the 
greater the administrative cost. Certainty requires that a taxpayer should not be in doubt of his tax 
liability in any given set of circumstances. Uncertainty results in additional compliance costs by 
way of consultation fees to tax advisers and litigation costs. Furthermore, uncertainty may cause 
the delay or cancellation of potential business transactions (South Africa, 198 7: 51). 
A balance needs to be struck between simplicity and certainty. On the one hand, it is necessary 
that rules and procedures should be as simple as possible. On the othgr hand, the ideal of 
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certainty often demands that many components of the tax system be codified m laws and 
regulations of inevitable complexity (South Africa, 1994: 1 0) 
1.4. 7 Interdependencies and conflicts between the canons of taxation 
From the above discussion of the different canons, it is clear that several interdependencies exist 
between them. These interrelationships often result in a blurring between the individual canons to 
the extent that any distinction between them appears artificial. Nevertheless, the distinction is 
necessary to facilitate rigorous and disciplined analysis. 
Several conflicts between the different canons are also evident. Compromises must inevitably be 
made between these conflicts, and consequently the design of an ideal system is virtually 
impossible. To compound the above-mentioned problem, there is no objective set of rules for 
determining how the compromises should be made. Rather, trade-offs are determined by a host of 
economic, political and social factors unique to each tax jurisdiction. As a result the whole 
process of tax reform becomes immensely challenging. 
1.5 PURPOSE, METHOD AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
I . 5.1 Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the desirability of a system of group taxation in South 
Africa against the background of the canons of taxation, with the objective of commenting on the 
key proposals of the Katz Commission in this regard. 
In Chapter 2 the present tax treatment of South African groups is investigated. The focus falls on 
the tax effects of intra-group transactions, as this aspect differentiates groups from divisionalised 
companies. Relevant provisions of the South African Income Tax Act are examined. Court cases 
dealing with the tax effects of intra-group transactions are elaborated upon. Finally, the canons of 
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taxation are employed to evaluate the status quo, and the conclusion is drawn that the present 
lack of group taxation creates a highly unsatisfactory situation. 
In Chapter 3, three diverse policy issues are examined. Firstly, divisionalisation is discussed as a 
viable alternative to group taxation for avoiding the tax anomalies caused by the present tax 
treatment of groups. Secondly, the chapter investigates whether a system of group taxation can be 
justified in the light of the limited liability of individual companies, bearing in mind that 
divisions of a single company do not enjoy a similar benefit. Finally, the possibility that a system 
of group taxation will encourage concentration of economic control and ownership is examined. 
In Chapter 4 consolidation systems are compared with loss transfer systems, by employing the 
canons of taxation as a theoretical framework. It is concluded that a consolidation system of 
group taxation represents a more satisfactory trade-off between the canons than a loss transfer 
system or the status quo. 
Chapter 5 summarises the proposals of the Katz Commission concerning group taxation and 
evaluates these proposals with reference to the conclusions reached in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 6 is devoted to a general summary of the study and a conclusion. 
1.5.2 Method 
The method followed in this work is that of a literature study. Literature consulted includes local 
and foreign tax legislation, textbooks, studies undertaken by overseas research institutions and 
local commissions, articles published in legal and business periodicals and relevant court cases. 
In addition, interviews were conducted with members of the subcommittee of the Katz 
Commission concerned with group taxation. Minutes of their meetings were also consulted. 
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1.5.3 Scope 
The scope of this study is limited in two ways. 
Firstly, the issue of group tax will only be addressed on a conceptual level, with the focus being 
on broad principles and policy issues instead of the detailed design and implementation of a 
specific system for South Africa. Although the Katz Commission is in favour of group taxation, 
the government has not yet responded to its recommendation. Significantly, the South African 
Revenue Service is very sceptical towards group taxation. As consensus has not yet been reached 
about the desirability of such a system for South Africa, it would be pointless to elevate the 
debate to the level of detailed design and implementation at this stage. 
Secondly, the types of tax that will be considered are limited to normal tax and secondary tax on 
companies. 
1.6SUMMARY 
Chapter 1 established the building blocks necessary for developing the arguments contained in 
the following chapters. The concept of groups was examined and the purpose and forms of group 
taxation were explained. Furthermore, the canons of taxation were discussed as they will serve as 
a tool for evaluation of the status quo and the proposals for reform. Finally, the purpose, method 
and scope of this work were set out. 
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2 PRESENT TAX TREATMENT OF GROUPS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Transactions between different divisions of the same company do not have tax effects, because 
the company, instead of its divisions, is treated as the taxable entity. On the other hand, 
transactions between different group companies do have tax effects, because the individual 
companies, instead of the group, are treated as the taxable entities. This chapter will examine the 
tax effects of certain intra-group transactions and will evaluate the impact of such tax effects on 
the canons of taxation. 
2.2 GENERAL INCOME/EXPENDITURE 
2. 2. 1 Introduction 
For the purposes of this work, general income/expenditure transactions refer to those transactions 
where the separate legs are recorded for accounting purposes as income and expenditure 
rgspectively. In addition, the inclusion of the income leg of such transactions in gross income is 
governed by the general definition of gross income in section 1 of the South African Income Tax 
Act (1962), hereafter referred to as "the Act". Finally, the deduction of the expenditure leg is 
governed by section 11(a), the general deduction formula, and section 23(g), which prohibits the 
deduction of non-trade expenditure. Examples of general income/expenditure transactions are 
intra-group interest, rentals and management fees. 
Various anomalies can occur with regard to general income/expenditure transactions. Such 
anomalies can be categorised as: 
• timing mismatches; 
• taxability/deductibility mismatches due to the non-satisfaction of certain requirements 
of sections 11(a) and 23(g) that are not echoed in the general definition of gross 
income; and 
• taxability/deductibility mismatches due to capitaVrevenue differences. 
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2.2.2 Relevant sections of the Act 
2.2.2.1 Section 1 - the general definition of gross income 
The general definition of gross income in section 1 of the Act states that "gross income, in 
relation to any year of assessment, means, in the case of any person, the total amount, in cash or 
otherwise, received by or accrued to or in favour of such a person during such year or period of 
assessment from a source within or deemed to be within the Republic, excluding receipts or 
accruals of a capital nature ... " Thus, before an amount, in cash or otherwise, can be included in a 
person's gross income, it must satisfy all of the following restrictive requirements: 
• The amount must be received by or have accrued to the person during the year of 
assessment in which it is to be included. 
• The amount must be from a source within or deemed to be within the Republic . 
• The amount may not be of a capital nature. 
2.2.2.2 Section 11(a)- the general deduction formula 
Section 11(a) of the Act states that "for the purpose of determining the taxable income derived by 
any person from carrying on any trade within the Republic, there shall be allowed as deductions 
from the income of such person so derived, expenditure and losses actually incurred in the 
Republic in the production of the income, provided such expenditure and losses are not of a 
capital nature." Thus, before expenditure or losses can be deducted, they must satisfy the 
following restrictive requirements: 
• The expenditure or losses must be actually incurred. 
• The expenditure and losses must be in the production of income derived from any 
trade carried on in the Republic. 
• The expenditure and losses may not be of a capital nature. 
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Although not specifically required by section 11(a), it was determined in Concentra (Pty) Ltd v 
CIR (1942) that expenditure or losses can only be deducted in the particular year of assessment in 
which they were actually incurred. 
2.2.2.3 Section 23(g)- prohibition of the deduction ofnon-trade expenditure 
Section 23(g) of the Act provided as follows before its amendment in 1992: "No deductions shall 
in any case be made in respect of ... any monies claimed as a deduction from income derived 
from trade, which are not wholly and exclusively laid out or expended for the purposes of trade." 
This wording embodied an all-or-nothing approach, as a deduction would be disallowed if any 
portion of expenditure was not incurred for the purposes of trade (Moo sa & Omar, 1998: 18). If 
expenditure was incurred for a dual purpose, section 23(g) would come into effect, irrespective of 
the fact that the non-trade purpose might have been secondary or insignificant. Furthermore, 
considerable difficulty was often experienced in distinguishing between instances where 
expenditure was exclusively incurred for the purposes of trade but produced incidental non-trade 
effects and instances where expenditure was incurred with a dual purpose in view. 
Because of the inevitable inequity and uncertainty created by the previous wording of section 
23(g), it was amended in 1992 to read as follows : "No deductions shall in any case be made in 
respect of any moneys, claimed as a deduction from income derived from trade, to the extent to 
which such moneys were not laid out or expended for the purposes of trade." Section 23(g) in its 
present form therefore provides for the apportionment of expenditure between its trade and non-
trade components and only prohibits a deduction in respect of the non-trade component (Huxham 
& Haupt, 1997: 71). 
It should be noted that section 11(a) also contains a trade requirement by stating that expenditure 
and losses to be deducted under that section must be incurred in the production of income derived 
from trade. Section 23(g) therefore elaborates on the trade requirement of section 11(a), by 
addressing the case where expenditure or losses are incurred for both trade and non-trade 
purposes. 
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2.2.2.4 Comparison of the requirements with regard to inclusions in gross income and deductions 
When the general definition of gross income in section 1 is compared to the general deduction 
formula in section ll(a), the following similarities can be identified: 
• Both provisions contain timing requirements. The general definition of gross income 
states that an amount shall be included in gross income during the year in which that 
amount was received by or accrued to a person. With regard to the general deduction 
formula, it was established in Concentra that expenditure and losses shall be deducted 
in the year of assessment in which they are actually incurred. 
• Both provisions exclude amounts of a capital nature. 
The following differences exist with regard to the restrictive requirements of the two provisions: 
• The general definition of gross income contains certain source requirements. These 
requirements are not particularly relevant for the purposes of this work. The reason is 
that these requirements merely establish the method by which taxable amounts are 
captured in the South African tax net. A group tax regime will not influence this 
method. Instead, it will deal with taxable amounts so captured within a group context. 
• The general deduction fonnula, as qualified by section 23(g), states that expenditure 
and losses will only be deductible if incurred in the production of income derived 
from a South African trade. 
The remainder of section 2.2 will demonstrate how the differences as well as the apparent 
similarities between the restrictive requirements of the general definition of gross income and the 
general deduction formula can produce tax anomalies within a group context. 
2. 2. 3 Timing mismatches 
The general definition of gross income states that an amount will be included in a person's gross 
income in the year of assessment in which it is received by or has accrued to that person. The 
word "or" in the phrase "received by or accrued to" implies that two separate nets are cast out -
one for all amounts received by a taxpayer, and the other for all amounts accrued to that taxpayer. 
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However there is a necessary implication against double taxation in instances where an amount is 
received by and accrues to a taxpayer in different years of assessment (CIR v Delfos, 1933). 
"Received" means received by the taxpayer in his personal capacity and for his own benefit 
(Geldenhuys v CIR, 1947). "Accrued" means that the taxpayer has become unconditionally 
entitled to the amount (CIR v People's Stores (Walvis Bay) (Pty) Ltd, 1990). 
Concerning the phrase "actually incurred", which is used in the general deduction formula, it was 
established in Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway Co Ltd v CIR ( 1936) that "actually incurred" 
cannot mean actually paid. So long as the liability to pay the expense has been actually incurred, 
it may be claimed as a deduction. In Nasionale Pers Bpk v KBI (1986), it was further stated that 
the phrase in question implied an absolute and unconditional legal liability. 
An interesting point that emerges when the phrase "received by or accrued to" is compared to the 
phrase "actually incurred", is that the latter does not include the word "paid" as in "actually paid 
or incurred by". This raises the question whether timing differences can arise in the case of 
general income/expenditure transactions. The examination of the facts of ITC 675 (1949) will 
provide an answer. The taxpayer in that case supplied day-old chickens to its customers and 
required payments to be made in advance before orders would be executed. The matter to be 
decided was whether deposits held by the taxpayer at year-end in respect of unexecuted orders 
were "received" by him. It was clear that the deposits had not accrued to the taxpayer, as he 
would only become unconditionally entitled to them once the chickens were delivered to 
customers. 
The Court stated that the only instance in which the deposits would not be received by the 
taxpayer was where such deposits were held in trust for repayment to its customers on the 
contingency that their orders were not fulfilled . The Court referred to the fact that the deposits 
were oerged into the general funds of the company and could be utilised in the company's 
business as it pleased, and concluded that the deposits were not held in trust. Consequently, such 
deposits were received by the taxpayer within the meaning of the general definition of gross 
mcome. 
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Assuming that the taxpayer and its customers had corresponding years of assessment, it is 
unlikely that the deposits in question would be expenditure actually incurred during that 
particular year of assessment. Because customers could claim refunds in case of non-delivery of 
chickens, they did not incur an absolute and unqualified liability at year-end. 
The conditional payment of a deposit between two group members, which is not held in trust by 
the receiver, may therefore have anomalous tax results. From a group perspective, such a 
payment represents a zero net cash flow. And although the inclusion of the receipt in taxable 
income in one year of assessment will be followed by the deduction of the corresponding 
expenditure in a succeeding year of assessment, the delayed deduction will produce a negative 
net present value of tax cash flows . The payment of a deposit between two divisions of a single 
company, on the other hand, will produce no such effect. 
2.2.4 Taxability/deductibility mismatches due to non-compliance with the production of income 
and trade requirements of section JJ(a) and 23(g) 
2.2.4.1 Introduction 
Section ll(a) requires that expenditure or losses must be incurred in the production of income 
derived from trade before such expenditure or losses will be deductible. Section 23(g) prohibits 
the deduction of monies, claimed as a deduction from income derived from trade, to the extent to 
which such monies were not laid out or expended for the purposes of trade. Similar requirements 
are not contained in the general definition of gross income. Consequently, expenditure in respect 
of a general income/expenditure transaction must overcome additional hurdles before a tax 
neutral result will be achieved from a group perspective. 
Intra-group tax anomalies with regard to the production of income and trade requirements of 
sections ll(a) and 23(g) may arise in two instances. The first instance is where an expense or loss 
is not deductible by the group company that incurred it, because the production of income and 
trade requirement are not satisfied at all, while the corresponding receipt/accrual is included in 
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another group company's gross income. The second instance is where an expense or loss is not 
deductible by the group company that incurred it (while the corresponding receipt/accrual is 
included in another group company's gross income), because the production of income and trade 
requirements are not satisfied in relation to the group company that incurred the expenditure, 
although it may be satisfied in relation the other group company or the group as a whole. 
2.2.4.2 Instances where expenditure or losses do not satisfy the production of income or trade 
requirements of sectiorl ;:; 11 (a) and 23(g) at all 
The application of the phrase "expenditure incurred in the production of incooe derived from 
trade" was explained by Watermeyer AJP in Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway Co Ltd v CIR 
(1936). He stated that, in the ordinary sense, it is not expenditure that produces income, but rather 
business operations and that expenditure is attendant upon these operations. To determine 
whether expenditure is incurred in the production of income derived from trade, it must be 
ascertained whether the related operation produces income. The answer will be in the affirmative 
if the operation is done bona fide for the purpose r f carrying on the trade that earns income. The 
expenses attendant on the performance of that operation will then be deductible. The question of 
how closely the expenses must be linked to the business operation was answered as follows by 
Watermeyer: " .. .in my opinion, all expenses attached to the performance of a business operation 
bona fidg performed for the purpose of earning income are deductible whether such expenses are 
necessary for its performance or attached to it by chance or are bona fide incurred for the more 
efficient performance of such operations provided they are so closely connected with it that they 
may be regarded as part of the cost of performing it." 
Ordinary business expenditure should satisfy the production of income and trade requirements 
relatively easily. Such expenditure will fall under the category of expenses necessary for the 
performance of business operations, or the category of expenses incurred bona fide for the more 
efficient performance of such operations. However, the remaining category of business expenses, 
namely expenses attached to business operations by chance, may experience difficulty in 
satisfying the requirements in question of section l l(a) and section 23(g). An example of such 
expenditure is damages payable due to negligence. Perhaps the most authoritative test to be 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
25 
applied to such expenditure was laid down in COT v Rendle (1965). In that case, it was decided 
that with regard to accidental expenditure, it is the risk of the mishap giving rise to the 
expenditure, instead of the expenditure itself, which must be closely linked with the business 
operations. Otherwise, the reference to accidental expenditure in Port Elizabeth Electrical 
Tramways would have been without any purpose. In addressing the issue of how close the risk 
must be to the business operations, Beadle CJ stated that "it should be inseparable from or a 
necessary incident of the carrying on of the particular business". 
An earlier case, Joffe & Co (Pty) Ltd v CIR (1946), specifically dealt with the deductibility of 
damages arising from negligence. The taxpayer in question was a construction engineer who was 
liable for damages as result of an accident caused by faulty construction. Watermeyer CJ 
disallowed the expenditure on the grounds that "there is nothing in the stated case to suggest that 
such negligence, and the consequent liability which the negligence entailed, were necessary 
concomitants of the trading operations of a construction engineer". It can be said that the test 
formulated in Joffe with regard to damages is a specific version of the general test formulated in 
Rendle with regard to all incidental expenditure, as damages are a specific form of accidental 
expenditure, while negligence is a specific mishap giving rise to accidental expenditure. 
The general definition of gross income contains no requirement similar to the production of 
income and trade requirements of sections 11 (a) and 23(g). Thus, it may happen in the case of an 
incidental payment made by one group company to another that the amount received by the one 
company will be taxable, while the corresponding payment will not be deductible by the other 
because of failing the tests formulated in Rendle and Joffe. 
2.2.4.3 Instances where expenditure or losses do not satisfy the production of income or trade 
requirements of sections ll(a) and 23(g) in relation to the group companies that incurred them 
It may happen that a group company incurs expenditure for purposes of the group's trade. In such 
an instance, the expenditure in question may not satisfy the production of income and trade 
requirements in relation to the particular company that incurred the expenditure. The narrow 
application of the production of income and trade tests to separate group companies is illustrated 
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in the following two cases, namely ITC 648 (1947) and Van Leer Packaging (Rhodesia) (Pvt.) 
Ltd. V COT (1970). 
ITC 648 
This particular case examined the question whether a payment made by a holding company to its 
subsidiary to recoup losses sustained by the latter was an allowable deduction under section 
14(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act of 1941. The issue that had to be decided was if the payment was 
made for purposes of the holding company's trade. 
The facts of the case can be described as follow. In accordance with an arrangement made 
between the holding company and its subsidiary, goods sold by the subsidiary to third parties 
were charged at cost plus 10%, while goods sold by the subsidiary to the holding company were 
charged at cost plus 2,5%. The holding company made a payment of £4 060 to the subsidiary, 
representing compensation for the accumulated losses incurred by the latter during the two years 
ended on 30 June 1944 and 1945 respectively. It was claimed that the accumulated losses 
incurred by the subsidiary during this period were entirely attributable to the low rate at which 
goods were sold by it to the holding company. 
The Court stated that the only way in which the payment could be regarded as being incurred for 
purposes of the holding company's trade was if the separate personality of the subsidiary was 
disregarded, and that such disregard would be inappropriate. Viewing the holding company in 
isolation, the Court concluded that the payment was made not because of the strength of a moral 
claim to correct an erroneous charge, but because the interests in both companies were identical 
and it was a convenient way of dealing with the matter of the accumulated losses. (Concerning 
the last finding, the Court probably alluded to the shifting of income between group members to 
accelerate the utilisation of assessed losses.) It was further held that the amount was not laid out 
for the taxpayer's business, but that it was laid out as a contribution to assist the subsidiary in its 
business. Because the payment was therefore not made for purposes of the holding company's 
trade, it was not allowed as a deduction. 
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The amount received by the subsidiary was almost certainly included in the gross income of the 
subsidiary, as it would have satisfied all the requirements for inclusion contained in the general 
definition of gross income. 
As an aside, the Court remarked that an initial agreement of a different kind might have resulted 
in the granting of a deduction. If, for instance, the holding company and its subsidiary agreed that 
the initial price would be cost price plus 2,5%, but that an additional amount would be paid to the 
subsidiary to enable it to run at a profit, then the payment, being contractually claimable in 
accordance with the original bargain, would have been made for purposes of the holding 
company's trade. This argument of the Court contains an element of artificiality. The special 
relationship that exists between group companies eliminates the need for the conclusion of formal 
agreements in advance of transactions. By requiring compliance with such formalities as a 
condition for deductibility of the payment, the commercial flexibility inherent in group 
relationships is significantly compromisgd. 
Van Leer Packaging (Rhodesia) (Pvt.) Ltd. v Commissioner of Taxes 
This case dealt with the deductibility of amounts paid by the taxpayer to its holding company in 
respect of experiments and research carried out by other group companies for the benefit of the 
group as a whole. The cost of the experiments and research was charged out by the research 
companies to the holding company. The latter then apportioned the cost against other members of 
the group. Previously, individual companies within the group had conducted their own research, 
but this was found to be uneconomical and consequently the above arrangement was devised. 
Although any member of the group confronted with a specific problem could refer it to one of the 
research depots, no group company had the right to insist that work had to be done in any 
particular field or on any particular problem. During the year of assessment for which a deduction 
was claimed by V an Leer in respect of its contribution to the group's cost of research and 
development, no research work was carried out at Van Leer's request. 
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The court firstly examined the issue whether the contribution was deductible under a section 
which specifically dealt with research and development costs. For reasons of interpretation not 
relevant to this study, it was decided that the contribution did not qualify for deduction under that 
section. The court then directed its attention to the possibility of a deduction under section 
14(2)(a) of the Rhodesian Income Tax Act (which was very similar to section ll(a) of the present 
South African Act) . In its judgement on the matter, the Court stated that the contribution did not 
represent the cost of research carried out by the taxpayer in its personal capacity, or the cost of 
research carried out by an independent contractor at the specific request of the taxpayer. It was 
further stated that the onus rested on V an Leer to establish on a balance of probabilities that the 
contribution was expended for the purposes of its trade and in the production of its income. The 
Court concluded that the evidence led by Van Leer did not assist in discharging the onus on any 
of these points. On the contrary, it indicated that much ofthe research was not concerned with the 
income-earning operations or even the income-earning structure of the taxpayer, but rather with 
the income-earning structure of the group when considered as a whole and independently of its 
constituent members. Consequently, the expenditure was held to be non-deductible by V an Leer 
under the general deduction formula. 
The trade test contained in section ll(a) and expanded by section 23(g) is essentially an 
economic test. As such, it should be applied to economic entities, instead of legal sub-entities. As 
can be seen from this case, and other cases which will follow, the treatment of individual group 
companies as taxable entities leads to the application of the trade test to legal sub-units within the 
economic unit. This may produce anomalous tax results, as will be illustrated by an analysis of 
the operational cash flows and their tax effects in the case under discussion. 
The operational cash flows resulting from the arrangement in the V an Leer case are presented in 
Table 2.1, assuming that the amount of Van Leer's contribution was R 100 and that the associated 
cost incurred by the research company was also RI 00. 
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Table 2.1 
Van Leer Packaging (Rhodesia) (Pvt.) Ltd. v CoT: hypothetical operational cash flows of 
the arrangement with regard to group companies 
Van Leer Holding Research Group 
company company 
Costs incurred - - (100) (100) 
by research 
company 
Amount - (100) 100 -
charged to 
holding 
company 
Contribution (100) 100 - -
by Van Leer 
Net cash flows (100) - - (100) 
As can be seen from the above table, Van Leer effectively financed the research cost. The 
holding company merely served as a channel through which the contribution was directed from 
the ultimate bearer of the cost, namely Van Leer, to the initial incurror of that cost, namely the 
research company. 
With regard to the tax effects of the arrangement, the Court held that Van Leer was not entitled to 
a deduction of its contribution. The Court did not consider the positions of the holding company 
and the research company, and it is therefore necessary to venture an opinion as to the tax 
implications of the arrangement on these entities. The research company probably had to include 
the amount received from the holding company in its gross income, as it would have constituted a 
normal trade receipt. If the costs incurred by the research company were of a revenue nature, they 
would have been deductible under the general deduction formula, as they represented a normal 
cost of its business of research. 
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The holding company's position poses an interesting problem. If it is assumed that the holding 
company did not act as an agent of the research company by merely collecting amounts for the 
latter, the contribution received by it from V an Leer would be included in its gross income. 
However, the amount paid over to the research company would not be deductible under the 
general deduction formula for the same reason advanced in the V an Leer case, namely that the 
research was conducted for the benefit of the group and not for the specific benefit of the holding 
company. If, on the other hand, it is assumed that the holding company acted as the agent of the 
research company, the transaction would have no tax implications for the holding company, as 
the contribution would not have accrued to it or have been received by it within the meaning of 
the general definition of gross income. For the sake of clarity, the tax results of the arrangement 
under the two alternatives will be presented in the Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 . 
Table 2.2 
Van Leer Packaging (Rhodesia) (Pvt) Ltd v CoT: tax effects of the arrangement, assuming 
that the holding company did not act as an agent of the research company 
Van Leer Holding Research Group 
company company 
Gross income - 100 100 200 
Deductions - - (100) (100) 
Taxable - 100 - 100 
income 
Incremental - 30 - 30 
tax at 30% 
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Table 2.3 
Van Leer Packaging (Rhodesia) (Pvt) Ltd v CoT: tax effects of the arrangement, assuming 
that the holding company did act as an agent of the research company 
Van Leer Holding Research Group 
company company 
Gross income - - 100 100 
Deductions - - (100) (100) 
Taxable - - - -
income 
Incremental - - - -
tax at 30% 
If the operational cash flows in respect of the arrangement are compared with the associated tax 
cash flows, it will be realised that the tax effects from a group perspective are extremely 
anomalous. Under both alternatives, the effective operational cash outflow of the group is RI 00, 
representing the actual cost of research incurred by the research company. Under the first 
alternative, the incurrence of research costs by the group leads to the payment of additional 
income tax of R30. Under the second alternative, the tax effect is not as harsh, but it is by no 
means satisfactory. Although the group is not taxed as result of the costs incurred by it, it 
nevertheless receives no tax relief in respect of such costs. 
If the group in question had been a divisionalised company, a separate research and development 
department funded by the various operating departments would have conducted all research 
activities. The research and development department would still not have carried out activities at 
the specific request of each operating department. However, the fact that the costs were incurred 
for the benefit of the company as a whole instead of specific operating divisions would not have 
prohibited a deduction under the general deduction formula, because the company would have 
been treated as the taxable entity. 
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It is clear that the differing tax treatment of groups and divisionalised companies in the above 
example is inequitable. Furthermore, the tax results of the arrangement in the Van Leer case 
might have encouraged the group to conduct its research on a decentralised basis again, thereby 
compromising neutrality and causing a less efficient use of resources. 
2.2.5 Taxability/deductibility mismatches due to capital/revgnue differences 
2.2.5.1 Capital/revenue considerations with regard to gross income 
The general definition of gross income excludes amounts of a capital nature. The distinction 
between capital and revenue can be explained in economic terms by stating that capital is the 
machine or structure that generates income or revenue. In CIR v Visser the example of a tree and 
its fruits was used to illustrate the difference between the two concepts. The tree is employed as a 
capital asset to produce frwit: an amount received by disposing of the fruit will be of a revenue 
nature, while an amount received by realizing the tree will be of a capital nature (Huxham & 
Haupt, 1997: 25). 
No particular difficulty should be experienced in distinguishing between capital and revenue on a 
conceptual level. However, considerable difficulty may be experienced in determining on the 
facts of a particular case whether an amount is in respect of a tree or its fruits. For example, 
income may be produced by way of rents from property, in which case the property is the 
income-producing machine. But income may also be derived from the business of property 
dealing, in which case it is the business of property dealing which is the income-producing 
machine, while amounts received from the disposal of properties will be of a revenue nature 
(Meyerowitz, 1997: 8-3). From this example, it is clear that the nature of the transaction is far 
more important than the nature of the asset in question. 
The nature of a transaction is determined by the intention of the taxpayer (Huxham and 
Haupt, 1997: 25). A taxpayer may dispose of an asset by an operation of business in carrying out 
a scheme for profit making, in which case the proceeds on disposal will be of a revenue nature. 
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Alternatively, a taxpayer may realise an asset as a mere change of investment, in which case the 
proceeds on disposal will be of a capital nature (Overseas Trust Corporation Limited v CIR, 
1926). Over the years the courts have evolved the application of the test of intention into a 
bewildering variety of permutations. Not only must the intention of the taxpayer at the date of 
acquisition of an asset be considered, but also the possibility of a change in intention before 
disposal of the asset (CIR v Stott, 1928; Natal Estates Ltd v CIR, 1975). Furthermore a taxpayer 
may have more than one intention with regard to a particular asset, in which case one intention 
may be dominant (COT v Levy, 1952). In other cases, however, neither intention may be 
dominant, with result that the taxpayer can be described as having a dual intention (Meyerowitz, 
1997: 8-19). To further add to the uncertainty, the following was said by Steyn CJ in CIR v 
African Oxygen Limited: "In so far as cases in our courts decide which factors are to be taken 
into account in dealing with such question ... they are, of course, of assistance, but each case 
must be decided on its own facts and circumstances." 
2.2.5.2 Capital/revenue considerations with regard to the general deduction formula 
The general deduction formula echoes the general definition of gross income by excluding 
expenditure and losses of a capital nature from deductibility. Two prominent cases that dealt with 
the capital/revenue issue in respect of expenditure and losses are CIR v George Forest Timber Co 
(1924) and New State Areas Ltd v CIR (1946). 
In George Forest Timber the difference between capital and revenue expenditure was described 
as follows: "Money spent in creating or acquiring an income-producing concern must be of a 
capital nature. It was invested to yield a future profit and while the outlay did not recur, the 
income did. There was a great difference between money spent in creating or acquiring a source 
of profit, and money spent in working it. The one was capital expenditure, the other was not." 
In New State Areas, Watermeyer CJ stated that expenditure attendant on the performance of 
operations that produce income is of a revenue nature, while expenditure incurred in the 
acquisition, expansion or improvement ofthe means of production (such as property and plant) is 
of a capital nature. With regard to capital expenditure, a further distinction was made bgtween 
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floating and fixed capital. When capital employed in a business is frequently changing its form 
from money to goods and vice versa (for example, the purchase and sale of trading stock by a 
merchant) and this is done for the purpose of making a profit, then the capital so employed is 
floating capital, which will be deductible. Watermeyer remarked that the problem which arises 
when distinguishing between capital and revenue expenditure is usually whether the expenditure 
in question should properly be regarded as the cost of performing the income-earning operations 
or as part of the cost of the income-earning plant or machinery. After considering various tests 
formulated in other cases, he concluded that "the true nature of each transaction must be enquired 
into in order to determine whether the expenditure attached to it is capital or revenue expenditure. 
Its true nature is a matter of fact. .. " 
2.2.5.3 Comparison ofthe considerations 
The tests employed to determine the capital or revenue nature of receipts and accruals, on the one 
hand, and of expenditure, on the other, are very similar conceptually. For example, in the case of 
CIR Visser (which dealt with a receipt) capital assets were referred to as income-producing 
machines while in New State Areas, which dealt with expenditure, an almost identical phrase was 
used to explain the concept of capital expenditure, namely "income-earning plant or machinery". 
The conceptual similarities between the tests employed in the case of receipts/accruals and the 
tests employed in the case of expenditure and losses are to be expected, as the general deduction 
formula concerns itself with the outgoing resulting from the acquisition of an asset, while the 
general definition of gross income concerns itself with the incoming resulting from the disposal 
ofthat asset. 
Other similarities can also be found. With regard to receipts and accruals the test of intention, 
although varied in its application, is a golden thread that runs through the vast majority of cases 
that decided the nature of specific receipts and accruals. With regard to expenditure, the 
previously quoted dictum of Watermeyer CJ in the authoritative New State Areas identified the 
purpose of expenditure as an important factor in determining its true nature. 
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With regard to the significance that can be attached to specific tests formulated in other cases, the 
sentiments of Steyn CJ in African Oxygen, which dealt with a receipt, were echoed by Viscount 
Radcliffe in COT v N'changa Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd (1964), which dealt with 
expenditure, when he said the following: "Nevertheless, it must be remembered that all these 
phrases, as, for instance, 'enduring benefit' or 'capital structure' are essentially descriptive rather 
than definitive, and, as each new case arises for jurisdiction and it is sought to reason by analogy 
from its facts to those of one previously decided, a court's primary duty is to enquire how far a 
description that was both relevant and significant to one set of circumstances is either relevant or 
significant in those which are presently before it." It is therefore clear that the courts will focus 
on the facts of each particular case in deciding the capital or revenue nature of expenditure. The 
guidelines established in other cases will be considered but they will by no means be decisive. 
Although the broad guidelines for distinguishing between capital and revenue receipts/accruals as 
well as capital and revenue expenditure are very similar, the application of such guidelines to the 
opposing legs of a transaction is not coordinated. The case of COT v N' changa Consolidated 
Copper Mines Ltd (1964) is an example of the asynchronous application of the guidelines within 
a group context. 
2.2.5.4 COT v N'changa Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd 
The facts of the case are as follows. N'changa was a mining company that made a payment to a 
fellow subsidiary, Bancroft Mines Ltd, as consideration for taking over a portion of the latter's 
intended mining production for a particular year. The Commissioner of Taxes contended that the 
pay:-.;ent was of a capital nature and therefore not deductible. However, the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council found that the payment was similar to a monetary levy paid on the 
production for a year, and that it should be viewed as a cost incidental to the production and sale 
of N'changa's output. As the payment therefore represented a cost of its income-earning 
operations, rather than a cost of establishing or adding to or improving its income-earning plant 
or machinery, it was held to be of a revenue nature. 
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The Judicial Committee did not consider whether the amount received by Bancroft was of a 
capital or revenue nature. An answer to this question may be found, however, by examining the 
case ofTauber and Corssen (Pty) Ltd v SIR (1975). The taxpayer in that case received an amount 
on the termination of an agency agreement as compensation for refraining from selling similar 
products of competitors of the principal, BASF, for a period of two years. The amount was 
calculated as a percentage of the profits earned from the particular agency agreement in the 
twelve months preceding its termination. The Secretary for Inland Revenue contended that the 
amount was intended to fill a hole in the income of the taxpayer, rather than a hole in his income-
producing machine, and that it consequently was of a revenue nature. The Court, however, found 
that the payment to Tauber and Corssen was made as compensation for neutralising a part of its 
income-producing structure geared towards the selling of products of a particular type, and was 
therefore of a capital nature. The fact that the restraint of trade was effective for two years only, 
and the fact that the compensation was calculated with reference to past profits, was held by the 
Court to be irrelevant. 
In the N'changa Copper case, the Judicial Committee held that the payment made to Bancroft by 
N'changa was for the right to have Bancroft out of production for a period of twelve months. 
Applying the principle established in Tauber and Corssen to that finding, it is difficult to argue 
that the receipt was not of a capital nature in Bancroft's hands. In fact, the Commissioner 
contended in the Federal Supreme Court (N'Changa Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd v CIR, 
1961) that the payment made by N'changa must be of a capital nature because the amount 
received by Bancroft was of a capital nature (N'Changa Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd v COT, 
1962). Clayden CJ responded as follows to that contention: "I do not propose to discuss 
Bancroft's position. Assuming that it was a capital receipt, that fact has no real bearing on 
Nchanga's liability for tax." 
The tax result in the N' changa case is extremely anomalous. The group of which N' changa and 
Ban croft were members received a deduction in respect of the payment made by N' changa, 
without having to include Bancroft's corresponding receipt in gross income. It experienced a zero 
net cash flow with regard to the intra-group payment, but received tax relief nevertheless. 
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The anomalies with regard to the capital or revenue nature of corresponding amounts will not 
always be in favour of taxpayers. It may happen that the expenditure component of an intra-group 
transaction is viewed as capital, while the receipt/accrual component thereof is viewed as income. 
By not coordinating decisions about the nature of income and corresponding expenditure that 
arise from intra-group transactions, a fertile ground for tax anomalies is created. Commercial 
reality dictates that transactions are often infinitely complex in both design and execution, 
resulting in a multitude of attendant facts and circumstances. When the parties to a transaction are 
viewed in isolation, it is possible that different facts and circumstances will be considered in each 
case, or that the same facts and circumstances will be interpreted differently, resulting in 
conflicting decisions about the nature of the amount in question. 
2.3 COSTS INCURRED IN RESPECT OF THE PROVISION OF INTRA-GROUP SERVICES 
2. 3.1 Introduction 
Section 2.3 will consider the tax implications of the costs incurred by a group company m 
providing a service to another group company, whereas section 2.2 considered the tax 
implications of the relevant intra-group transaction. The deductibility of such costs revolves 
around an application of the production of income and trade requirements of sections ll(a) and 
23(g). An intra-group service may initially be provided at a loss for sound commercial reasons 
other than the transfer of income to the receiver of the service to accelerate the utilisation of an 
assessed loss. In such an instance the provider of the service may experience difficulty in 
satisfying the above-mentioned requirements in respect of the costs incurred by it, as an 
examination of relevant court cases will reveal. 
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2.3.2 Relevant court cases 
2.3 .2.1 ITC 1037 (1963) 
ITC 1037 dealt with the deductibility by a taxpayer of expenditure in excess of rental income 
derived from a property. The taxpayer was a wholly owned subsidiary of another company. The 
latter company decided to acquire a business occupying a portion of a certain building. In order 
to obtain security of tenure for that business, the property was purchased by the taxpayer. During 
the first year of assessment in which the property was acquired, expenditure in relation to the 
property exceeded rental income by R1 325. The Commissioner of Inland Revenue disallowed 
such excess expenditure on the grounds that it was not expended wholly and exclusively for 
purposes of the taxpayer's trade. 
The Court stated that one of the difficulties that it experienced with the case was the fact that the 
taxpayer was a wholly owned subsidiary. It therefore did not appear as if the directors of the 
taxpayer devoted independent consideration to the question whether the purchase of the property 
would be to its advantage, as opposed to the advantage of the parent company. The Court held 
that the only advantage that the taxpayer could possibly derive from the purchase, if considered 
in isolation, was to obtain income from the property by way of rents. Consequently, if it could be 
demonstrated that the directors of the taxpayer had a reasonable belief that the property would be 
a sound investment, in the sense that the taxpayer would be able to make a profit out of the 
property within a reasonable time, then the excess expenditure would be allowed as a deduction. 
After analysing the rental income and expenditure of the taxpayer during the year of assessment 
in which the property was acquired, the Court found that there was little or no prospect of the 
company earning a profit from the property within a reasonable period of time. This analysis in 
itself was questionable. No attention was devoted to future projections of profitability, although 
the renting of property is a long-term venture in which initial losses are recouped by later profits. 
The Court concluded that the purchase was entered into with the predominant object of ensuring 
that the occupation of certain premises would be secure for the taxpayer' s holding company. As 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
39 
the expenditure was incurred primarily to serve the purposes of the taxpayer's holding company, 
it was not laid out wholly and exclusively for the taxpayer's own trade. Consequently, the Court 
confirmed the Commissioner's assessment. 
It is interesting to note that the result of this judgement is more in harmony with section 23(g) 
after its amendment than before. On a strict interpretation of section 23(g) in its unamended form, 
the whole amount of an expense must be disallowed as a deduction if the sole purpose thereof is 
not related to the taxpayer's trade. However, the Court seemed to apportion the expenditure in 
question between its trade and non-trade components, holding that the expenditure in excess of 
the rental income was not incurred for the purposes of trade. Only after its amendment in 1992 
did section 23(g) make provision for such apportionment. Although the Court' s application of 
section 23(g) as it then stood might not have been entirely correct, a useful guideline was 
established for the application of section 23(g) in its present form . 
Once more the application of 23(g) to a legal sub-unit, instead of the economic unit, produced an 
anomalous result from a group perspective. Although the inclusion in the taxpayer's gross 
income of the rental received from the holding company would have been neutralised by a 
corresponding deduction to the holding company, the group was not allowed a deduction of the 
full amount of the taxpayer's expenditure, which represented the group's effective cost in respect 
of its rental activities. 
Had the property been owned by the holding company, the expenditure incurred in excess of 
rental income earned from outside parties would have been deductible against its other operating 
income. The reason is that there would have been a dual trade purpose in holding the property, 
namely to derive rental income from the portion of the property which was not required for the 
activities of the acquired business and to obtain security of tenure for that business. 
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2.3 .2.2 CIR v Sunnyside Centre (Pty) Ltd ( 1996) 
Sunnyside Centre was a wholly owned subsidiary of Sam Gross Holdings (Pty) Ltd (SGH). It 
owned a building consisting of shops and flats, which were let out. Another wholly owned 
subsidiary of SGH, Agros (Pty) Ltd, needed funding to acquire a property. As Sunnyside could 
obtain finance at a lower rate than Agros, it was decided that Sunnyside would borrow the 
required funds . The money so borrowed by Sunnyside was lent to SGH, which in turn lent it to 
Agros. The usual informality in respect of intra-group transaction prevailed; nothing was reduced 
to writing and no specific agreement was reached between Sunnyside and SGH as to the rate of 
interest and the terms of repayment. However, it was intended that SGH would eventually pay 
Sunnyside all interest that the latter incurred, together with the capital sum. Sunnyside was 
therefore not to suffer a loss as result of the arrangement. A feasibility study indicated that it 
would take some years before rentals on the property to be acquired by Agros could be raised to a 
level that would match the interest burden of Sunnyside. Thus, the interest initially incurred by 
Sunnyside would exceed the interest received from SGH, although the situation would be 
reversed in later years. 
The Court had to decide whether interest paid by Sunnyside in excess of interest received by it, 
were laid out for the purpose of its trade, and if so, whether the excess portion was wholly and 
exclusively laid out for such purpose. The Court stated that section 23(g) applied to the case in its 
unamended form, and as such it embodied an all-or-nothing approach. It is submitted, however, 
that the Court applied section 23(g) in its amended form by dividing the total amount of interest 
expenditure into two components - one component equal to the amount of interest received by 
Sunnyside from Agros and the other component representing the excess amount - and focusing 
on the purpose of the second component. Had the court followed a strict interpretation of section 
23(g) in its unamended form, it would have focused on the interest expense in its entirety in 
determining the purpose for which it was laid out. The principles established in this case may 
therefore serve as useful guidelines for the application of section 23(g) in its present form. 
Turning firstly to the question whether the excess interest was laid out wholly and exclusively for 
the purpose of Sunnyside's trade, the Court referred to the fact that no formal contract was 
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concluded specifying the terms of the loan. Instead, such terms were subject to future ad hoc 
determination. It was further found that Sunnyside did not expect to profit from the reinvestment 
of the borrowed funds. Based on the above-mentioned findings, the Court concluded that the real 
object of the borrowing and lending of the funds was to enable Agros to pay for its acquisition. 
As there was a purpose other than deriving income from its own trade, the gxcess interest was 
held to be non-deductible. 
The main implication of this judgement is that a formal, written agreement should be compiled in 
cases where an intra-group transaction is concluded which will result in initial losses to one of the 
group companies. By complying with formalities that are usually required in transactions 
concluded between parties at arm's length, group companies may demonstrate independent trade 
intentions. However, by following such an approach, artificiality is introduced into intra-group 
transactions and economic flexibility is sacrificed. 
Having found that the excess expenditure was not wholly and exclusively laid out for the purpose 
ofSunnyside's trade, the Court proceeded to consider whether the excess amount was laid out for 
trade purposes at all although the Court stated that an inquiry on that matter was not necessary. 
On the facts stated, the Court concluded that Sunnyside did not intend to profit from the 
transaction, but that at most it hoped to recover its costs eventually. With regard to the question 
whether profit is an essential requirement of the carrying on of a trade, the following extract from 
the judgement in De Beers Holdings (Pty) Ltd. was quoted: "It is true ... that the absence of 
profit does not necessarily exclude a transaction from being part of a taxpayer's trade; and 
corresponding moneys laid out in a non-profitable transaction may nevertheless be wholly or 
exclusively expended for the purposes of trade within the terms of section 23(g). Such moneys 
may well be disbursed on the grounds of commercial expediency or in order to indirectly 
promote the carrying on of the taxpayer's trade ... Where, however, a trader normally carries on 
a business by buying goods and selling them at a profit, then as a general rule a transaction 
entered into with the purpose of not making a profit, or even suffering a loss, must, in order to 
satisfy section 23(g), be shown to have been so connected with the pursuit of the taxpayer's trade, 
e.g. on the grounds of commercial expediency or indirect facilitation of the trade, as to justify the 
conclusion that, despite the lack of a profit motive, the moneys paid out under the transaction 
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were wholly and exclusively expended for the purposes of trade ... Generally, unless the facts 
speak for themselves, this will call for an explanation from the taxpayer." 
Sunnyside, being unable to prove that it entered into the scheme to earn a profit, sought to bring 
itself under the heads of commercial expediency or indirect facilitation of trade, by arguing that it 
was expedient to maintain an arrangement whereby SGH provided administrative services to all 
three companies and acted as the 'banker' of the group. However, the Court found that there was 
an atmosphere of unreality in the submission that it was expedient to keep the directors of the 
holding company 'sweet', in order to persuade them to continue running the group's affairs to 
Sunnyside's benefit. No evidence was presented, for instance, that Sunnyside lent assistance in 
order to ward off higher service charges, or to stave off a failure of Agros such as might 
ultimately have affected the solvency of the group and even Sunnyside itself. The Court 
conceded that facts of that kind might have been enough to satisfy the test of commercial 
expediency or indirect facilitation of Sunnyside's trade, but emphasised that such facts had not 
been established. 
Where ITC 103 7 implied that the earning of profit is necessary before costs incurred in respect of 
the provision of intra-group services will be deductible, the Sunnyside case indicated that costs 
incurred in respect of such transactions may satisfy the trade requirement of sections ll(a) and 
23(g) on grounds other than the earning of profit. Nevertheless, from the Court's application of 
the De Beers principle to the facts of the Sunnyside case, it is clear that groups will experience 
considerable difficulty in demonstrating such grounds where intra-group services are provided 
bona fide at a loss. 
2.4 COSTS INCURRED BY ONE GROUP COMPANY FOR THE BENEFIT OF ANOTHER 
In certain instances one group member may incur costs for the benefit of another group member. 
Where no or inconsequential minority shareholdings exist within a group structure, it is not 
important which legal sub-unit within the group incurs the particular costs. However, the 
production of income and trade requirements of sections ll(a) and 23(g) will prevent a deduction 
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of such costs when they do not relate to the trade of the specific group company that incurred 
them. This is illustrated in ITC 630 (1946). 
The case dealt with the deductibility of expenditure incurred by a taxpayer in respect of 
employees engaged in the business of one of its subsidiaries. The taxpayer made certain 
payments, by way of salaries and travelling expenses, to two of its employees who had been 
engaged in reorganising the business of a subsidiary company in which it had acquirgd a 
shareholding. During the year of assessment, goods had been supplied to the subsidiary by the 
taxpayer at prices representing cost plus 5%. 
The Commissioner refused to allow a deduction in respect of the payments, contending that they 
were not incurred in the production of the taxpayer's income and for the purposes ofhis trade. 
In delivering judgement the Court referred to the distinction between subsidiaries and divisions, 
and the apparent confusion in the mind of the taxpayer between the two concepts. The following 
was said in this regard: "It would seem that the distinction between branches and subsidiary 
companies, being independent persona, was not present in the mind of the appellant's officials ... 
For, in cross-examination, the public officer of the company ... admitted that the appellant 
regarded this particular subsidiary company as a branch. Although expenditure in respect of a 
branch, taking the form of salaries and expenses of officials of the appellant's head office staff 
who do work for the advancement of such branch, would no doubt be expenditure incurred in the 
production of the appellant's income, the same expenditure designed to improve the position of a 
subsidiary incorporated company would prima facie not be on the same footing . For the 
connection between such expenditure on a branch and the income of the appellant would be a 
direct one inasmuch as the income of the branch is part of the income of the appellant. But the 
same cannot be said of the expenditure on the subsidiary company which is a separate and 
independent persona and a taxpayer having its own income distinct for all purposes ... from the 
appellant's." 
The circumstances of this case provide concrete proof of the misunderstanding that often exists in 
the practically orientated business world about the separate persona of holding companies and 
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their subsidiaries. Significantly, this misunderstanding is not restricted to business people 
involved in small and relatively simple enterprises, but often extends to business people who 
employ complex legal structures to contain their enterprises, as the facts of the case clearly 
illustrate. The officials of the holding company regarded the subsidiary as a branch for all 
practical purposes, and therefore did not pay particular attention to which entity should bear the 
costs in question. The transaction was structured with the economic substance of the group as 
primary consideration. As the group represented a single economic unit in reality, it did not 
matter to them which legal sub-unit thereof incurred the costs. However, the deduction of the 
costs was disallowed in view of the legal form of the group. 
It is questionable whether a system of taxation for groups will operate to the satisfaction of the 
fiscus as well as taxpayers if it so clearly conflicts with the pragmatic practices that are often 
followed in the business world. No doubt, tax morality will be damaged when taxpayers receive 
surprises as unpleasant as the one above. 
The Court further held that amounts that might be received by way of dividends from the 
subsidiary would not constitute income, as dividends are exempt from normal taxation. And even 
if dividends were not exempt from normal taxation, the Court found that the "production of 
income" test would still not be satisfied, because the primary purpose of the expenditure was to 
provide income for the subsidiary, rather than dividends for the holding company. The 
connection between the expenditure and any dividends would therefore not be sufficiently close. 
In the same light, the Court found that revenue received from goods sold to the subsidiary was 
merely a collateral advantage to the taxpayer and could not be viewed as the primary purpose of 
the expenditure. 
Consequently, the appeal of the taxpayer was set aside and the Commissioner's assessment was 
confirmed on the grounds that the taxpayer and its subsidiary were separate legal personae, and 
that the expenditure incurred by the taxpayer was in the production of the subsidiary's income 
rather than its own. 
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2.5 INTEREST ON LOANS EMPLOYED TO FINANCE THE PURCHASE OF SHARES IN 
OTHER GROUP COMPANIES 
2. 5.1 Introduction 
Section 11 (a) of the Act requires expenditure to be in the production of income before it will be 
allowed as a deduction. Section 23(f) reinforces this positive requirement by prohibiting the 
deduction of "any expenses incurred in respect of any amounts received or accrued which do not 
constitute income as defined in section one". 'Income' is defined in section one as "the amount 
remaining of the gross income of any person for any year or period of assessment after deducting 
therefrom the amounts that are exempt from normal tax under Part I of Chapter 11". 
When a person purchases shares in a company and finances the purchase by way of a loan, a 
problem arises as to the deductibility of the interest incurred. The reason is that the dividends that 
flow from the shares are exempted from normal tax by section lO(l)(k) of the Act. The 
expenditure on interest will therefore not be in the production of income as defined. 
Another tax anomaly becomes apparent when the position of a company purchasing a business by 
way of a branch is compared to the position of a company acquiring a business by purchasing all 
of the shares in another company. 
In the first instance, all the requirements of section 11 (a) will normally be satisfied. The business 
of the acquired branch will produce non-exempted revenue and interest incurred on the loan will 
therefore be in the production of the company's income. Furthermore, the interest will not be of a 
capital nature, as it represents the cost of financing the acquisition of an asset rather than the cost 
of acquiring the asset (Huxham and Haupt, 1997: 81 ). This sentiment is echoed in ITC 1124 
(1968), where it was stated that interest is the recurrent or periodical charge or 'rental' payable 
for the continued use by a person of money lent to him, and that it is therefore revenue in nature, 
although the money may be utilised for the acquisition of a fixed capital asset. 
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In the second instance, the company will not be entitled to deduct the interest. Although the 
interest will still be of a revenue nature it will not be incurred in the production of the company's 
income, as the investment in the subsidiary will yield exempt dividends to that company. 
The differing treatment of interest on loans when branches or closely held subsidiaries are 
acquired seems inequitable. A closely held subsidiary is acquired, not as a passive investment, 
but as an extension of the holding company's business, which will be managed by and 
operationally integrated into the holding company. The legal interface between the two 
compames 1s often irrelevant from a commercial point of view. Furthermore, dividends are 
merely the formal mechanism to transfer business profits between separate legal entities within 
the same economic unit. Conceptually, therefore, it does not make sense to disallow the 
deduction of interest in such circumstances. 
2.5.2 Relevant court cases 
2.5 .2.1 Introduction 
Although the fruits of shares are exempt dividends, taxpayers have nevertheless sought to deduct 
interest on loans employed to purchase shares in subsidiaries on the grounds that there was a link 
between the interest and the income derived from their own trades. In the majority of cases, 
however, taxpayers were unsuccessful in obtaining deductions of the interest in question, as the 
following examination of court cases will reveal. 
2.5.2.2 ITC 301 (1934) 
The taxpayer in ITC 301 was a company carrying on a general trading business. With the view to 
expanding its operations, it acquired all the shares in another company that carried on a similar 
business and funded the acquisition with a loan. The newly acquired subsidiary was viewed as a 
branch of the holding company by the directors of the latter, and it was argued by the taxpayer 
that the reason for purchasing the shares instead of the underlying assets was to provide 
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convenient bulk security to the grantor of the loan by pledging the shares to him. The 
Commissioner's response was that the subsidiary was a separate legal persona, and that one 
company could not run another as a branch business. 
The Court did not express an opmwn on the branch/subsidiary debate and disallowed the 
deduction of the interest on other grounds. One of these grounds was that the purchased shares 
were a capital asset and that the interest was therefore of a capital nature. This finding is 
questionable, particularly in the light of what has been said in section 2.5.1 concerning the 
capital/revenue nature of interest. 
However, an alternative ground on which the Court based its judgement contains more merit. The 
taxpayer contended that one of the main areas of activity from which it derived income was the 
transporting of goods to the various branch stores which it owned, including the stores belonging 
to the acquired company, and that the interest expenditure was therefore incurred in the 
production of its income. The Court responded by stating that the interest was expended on 
acquiring the shares in the subsidiary, and that it did not have any direct connection with the 
earning of its own trading income. Thus, it held that the interest was not deductible. 
2.5.2.3 CIR v Drakensberg Gardens Hotel (Pty) Ltd (1960) 
In contrast to the taxpayer in ITC 301, Drakensberg Gardens Hotel (Pty) Ltd was allowed a 
deduction in respect of interest incurred on the outstanding balance of the purchase price of 
shares in a subsidiary. The facts of the case were as follows. Drakensberg was a company held by 
a partnership. It leased a hotel and shop from an unrelated company, namely J. & M. Stiebel (Pty) 
Ltd. The hotel was sub-leased by Drakensberg to the partnership, while the shop was operated by 
itself. The hotel business of the partnership showed very good potential, but certain 
improvements to the buildings were required. However, Stiebel was not prepared to finance these 
improvements or to permit Drakensberg Gardens Hotel to do so. Consequently, Drakensberg 
decided to purchase the shares in Stiebel. Its stated objective with the purchase of the shares was 
"to obtain absolute control of the hotel and store premises, thereby ensuring for itself security of 
tenure and the right to make improvements as it desired and to sub-let at such increased rental as 
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it might determine without having to obtain the consent of third parties or itself having to pay an 
increased rental, as well as to secure for itself all rights to the hotel and store licenses". The 
transaction took the form it did, that is the purchase of the shares in Stiebel instead of the 
purchase of the property owned by it, to avoid the payment of transfer duty. The partnership ran 
the two companies in such a way that each company would show only a marginal profit. As a 
result, the increased expenditure of Drakensberg in the form of interest on the outstanding 
balance was compensated for by increased rental income received from the partnership. 
Again, the issue to be decided was whether the interest was incurred in the production of 
Drakensberg' s income. The majority of the Court, in finding that this was indeed the case, stated 
that the interest was not sought to be deducted against exempt dividends flowing from the shares 
in Stiebel, but against the increased rental received by Drakensberg from the partnership. 
Referring to the stated objective of Drakensberg with the purchase of the shares, the majority 
held that the connection between the interest expenditure and trade income of Drakensberg in the 
form of rentals was sufficiently close to substantiate the view that it was incurred in the 
production ofDrakensberg's income. The fact that the acquisition was to be effected through the 
purchase of shares in Stiebel did not remove the interest payments too far from such income. 
When comparing the judgement in this case with the judgement in ITC 301, it appears that a 
close link must be established between the interest expenditure incurred as result of the purchase 
of shares in a subsidiary and the income-earning operations of the holding company. 
Furthermore, link must be commercially realistic to suffice. 
The establishment of a sufficiently close link may be difficult, as the courts tend prima facie to 
associate the interest with the purchased shares and the concomitant dividend stream. Exactly 
how difficult it can be to establish such a link is illustrated in the following two cases, where both 
of the taxpayers' endeavours to obtain deductions were unsuccessful. 
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2.5.2.4 ITC 1124 (1968) 
The taxpayer in ITC 1124 was a member of a group of companies that carried on business as 
growers of timber plantations, saw-millers and manufacturers of wooden articles. The taxpayer's 
activities were confined to plantation growing, and all the timber from its plantations was sold to 
a saw-milling company that was a fellow member of the group. The saw-milling company did not 
work to full capacity due to a lack of sufficient timber. Consequently, the taxpayer purchased all 
the shares in two other plantation companies, whereafter these companies at all times sold their 
timber directly to the saw-milling company without any intervention of the taxpayer. The 
purchase of the shares was financed by way of a loan on which interest was paid. 
The Court, in considering the deductibility of the interest, stated that if such interest was linked 
with the actual or prospective receipt by the taxpayer of dividends, the interest could not be 
allowed as a deduction. It conceded, however, that a deduction would be allowed under section 
11(a) if the interest was so closely connected with the taxpayer's own income-earning operations 
that it would be proper, natural or reasonable to regard it as part of the costs of performing such 
operations. The Court proceeded to find that the income-earning operations of the taxpayer were 
the growing and felling of timber, the purchasing of timber from other growers and the selling of 
all such timber to the saw-milling company. It further stated that the purpose of the taxpayer 
getting control of the two other companies was not to enable it to procure and sell the latter's 
timber, but to cause them to sell their timber directly to the saw-milling company. No link 
between the interest and the operations of the taxpayer could therefore be found. 
The taxpayer did present a possible link between the interest expenditure and its own trading 
income, by contending that competition between growers often resulted in uneconomic prices for 
timber. It was in the interest of the taxpayer to procure as much timber as possible for the capital-
intensive saw-milling company so that it could run near full production capacity. In such a way 
the financial health of the saw-milling company would be ensured, enabling it to offer economic 
prices for the timber supplied by the taxpayer. The Court's response to this contention was that 
even if such a connection existed, the taxpayer did not prove that the connection was sufficiently 
close. According to the Court, examples of required evidence would include increases in the 
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volumes or prices of timber supplied by the taxpayer, or the maintenance of volumes or prices 
that would be unsustainable had the other two companies not supplied the saw-milling company. 
As the taxpayer did not establish a sufficiently close link between the interest and its own trading 
income, the Court disallowed a deduction in respect of the interest. 
If the taxpayer in this case purchased the timber from the two acquired companies, and those 
companies delivered it to the saw-milling company in the capacity of agents of the taxpayer, the 
interest might have been deductible. However, such an arrangement could be vulnerable to an 
application of section 1 03(1) (refer to section 2.12.1 ), as the intervention by the taxpayer between 
the two timber growers and the saw miller could be considered artificial. A more effective 
method to prevent an application of section 103(1), might have been if the two companies 
physically delivered the timber to the appellant and the taxpayer in turn delivered the timber to 
the saw-milling company. Thus, by introducing a physical dimension to the arrangement, it 
would have assumed a more commercially genuine appearance than the first alternative. 
However, such an arrangement would probably have resulted in a less efficient distribution of 
timber within the group. 
2.5.2.5 ITC 1356 (1981) 
The taxpayer in this case was an investment holding company with interests in vanous 
subsidiaries. A loan was taken up to acquire a subsidiary, and the taxpayer claimed a deduction of 
the loan interest under section 11(a) on the grounds that the acquisition was made with the sole 
purpose of obtaining income from the subsidiary by way of management fees. In this regard, 
reliance was placed on the decision in CIR v Drakensberg Gardens Hotel. The taxpayer reasoned 
that as the taxpayer in that case obtained a deduction of interest from its rental income, it should 
obtain a deduction of interest from management fees earned. 
The Court held that, even if it was assumed that the taxpayer's only purpose in acquiring the 
subsidiary was to earn management fees, the connection between the acquisition of the shares 
and the production of management fees was not sufficiently close. The Court stated that the 
purchase of the shares was not a sine quo non for the taxpayer to earn income by providing 
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management services, whereas in the Drakensberg Garden Hotel case it was necessary to acquire 
the subsidiary to protect and enlarge the taxpayer's source of income. It was further held that, 
while it could be said that the borrowing of money by the taxpayer and the acquisition of shares 
in the subsidiary assisted in creating the opportunity to render management services, this was not 
enough to merit the view that the interest expenditure was incurred for the purpose of a supposed 
trade in which management services were provided. 
The Court's decision in ITC 1356 once again emphasises the difficulties that a taxpayer will 
experience in demonstrating a close link between interest expenditure in respect of a loan used to 
purchase shares, and the income-earning operations of its own trade. It appears from this case 
that the acquisition of the shares in another group member must not only result in the protection 
or expansion of the taxpayer's own income, but that it must also be necessary for such protection 
or expansion of its income. 
2.5.2.6 Summary 
From the above-mentioned cases, it is clear that interest on loans employed to purchase shares in 
subsidiaries will only be allowed as a deduction in the exceptional circumstances where a 
sufficiently close link can be established between the interest and the taxpayer's own income-
producing operations. Furthermore, the existence of such a link is a matter of fact to be 
determined by the circumstances of each case. The consideration of the circumstances of each 
case clearly involves a great deal of subjectivity, which inevitably leads to uncertainty about tax 
implications when acquisitions are structured. In addition, attempts to structure acquisitions in 
such a way that deductions may be obtained with regard to loan interest will compromise 
neutrality. 
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2.6 LOSSES ON INTRA-GROUP LOANS 
2. 6.1 Introduction 
The deductibility or non-deductibility of losses on intra-group loans may produce tax anomalies 
in various instances. Section 2.6.2 will identify the anomalies that can occur when such losses are 
either allowed or disallowed as deductions. Section 2.6.3 will examine court cases that 
established the general principles concerning the deductibility of loan losses. Finally, section 
2.6.4 will investigate court cases that specifically dealt with the deductibility of loan losses within 
a group context. 
2.6.2 Possible anomalies 
Assume the following information. Holdco grants a loan of Rl 00 to Subco, its wholly owned 
subsidiary, and the latter applies the funds to finance expenditure that is deductible for tax 
purposes. From a group perspective, the loan merely serves as a mechanism to transfer funds 
from one legal sub-unit (Holdco) to another legal sub-unit (Subco) within the same economic 
entity, in order to finance group expenditure specifically incurred by the second legal sub-unit. 
Subco experiences considerable financial difficulties and is consequently liquidated. If Subco 
utilises all its tax credits before or during liquidation (for example, if the disposal of depreciable 
assets leads to substantial recoupments that can absorb any assessed loss), and if a deduction is 
granted to Holdco in respect of the loan loss, the group will effectively obtain a R200 deduction 
with regard to a group outflow of Rl 00. On the other hand, if Holdco does not receive a 
deduction in respect of the loan loss, the effective aeduction for the group will amount to Rl 00, 
which corresponds to the amount of the group's cash outflow. 
If Subco cannot utilise the deduction in respect of the expenditure of Rl 00 before or during its 
liquidation, no tax relief will be obtained, as Subco's assessed loss will fall away once it is 
wound up. If no deduction is allowed to Holdco in respect of the loan loss, the group will not 
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have received any tax relief with regard to the group outflow ofRlOO. However, if a deduction is 
indeed allowed to Holdco, the tax deduction from a group perspective will correspond to the 
effective group outflow. 
Thus, four possible tax alternatives exist, two of which produce anomalous results. One of these 
alternatives produces an unreasonable tax result from the fiscus's point of view, in the sense that 
a R200 deduction will be granted in respect of a Rl 00 outflow incurred by an economic entity. 
The other alternative produces an unreasonable tax result from the group's point of view, as no 
deduction will be granted in respect of the outflow incurred by it. 
2. 6. 3 General principles with regard to the deductibility of loan losses 
There is no section in the Act which deals with loan losses in particular, and therefore such losses 
will therefore only qualify for deduction under section ll(a). The main hurdle that taxpayers will 
encounter is to demonstrate that loan losses are of a revenue nature. Most court cases with regard 
to the deductibility of loan losses revolve around this issue. 
In Stone v SIR (1974), the Court, in determining whether a loan loss was of a capital or revenue 
nature, referred to CIR v George Forest Timber Co and CIR v New State Areas Ltd (which were 
discussed in section 2.2.5.2). Both cases explained the distinction between revenue and capital 
expenditure and the further distinction between fixed and floating capital expenditure. Applying 
the principles formulated in those cases, the Court held that in the ordinary case of a loan of 
money, the capital lent constitutes fixed capital. However, it accepted the decisions reached in 
other cases that loan losses sustained by a moneylender are deductible, because the capital 
employed by him to make such loans constitutes his circulating or floating capital which is 
constantly turned over at a profit. 
In SIR v Crane (1977) the meaning ofthe term 'moneylender' was considered. It was held by the 
Court that there is no universal definition of a moneylender and that the question whether a 
specific person is a moneylender is one of fact depending on the circumstances of the particular 
case. Nevertheless, certain guidelines for determining whether a person is a moneylender were 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
54 
extracted from other court cases. The Court stated that it was not enough to show that a person 
had lent money on several occasions at remunerative rates of interest. There must be a certain 
degree of system and continuity about the transactions, and he must be ready and willing to lend 
to all and sundry provided that they are eligible from his point of view. Furthermore, the system 
or plan employed by the person for laying out and getting back the capital for further use should 
involve a frequent turnover of the capital. Finally, the obtaining of security for the capital is a 
usual though not an essential feature of loans made in such a business. 
From the above cases, the following line of reasoning may be deduced for solving the problem of 
the deductibility of loan losses under section ll(a). Firstly, it must be determined whether the 
person making the loan is a moneylender. If so, the loss will be one of a floating capital nature. If 
the other requirements of section 11(a) are satisfied, the loss will be allowed as a deduction. 
However, from the judgement in SIR v Crane it is clear that establishing whether a person is a 
moneylender may be a challenging exercise fraught with uncertainty. 
2.6.4 Deductibility of loan losses within a group context 
2.6.4.1 Plate Glass and Shatterprufe Industries (Finance Company) (Pty) Ltd v SIR (1979) 
Plate Glass was a subsidiary that served as the finance company of its group. Previously, each 
group company controlled its own funds and made its own arrangements for financial facilities. 
To put the financing of group companies on a sounder basis, and with a view to obtaining 
financial facilities on more advantageous terms, the taxpayer was formed for the purpose of 
administering the financial resources of the group to the best possible advantage. To that end the 
taxpayer borrowed money from other group companies and outside parties and lent it to group 
companies that required funds. 
The case did not deal with the deductibility of a loss on a loan made by the taxpayer, but rather 
with the deductibility of a foreign exchange loss on a loan granted to the taxpayer. However, to 
decide whether such a loss was of a capital or revenue nature, the Court mainly focused on the 
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question whether the taxpayer was involved in moneylending in order to determine whether the 
exchange loss was a cost associated with its floating capital. The principles established in this 
case are therefore relevant to the matter under consideration. 
It was found by the Court that Plate Glass's sole function was that of controlling and channeling 
funds available to the group. Reasons for this finding were that it did not lend money to 
borrowers outside the group and that it often lent vast amounts to fellow group companies 
without obtaining any security. The Court stated that the taxpayer's business operations were not 
directed at promoting trading operations to its own best advantage. Instead, its policy was 
directed by group requirements and its function was the rationalisation and redistribution of 
group capital to the best advantage of the group. It was therefore concluded that the taxpayer was 
not a moneylender in its own right. 
The Court further stated that the true inquiry in such cases should be into the function of the 
money in the taxpayer's hands, rather than into the nature of the taxpayer's business. 
Nevertheless, it was remarked that the latter inquiry serves as an important guide to the former 
inquiry. On this basis, it was found that the money borrowed by Plate Glass did not constitute its 
working capital, as it was not borrowed to enable Plate Glass to trade in own right. The taxpayer 
merely served as a conduit for the flow of funds within the group. The fact that it was a separate 
juristic persona did not alter the character of the funds in its hands as capital raised by the group 
for use by companies in that group. 
The Court's line of reasoning in this case appears to be extremely inequitable. In treating Plate 
Glass as a separate taxable entity, it emphasised legal form over economic substance. Yet, when 
determining the nature of the taxpayer's business and the function of the money in its hands, it 
emphasised economic substance over legal form by stating that the taxpayer did not trade in its 
own right but merely acted as a conduit of funds within the group. The Court was therefore not 
consistent in its approach, to the detriment of the taxpayer. It is submitted that if the Court did not 
switch its approach when determining the nature of the taxpayer's business and the character of 
the money in its hands, it would have been forced to conclude that Plate Glass did in fact trade 
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for its own account as a money lender, and that the money in question was borrowed for this 
purpose. 
2.6.4.2 Solaglass Finance Company (Pty) Ltd v CIR (1991) 
The taxpayer in this case was the same person as the taxpayer in the previous case. Its name was 
merely changed from Plate Glass and Shatterprufe to Solaglass Finance Company. In the period 
subsequent to the previous case, the appellant's field of activities was marginally broadened. 
Loans were now also made to staff members of companies within the group and bills were 
discounted for customers of trading subsidiaries to enable those customers to settle their accounts 
with such subsidiaries. The taxpayer also deposited money with building societies to enable staff 
members to obtain mortgage bonds. The expansion of business was therefore primarily directed 
at promoting the interests of group companies, and as such could be viewed as an extension of its 
original mandate to control and manage the financial resources of the group. 
The issue at hand in this particular case was the deductibility under sections ll(a) and 23(g) of a 
loss incurred by the taxpayer as result of a loan to a fellow subsidiary that became irrecoverable. 
With regard to section 11(a), the Court stated that if the taxpayer could show that it had been 
carrying on the business of moneylending, losses sustained by it as result of loans made in the 
course of such business becoming irrecoverable would be of a revenue nature. The Court found 
that the taxpayer's sole business consisted of the borrowing of money and the making of loans, 
albeit only to companies in the group, staff members and customers of trading subsidiaries. The 
taxpayer's business could therefore be described as one consisting entirely of the borrowing and 
lending of money at a profit. The Court remarked that certain features of the taxpayer's business 
were not found in an ordinary moneylending business because of the group constraints under 
which it operated. However, that did not preclude the taxpayer's business from being one of 
moneylending. The capital that became irretrievable was therefore floating capital. 
The finding of the Court with regard to the nature of the taxpayer's business is in direct 
opposition to the finding in the Plate Glass case, although the taxpayer in both cases was the 
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same person and its activities had not changed materially. The conflicting findings in these cases 
illustrate that the outcome of a determination of a taxpayer's status as a moneylender or not can 
be highly unpredictable. This is to be expected when no exact definition of the term exists and 
when the courts subjectively apply imprecise guidelines to the circumstances of each particular 
case. 
Although the Court found that the loss was not of a capital nature, the majority decided that 
section 23(g) prohibited a deduction of the loss. It should be noted that section 23(g) still existed 
in its unamended form at the time, and therefore stated that the loss must be incurred wholly and 
exclusively for the purposes of trade to be deductible. In arriving at the decision that the loss was 
not incurred wholly and exclusively for purposes of Solaglass ' s trade, the following 
considerations were taken into account: 
• On the facts, the taxpayer' s trading activities were geared to the achievement of a dual 
purpose, namely the making of a profit by the taxpayer as well as the furthering of the 
interests of other subsidiaries within the group. 
• The promotion of the group's interests was an integral part of the activities carried out 
by the taxpayer, as its trading activities were governed by group requirements. 
• The connection between the loan giving rise to the loss and the benefit to the group 
was both direct and immediate, and that there was a close link between the taxpayer's 
activities and the furthering of the group's interests. Consequently, a distinct purpose 
other than that of trading in its own right existed. 
It is interesting to speculate about the outcome of the case if section 23(g) had already been 
amended at the time. If the method of apportionment employed in ITC 1037 and CIR v 
Sunnyside Center (Pty) Ltd. is followed, the deduction of the loan loss would probably have been 
limited to the net interest income derived by Solaglass from that particular loan. 
In contrast to the Plate Glass case, the Court was consistent when it identified the taxable entity 
and considered the nature of that entity' s business. Legal form was emphasised by treating 
Solaglass, rather than the group, as the taxable entity. The focus on legal form was maintained 
when the Court examined Solaglass's activities and found that it was involved in moneylending, 
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irrespective of the fact that the moneylending operations were predominantly carried out within 
group context. However, in its application of section 23(g), the majority of the Court shifted its 
emphasis from form to substance by venturing beyond the boundaries of the taxpayer's separate 
legal persona into the economic sphere of the group, and by finding that the activities of the 
taxpayer were partially aimed at promoting the interests of this economic sphere. This 
inconsistency of focus, which can also be found in other cases that dealt with the application of 
the trade test of sections ll(a) and 23(g) to intra-group transactions, is highly unsatisfactory. 
2.6.4.3 Summary 
The deductibility of loan losses creates a fair amount ofuncertainty. Although it was laid down in 
several court cases that losses will be of a revenue nature if it is determined that the taxpayer is a 
moneylender, the guidelines for such determination and their application to the facts of a 
particular case are by no means cast in stone. Furthermore, the issue is complicated within a 
group context by the trade requirement of section 23(g), which may operate to the detriment of a 
group financing company whose moneylending activities are dictated by group policy. 
Because the deductibility of intra-group loan losses is considered independently of any tax relief 
obtained with regard to the expenditure financed by the loan proceeds, and because the 
deductibility of such loan losses is highly unpredictable, the anomalies referred to in section 2.6.2 
occur at random and therefore are not properly controlled by the present tax system. 
2.7 THE EMPLOYMENT OF REALISATION COMPANIES TO DISPOSE OF ASSETS 
2. 7.1 Introduction 
In deciding the capital or revenue nature of a receipt or an accrual, the courts have established 
that the intention with which an asset is acquired is not conclusive. A change in intention is also 
relevant in that an intention to hold an asset as an investment may be changed into an intention to 
engage it in a scheme of profit-making and vice versa (Meyerowitz, 1997: 8-12). 
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The realisation of an asset does not per se constitute a change of intention. In CIR v Stott (1928), 
Wessels JA said the following in this regard: "Every person who invested his surplus funds in 
land or stock or any other asset was entitled to realise such asset to the best advantage and to 
accommodate the asset to the exigencies of the market in which he was selling. The fact that he 
did so could not alter what was an investment of capital into a trade or business for earning 
profits." And in John Bell & Co (Pty) Ltd v SIR (1976), Wessels JA further developed this 
principle when he stated: " ... the mere change of intention to dispose of an asset hitherto held as 
capital does not per se subject the resultant profit to tax. Something more is required in order to 
metamorphose the character of the asset and so render the proceeds income. For example, the 
taxpayer must already be trading in the same or similar kinds of assets, or he then and there starts 
some trade or business or embarks on some scheme for selling such assets for profit, and, in 
either case, the asset in question is taken into or used as his stock-in-trade." But the dividing line 
between the realisation of a capital asset to best advantage and a change of intention invoking the 
use of or disposal of an asset as trading stock in the course of a profit-making scheme is often 
blurred (Meyerowitz, 1997: 8.13) In Natal Estates Ltd v SIR (1975), it was stated that the 
distinction between the two courses of action is a matter of degree depending on the 
circumstances of each particular case. 
It is against this background that the concept of realisation companies is introduced. Such 
companies are formed to realise assets previously held by the companies' promoters. A question 
that arises in this regard is whether a company which genuinely intends to merely realise a capital 
asset to best advantage, and proceeds to do so through a separate entity, will be prejudiced from a 
tax perspective by conducting the realisation in this manner. A further question that arises is 
whether a company wishing to speculatively dispose of an asset previously held by it as capital 
can obtain an undue tax advantage by effecting the realisation through a separate entity. These 
questions and other relevant issues will be examined in the ensuing sub-sections. 
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2. 7. 2 The use of separate companies to realise capital assets 
2.7.2.1 Realisation Company v COT (1951) 
The facts of the case can be summarised as follows. 'A' Company Ltd. was incorporated in 
England for the purpose of making investments. Its issued share capital was £1250 000. The 
value of certain of A's investments decreased, with result that its net asset value fell below the 
amount of its issued capital. In view of a dictum laid down in an English court case, A was 
therefore precluded from declaring any dividends out of income derived from its successful 
investments. Consequently it was decided to unwind A. Its quality assets were transferred to 
another company in exchange for shares in that company and the shares were distributed by A to 
its shareholders. The depreciated assets were transferred to a realisation company in exchange for 
debentures, which were also distributed by A to its shareholders. The underlying rationale was 
that the realisation company would utilise the realised proceeds of the transferred assets to 
redeem the debentures . 
Amongst the assets transferred to the realisation company were debentures of £60 000 in a 
company in liquidation. The property hypothecated to these debentures was declared executable. 
The realisation company pu: ::based the property for £20 000 and sold it at a considerable profit. 
The issue at hand was whether the proceeds on disposal of the property were of a capital or 
revenue nature. It should be noted that the transaction in question was not the disposal of the 
transferred debentures but the disposal of the underlying property. Nevertheless, it can be said 
that the case effectively dealt with the disposal of the debentures, as they must have been 
acquired by the realisation company with the intention of realizing it at maximum value through 
the purchase and profitable resale of the underlying security. 
The Commissioner contended that the business of the realisation company was to acquire certain 
assets and to sell or otherwise dispose of them as profitably as possible, and that the purchase and 
realisation of the property was a scheme of profit-making in the ordinary course of its business. 
Beadle J responded as follows to this contention: " . . . an examination of these 'realisation 
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company' cases does seem to show that where a company is formed for a legitimate purpose 
unrelated to tax avoidance with the express object of realizing assets acquired at its formation 
from its promoter - assets which its promoter himself could have realised in similar 
circumstances without attracting tax, and the company does nothing more than realise those 
assets, then any gains made on a simple realisation of those assets would be regarded as accruals 
of a capital nature." By applying this principle to the facts of the case, the Court concluded that 
the proceeds on the disposal of the property was capital in nature. 
It appears from this judgement that in the ver:-' particular circumstances described in the above 
quotation, the courts will look beyond the separate legal persona of the realisation company and 
will consider the economic substance of the realisation. Thus, if a company decides to sell a 
capital asset through a wholly owned realisation company for commercial reasons other than the 
obtaining of a tax advantage, the group will not be unfairly prejudiced by this particular mode of 
disposal. However, when a separate entity is employed to realise a capital asset, care must be 
taken to comply with all the requirements stated by Beadle J, or disastrous tax effects may result. 
The following case is an illustration in point. 
2. 7 .2.2 Overseas Trust Corporation Ltd v CIR ( 1926) 
The Overseas Trust Corporation was an investment company that carried on the business of 
buying and selling shares with the view to profit from such dealings. The company had been 
formed to take over the interests of one L, who held 97% of the shares of the company. Although 
the case did not deal with a holding company using a subsidiary to realise an asset, the principles 
established and confirmed therein are nevertheless applicable to all realisation company 
situations, including those that exist within group context. 
For reasons not known to the Court, L had sold his interests to the company at less than half of 
their market value. Among the assets acquired from L were certain shareholdings in companies 
which had formerly carried on business in the Territory of South West Africa, but had been 
placed in liquidation prior to the formation of Overseas Trust. At the date of transfer of these 
shareholdings, there remained in the hands of the Custodian of Enemy Property for the Territory 
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certain sums due to be paid to the shareholders of these companies. On these monies being paid 
out by the Custodian, the amount received by Overseas Trust was largely in excess of the price 
paid to L for the shares. The matter to be decided by the Court was whether the proceeds received 
by Overseas Trust was of a revenue or capital nature. 
In delivering judgement the Court stated that the character that the money would have possessed 
in the hands of L was not relevant to the issue at hand. The following was said in this regard by 
Innes CJ: "The court was concerned with the position of the appellant, not with what would, 
under other circumstances, have been the position of the vendor. He had promoted and formed 
the company for his own convenience; by the transfer of those assets to it, on the basis on which 
that transfer had been arranged, a new position had been created which might be inconvenient but 
must be accepted. In the words of the President of the Special Court, 'neither Dr. Lubbe nor the 
company can escape the consequences involved by the creation of a distinct persona.'" The 
Court found that as the company was an investment dealing company that bought shares with the 
view of selling them at a profit, the amount received by Overseas Trust represented a gain made 
by an operation ofbusiness in carrying out a scheme of profit-making, and that it was therefore of 
a revenue nature. 
The Overseas Trust Corporation case can be distinguished from the Realisation Company case by 
stating that in the latter case the company was established with the express purpose of realizing a 
capital asset of its promoter to the best advantage, while in the former case a capital asset of the 
promoter was transferred to a company that speculatively traded in similar assets. Although the 
intention of the promoter with regard to the shares in the former case may not have changed, and 
although the company realised the shares in exactly the same way as the promoter would have 
done, the Court focused on the separate persona of the company and the trading activities carried 
out by it independently of the promoter, to decide that the realisation proceeds were of a revenue 
nature. When a capital asset is realised through a separate entity, extreme care must therefore be 
taken to ensure compliance with the requirements set out in the quotation from Realisation 
Company v Cot. The mere fact that a taxpayer did not change his intention with regard to a 
capital asset upon its transfer to another entity will not be sufficient to escape liability for tax. 
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2.7.2.3 Berea West Estates (Pty) Ltd. v SIR (1976) 
The history of the property realised in this case is as follows. The original owner of the property, 
K, donated an undivided half share of it in trust to his children. By his will K donated the 
remaining undivided half share in the property to his children. The administration ofthe trust and 
K' s estate became very difficult due to a variety of reasons. Consequently, it was decided to sell 
the property held by the trust and K's estate. In order to ease the realisation from an 
administrative perspective, the property was transferred to a company. Debentures were issued to 
creditors of the estate, while shares in the company were issued to the trust and K's heirs. The 
principal objective of the company was to realise the property to the best advantage of the 
shareholders after discharging all liabilities to creditors. 
The company set about to actively develop the property as no seller could be found for the 
property en bloc at a reasonable price. However, no development activities were carried out other 
than those activities prescribed by the Private Township Board. Thus, Berea West Estates only 
developed the property to the extent that was necessary to market it as a township. 
The Court found that Berea was indeed a realisation company with the original intention of 
realizing a capital asset to the best advantage of its shareholders. However, the inquiry did not 
stop there. In the light of the particular method of disposal, the Court further considered the 
possibility that it had changed its original intention and embarked upon a scheme of selling the 
property for a profit, thereby converting what was initially a capital asset into stock-in-trade. 
Referring to the sheer size of the property, the Court found that the prudent course of disposal 
would be to divide the property into lots. Berea was merely accommodating the property to the 
exigencies of the market and therefore it did not deviate from its original intention of being a 
realisation company. 
An important point that emerges from this case is that a realisation company will not be able to 
trade actively in property without incurring a liability for tax merely because it is referred to as a 
realisation company. On the contrary, it will be subjected to the same tests that the original owner 
would have been subjected to if the latter had realised the asset. 
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2. 7.3 The use of separate companies to realise assets where the intention has changed from 
investment to speculation 
Although a realisation company will be subjected to the same tests that its promoter would have 
been subjected to if the latter had sold the asset, it is still possible to obtain an unjustified tax 
advantage through the use of a realisation company where the owner of an asset has changed his 
intention from investment to speculation. The reason is that a realisation company will facilitate 
the splitting of the total economic gain to the original owner into a non-taxable capital portion 
and a taxable revenue portion. An example will illustrate this statement. Assume that Holdco 
acquired a property for Rl 000 000 with the intention of deriving rental income from it and indeed 
employed the asset for that purpose over an extended period. Clearly Holdco had a capital motive 
when it acquired the property. Due to considerable development within the neighbouring area, 
the plot has dramatically increased in value. Unfortunately, the building does not fully exploit the 
potential of the plot. Holdco, realising that an opportunity for vast profit has presented itself, 
decides to demolish the original building and to erect an improved building on the plot, after 
which it will sell the property. Total demolition and construction costs will amount to 
R5 000 000 and it is estimated that the property can be sold for Rl5 000 000 shortly after 
completion of the development work. 
If Holdco decides to develop the property itself, its change of intention concerning the property 
will convert what was previously a capital asset into stock-in-trade. The proceeds on disposal of 
R15 000 000 will be included in the gross income of Holdco, the demolition and construction 
costs of R5 000 000 will be deducted under section ll(a), and the original purchase price of 
Rl 000 000 will be deducted under section 22(2). The net tax result is an increase in Holdco's 
taxable income ofR9 000 000. 
However, Holdco may decide to form a wholly owned subsidiary to develop the property, or 
otherwise the property may be transferred to an existing wholly owned subsidiary for such 
purposes. If the property is sold to the subsidiary at its current market value of (say) R8 000 000, 
the proceeds will not be included in Holdco's gross income, because it has merely realised a 
capital asset. Subco will have to include the R 15 000 000 selling price of the developed property 
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m its gross mcome, but it will be entitled to deductions in respect of the demolition and 
construction costs ofR5 000 000 as well as the purchase price ofR8 000 000. 
The tax result of this arrangement from a group perspective will be an increase in taxable income 
of only R2 000 000. If sound commercial reasons can be advanced for structuring the disposal in 
this way, the Commissioner of Inland Revenue will not be able to invoke the provisions of 
section 103(1) (refer to section 2.12.1). 
It should be noted that the above-mentioned opportunity for tax avoidance is not restricted to 
groups. It is perfectly possible for a natural person to employ a realisation company in the above-
mentioned way to minimise his tax liability. However, a group taxation system that disregards the 
legal boundaries between separate group companies, such as a consolidation system, will prevent 
such tax avoidance with regard to groups. 
The utilisation of a separate entity to dispose of an asset where the intention of the original owner 
has changed from investment to speculation will not always produce a tax advantage. If a capital 
asset is disposed of to a wholly owned trading company at a price below its cost, the trading 
company will be taxed on a profit in excess of the net gain to the group, because a portion of the 
taxable revenue profit of the trading company will not be neutralised by the non-deductible 
capital loss of the first member. An illustration of this situation is presented below. 
Holdco owns an office block, acquired at a cost of R20 000 000, as an investment property in a 
once fashionable city center. However, dramatic urban decay has caused occupancy levels to 
dwindle to uneconomic levels. Consequently, Holdco decides to dispose of the property to a 
wholly owned subsidiary, Subco, at its market value of R8 000 000. Subco is an established 
property developer that is renowned for its expertise in converting properties to other uses and 
the company intends to convert the office building into low-cost flats. It incurs construction costs 
of R5 000 000 and sells the flats to individual purchasers for a total consideration of 
R15 000 000. From a tax perspective Holdco will not be entitled to deduct its capital loss of 
R12 000 000 under section ll(a). Subco, being a separate taxable entity, will be taxed on its 
trading profit of R2 000 000, which represents the sales proceeds of R15 000 000 minus the 
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acquisition cost of R8 000 000 and the further construction costs of R5 000 000. From the 
group's point of view a loss of RIO 000 000 is sustained, which is calculated as the sales 
proceeds ofRI5 000 000 received by Subco, minus the original acquisition cost ofR20 000 000 
incurred by Holdco and the construction costs of R5 000 000 incurred by Subco. However, by 
employing Subco to effect the disposal, the loss to the group of RI 0 000 000 is split into a 
taxable revenue profit ofR2 000 000 and a non-deductible capital loss ofRI2 000 000. 
An attempt by the group to increase the transfer price of the property to the artificial level of 
R20 000 000 so that Holdco will not sustain a capital loss while Subco will incur a revenue loss 
ofRIO 000 000, may result in an application of section I03(I). 
Had Subco been a division of Holdco, instead of separate company, it would have been possible 
to argue that Holdco had changed its intention with regard to the office block, and converted a 
capital asset into stock-in-trade. Consequently, Holdco would be entitled to a deduction of the 
original acquisition cost of R20 000 000 and the tax result would be harmony with the economic 
loss sustained. 
2. 7. 4 Conclusion 
Where a separate company is employed merely to realise a capital asset of the original owner to 
the best advantage, unfavourable tax anomaEes will not arise on condition that the requirements 
laid down in Realisation Co v COT are satisfied. However, where a separate company is utilised 
to realise an asset in respect of which the intention has changed from investment to speculation, 
tax anomalies which are favourable to groups may arise due to the artificial dissection of the total 
gain or loss into separate capital and revenue portions. 
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2.8 INTRA-GROUP TRANSFER OF REVENUE ASSETS WHICH ARE SUBSEQUENTLY 
HELD AS CAPITAL 
2. 8.1 Introduction 
Where a group company profitably disposes of a revenue asset to another group company, which 
is subsequently held by the latter as a capital asset, tax results may arise which differ from the 
results that would have arisen if the asset was transferred between divisions of the same 
company. In this regard, it is necessary to distinguish between two scenarios. 
In the first scenario an asset is acquired by a group company trading in similar assets, but with 
the express purpose of transferring it to another group company that intends to employ the asset 
as fixed capital. The equivalent of this scenario within a divisionalised company is one where 
such a company acquires an asset with an investment intention and utilises it in accordance with 
that intention. 
In the second scenario an asset is acquired by one group company trading in similar assets with 
the intention that the asset will serve as its stock-in-trade. It is subsequently transferred to another 
group company, which intends to employ the asset as fixed capital. The equivalent of this 
scenario within a divisionalised company is one where such a company changes its intention with 
regard to an asset from speculation to investment. 
The two scenarios and their equivalents within divisionalised companies will be illustrated in 
section 2.8.2 and 2.8.3 respectively. 
2.8.2 Asset acquired by a trading entity with the express purpose of transferring it to another 
entity, which will use it as fixed capital 
Assume that Subco, an 80% subsidiary trading in property, acqmres an office building at a 
'wholesale' price of R9 000 000 and immediately sells it to Holdco at a ' retail price' of 
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RIO 000 000. Holdco intends to occupy the property for trade purposes. The group will 
effectively be taxed on a profit of Rl 000 000, although in substance it has merely acquired a 
capital asset at a cost of R9 000 000. If Subco had been a division of Holdco, the initial purchase 
of the building would be viewed as the acquisition of a capital asset, and the transfer between the 
divisions would have no effect on the taxable income of the company. 
It should be noted that when an office building is employed as a capital asset, no allowances will 
be granted in respect of its cost. Where thg asset transferred between group companies is 
deductible manufacturing equipment, for example, the tax implications of the transfer will differ, 
but will nevertheless be anomalous. The profit made by the trading company upon the transfer of 
the equipment will be taxed immediately. Although this profit inflates the purchasing company's 
cost of acquisition on which deductions will be granted under section 12C, the deductions will be 
spread over an extended period. A timing disadvantage will therefore occur in respect of the tax 
cash flows arising from the transfer. On the other hand, where a trading division of a company 
purchases machinery for a manufacturing division, which is to be used by the latter as a capital 
asset, the transfer of the machinery will attract no tax consequences, even if the trading company 
earns an internal profit from the transfer. The company's intention with the acquisition of the 
machinery will be one of investment, irrespective of the fact that the machinery was procured by 
a trading division of the company. The deductions in respect of the machinery will be based on 
the original purchase price, and not the transfer price between the divisions. No timing 
disadvantage will therefore arise, in the sense that the internal profit will be taxed immediately, 
while deductions in respect thereof will only be granted over an extended period. 
An example will serve to quantify the disadvantageous timing of cash flows explained above. 
Assume that Subco, a trader in manufacturing equipment, acquires machinery at a wholesale 
price ofR200 000 and immediately transfers it to Holdco at a retail price ofR300 000. The latter 
employs it in a process of manufacture. Table 2.4 illustrates the tax cash flows in respect of the 
transaction under the assumption that Subco is a wholly owned subsidiary of Holdco, while table 
2.5 illustrates the tax cash flows under the assumption that Subco is a trading division ofHoldco. 
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Table 2.4 
Tax cash flows in respect of machinery transferred between entities and subsequently held 
as capital, assuming that they are separate group companies 
Year 1 
Tax on profit made (30 000) (1) 
by Subco 
Tax relief in 30 000 (2) 
respect of cost of 
machinery to 
Holdco 
Net tax cash flows -
(1) (300 000- 200 000) * 30% 
(2) 300 000 I 3 * 30% 
Year2 Year 3 
- -
30 000 30 000 
30 000 30 000 
Applying a weighted average cost of capital of 20% to the net tax cash flows above, a present 
value ofR38 194 at the beginning of year 1 is obtained. 
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Table 2.5 
Tax cash flows in respect of machinery transferred between entities and subsequently held 
as capital, assuming that they are divisions of the same company 
Year 1 Year2 Year 3 
Tax on profit made - - -
by Subco 
Tax relief in 20 000 (1) 20 000 20 000 
respect of cost of 
machinery to 
Holdco 
Net tax cash flows 20 000 20 000 20 000 
(1) 200 000 I 3 * 30% 
Applying a weighted average cost of capital of 20% to the net tax cash flows above, a present 
value ofR42 130 is obtained, which is R3 936 more favourable than the present value ofR38 194 
in the case where Subco and Holdco are group companies. 
It may be argued that identical present va' ues can be obtained if Holdco, instead of Subco, 
purchases the machinery at its wholesale price. However, this may not be possible in practice. 
For example, Subco may have an exclusive distribution agreement with the manufacturer of the 
equipment, or it may be able to procure the equipment at wholesale prices due to bulk purchasing 
or long-term agreements. In such a case, it may be argued, Subco can merely transfer the 
equipment to Holdco at its wholesale price. However, if this cost is substantially below the 
normal selling price, the arrangement may be susceptible to an attack under section 1 03( 1 ). 
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2.8.3 Asset acquired by a trading entity as stock-in-trade and subsequently transferred to another 
entity which will use it as fixed capital 
If a trading company acqmres an asset with the intention to hold it as stock-in-trade, and 
subsequently transfers it to another company within the group that utilises it as fixed capital, the 
tax consequences will be identical to the tax consequences described in section 2.8.2 with regard 
to groups. 
If the trading entity is a division of the company to which the asset is transferred, the tax 
consequences will differ from the tax consequences described in section 2.8.2 with regard to 
divisionalised companies. In such an instance, the tax effects of the transfer will be determined 
by section 22(8) of the Act. According to that section, if a taxpayer has applied any trading stock 
for any purpose other than the disposal thereof in the ordinary course of his trade and the cost 
price of such trading stock has been taken into account in the determination of the taxable income 
for any year of assessment, the taxpayer shall be deemed to have recovered or recouped an 
amount equal to the market value of such trading stock, and such amount shall be included in his 
income for the year of assessment in which the trading stock was so applied. Where an asset 
consisting of trading stock so applied is used or consumed by the taxpayer in carrying on his 
trade, the amount included in his income shall for the purposes of the Act be deemed to be 
expenditure incurred in respect of the acquisition by him of the asset. Thus, the internal profit 
upon the transfer of the asset will be taxed, but it will form part of the deemed cost of the asset on 
which deductions, if applicable, will be granted. The tax consequences of an intra-divisional 
transfer of assets and the tax consequences of an intra-group transfer of assets will therefore be 
identical if the circumstances described in this section prevail. 
Although equitable tax treatment is achieved between groups and divisionalised companies in the 
circumstances described in this section, it should be noted that inequitable tax results still arise in 
the circumstances described in section 2.8.2. 
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2.9 INTRA-GROUP LEASE PREMIUMS 
Paragraph f of the definition of gross income in section 1 of the Act specifically includes in gross 
income any amount received or accrued from another person as premium or like consideration for 
the use or right of use of certain specified properties. It should be noted that the full amount of 
the premium must be included in gross income in the year of assessment in which it is received 
by or accrues to a person. 
Section 11 (f) of the Act provides for an allowance in respect of any premium or consideration in 
the nature of a premium paid by a taxpayer for the use or right of use of certain specified 
properties. The deductions are spread over the period of the lease or twenty-five years, whichever 
is less. Furthermore, no deduction will be allowed in any year of assessment if the leased 
property is not used in the production ofthe lessee's income or if no income is derived from it. 
The application of the above-mentioned provisions to intra-group lease premiums produces a 
negative net present value of group tax cash flows despite the fact that no net operational cash 
flow occun: from a group perspective. An example will illustrate this statement. Assume that 
Holdco owns 100% of the shares in Subco. A contract of lease is entered into between the two 
companies in terms of which Holdco will lease an asset from Subco for a period of ten years. A 
premium of R10 000 is payable by Holdco at the commencement of the lease. The group cash 
flow in respect of the premium is zero, as Holdco pays an amount of Rl 0 000 to its wholly 
owned subsidiary. However, the resultant l:ax cash flows produce a negative net present value 
because ofthe immediate inclusion of the R10 000 in Subco's gross income, while the deduction 
ofthis amount to Holdco is allowed in ten annual installments ofR1 000. Assuming that tax cash 
flows arise at the end of each year of assessment, Subco will pay tax ofR3 000 (R10 000*30%) 
at the end of the first year, while Holdco will receive tax relief ofR300 (R1 000*30%) at the end 
of the first to tenth year of assessment. Applying a weighted average cost of capital of 20% to 
these tax cash flows, a negative net present value of R1 242 is obtained at the beginning of year 
1. 
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If Holdco decides to withdraw the asset from use at the end of year two, an even less favourable 
net present value of tax cash flows will be produced. Because the asset is no longer used in the 
production ofHoldco' s income from thereon, Holdco will not obtain any further allowances. The 
entire premium is still included in Subco's gross income, but Holdco will only be able to deduct 
20% of the premium. Thus, Subco will pay tax of R3 500 at the end of the first year, while 
Holdco will receive tax relief of R350 at the end of the first and second year of assessment. 
Again applying a discount rate of 20% to these cash flows, a negative net present value of R2 382 
is obtained. 
In the case of a divisionalised company, where an asset 'owned' by one division is temporarily 
transferred to another division, no tax implications will arise as a consequence of the transfer. 
Again, the differing tax treatment of groups and divisionalised companies produces inequities. 
To avoid the anomalous tax treatment of intra-group lease premiums in the situation where a 
lump sum payment is nevertheless required, the lump sum may be described as a bullet rental 
instead of a lease premium. A bullet rental should be deductible in full under section 11 (a) during 
the year in which it is incurred, resulting in the simultaneous inclusion in gross income and 
deduction of the amount in question. However, when the definitions of lease premiums 
established in various court cases are examined, it becomes apparent that the distinction between 
bullet rentals and lease premiums is far from clear. In CIR v Butcher Brothers (Pty) Ltd (1945), 
the phrase 'premium or like consideration' , as it appears in paragraph f of the definition of gross 
income, was defined as the consideration passing from a lessor to a lessee, whether in cash or 
otherwise, distinct from and in addition to, or in lieu of rent. In CIR v Meyerson (1947), 
Greenberg JA, while also considering that phrase within the context of paragraph f of the 
definition of gross income, stated that it was restricted to a payment over and above something 
else. And in Turnbull v CIR (1953), Centlivers JA, concerning himself with the application of 
section 11(±), remarked that the phrase 'premium or consideration in the nature of a premium' 
means a consideration in the nature of rent passing from the lessee to the lessor. The definitions 
established in Meyerson and Turnbull are clearly contradictory. The former provides for 
something over and above rent, while the latter for something in the nature of rent. The Butcher 
Brothers judgement further complicates the issue by describing a premium as a payment over and 
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above, or in the nature of rent. Considerable uncertainty therefore exists about the distiction 
between bullet rentals, which will not produce tax anomalies from a group perspective, and lease 
premiums, which will produce such anomalies. 
2.10 INTRA-GROUP LEASEHOLD IMPROVEMENTS 
According to paragraph g of the definition of gross income, if there accrues to the taxpayer, in 
terms of any agreement relating to the grant to any other person of the right of use or occupation 
of land or buildings, the right to have improvements effected on the land or to the buildings, there 
is included in his gross income in the year of assessment in which the right accrues -
• the amount stipulated in the agreement as the value of the improvements or as the 
amount to be expended on the improvements; or 
• if no such amount is stipulated, an amount representing the fair and reasonable value 
of the improvements. 
Although the section requires the inclusion of the relevant amount in gross income in the year of 
assessment during which the right accrues to the taxpayer (which is normally the year in which 
the agreement is concluded), in practice the amount is taxed in the year during which the 
improvements are completed (Huxham and Haupt, 1997: 147). It should be noted that the entire 
amount of the improvements must be included in gross income during that year, and that no 
provision is made for the spreading of this amount over the remaining period of the lease. 
A corresponding allowance is granted by section 11 (g) of the Act. That section allows the 
deduction of expenditure actually incurred by the taxpayer in pursuance of the obligation to effect 
improvements on land or to buildings under an agreement whereby the right of use or occupation 
of the land or buildings is granted by any other person. The allowance is spread over twenty-five 
years or the period remaining of the lease at the time of completion of the improvements, 
whichever is the lesser. Furthermore, the allowance is not granted in any year of assessment in 
which the land or buildings are not occupied for the production of income, or in which no income 
is derived from them. 
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Tax anomalies similar to those discussed in section 2.9 (intra-group lease premiums) will occur 
in the instance where a lease contract providing for improvements to be effected by the lessee, is 
concluded between group companies. Again, the reasons for these anomalies are, firstly, that the 
entire amount of the improvements is included in the lessor's gross income when they are 
completed, while the deductions granted to the lessor are spread over the remaining period of the 
lease, and, secondly, that the total amount of the improvements may not be allowed as a 
deduction to the lessee if the leased property is withdrawn from use by the lessee before expiry of 
the lease term. 
Further anomalies may occur in the case of leasehold improvements due to certain features 
peculiar to paragraph g of the definition of gross income and section 11 (g). The first of these 
anomalies arises when an amount is stipulated in the lease agreement as the value or cost of the 
improvements, and the lessee spends a smaller amount. According to a strict interpretation of 
paragra.ph g of the definition of gross income, the lessor must nevertheless include the amount 
stipulated in the agreement in his gross income, while section 11 (g) only allows deductions in 
respect of the costs actually incurred by the lessee. A situation is therefore created where the 
gross income of the lessor will be greater than the deductions of the lessee, thereby increasing the 
magnitude of the negative net present value of the group's tax cash flows. 
The second anomaly anses when an amount is stipulated in the agreement, and the lessee 
voluntarily spends an additional amount. Is such a case, the amount that will be included in the 
lessor's gross income is still the amount stipulated in the agreement. Ordinarily, the lessee will 
not be entitled to a section 11(g) allowance in respect of the excess amount, as it will not have 
been incurred in discharging the obligation placed upon it. However, the excess cost of the 
building so erected or improved may qualify for deductions under section 11(t) (expenditure on 
housing for employees), section 13 (expenditure on industrial buildings) and/or section 13ter 
(expenditure on residential housing). The total allowances of the lessor will therefore be greater 
than the gross income of the lessee. Interestingly, this anomaly may lead to the more equitable 
tax treatment of groups relative to divisionalised companies, by reducing or even eliminating the 
negative net present value of the group's resultant tax cash flows. 
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In the case of divisionalised companies the comparable situation with regard to leasehold 
improvements will be where one division temporarily uses land or buildings 'owned' by another 
division, and employs its own divisional cash flow to effect improvements to that land or 
buildings. If the improvements do not qualify for any allowances, there will be no tax 
implications. Because the arrangement does not attract any tax consequences, the net present 
value of incremental tax cash flows will be zero. If the improvements qualify for deductions 
under (say) section 13, the tax relief so obtained by the company will result in a positive net 
present value of incremental tax cash flows. When the zero or positive net present value in the 
case of a divisionalised structure is compared to negative net present value in the case of a group 
structure, it is again obvious that the present tax system does not achieve equity between these 
structures. 
Where any premium or like consideration or any improvements to leased property are included in 
the lessor's income, section 11(h) provides for a deduction against the amount so included as the 
Commissioner deems reasonable. The Commissioner therefore has discretionary powers in this 
regard, and he will generally not allow a deduction in respect of lease premiums. With regard to 
lease improvements, the amount of the allowance is determined as the difference between the 
amount of the accrual and its present value discounted over the period of the lease taken into 
account for the purpose of determining the lessee's yearly deduction and adjusted according to 
the particular circumstances, if any (Meyerowitz, 1997: 12-32). 
However, no deduction is permitted to the taxpayer in respect of a right to improvements if-
• the taxpayer or the lessee is a company and the lessee or the taxpayer, as the case may 
be, is effectively interested in more than 50% of any class of shares issued by the 
company, whether directly as a shareholder, or indirectly as a shareholder in any other 
company; or 
• both the taxpayer and the lessee are companies and any third person is effectively 
interested in more than 50% of any class of shares issued by one of those companies 
and in more than 50% of any class of shares issued by the other company, whether 
directly as a shareholder in the company by which the shares were issued or indirectly 
as a shareholder in any other company. 
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The relationships described above include the relationships which exist within a closely held 
group, with result that the section ll(h) allowance will not be granted where the improvements 
are effected by one group company to another's property. The irony in this situation cannot be 
escaped: an allowance which would counter the anomaly of negative net present values in respect 
of tax cash flows arising from intra-group leasehold improvements is prohibited because the lease 
agreement is concluded between group members. 
2.11 THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 24J TO INSTRUMENTS TRANSFERRED 
BETWEEN GROUP MEMBERS 
2.11.1 Introduction 
Section 24J was introduced into the Act mainly for two reasons. The first is to provide for 
synchronisation between the time when interest is incurred for purposes of section ll(a) and the 
time when interest is accrued for purposes of the definition of gross income in section 1 
(Meyerowitz, 1997: 13-27), thereby preventing instances where the issuer of an instrument 
claims a deduction of interest in one year of assessment on the grounds that it is incurred by him 
in that year, while the holder of the instrument includes the interest in his gross income in a later 
year of assessment on the grounds that it accrues to him in that year. 
The second reason for section 24J's existence is to expand the meaning of interest to include 
related finance charges, discounts and premiums. In this way capital/revenue mismatches are 
prevented with regard to amounts that represent interest in substance. For example, a loan can be 
granted on condition that the capital amount thereof must be repaid with a premium. Before the 
introduction of section 24J, the grantor of the loan may have argued that the premium was of a 
capital nature, while the grantee may have argued that the premium was of a revenue nature, as 
the payment thereof secured no enduring benefit. 
By preventing timing differences with regard to the incurral and accrual of interest, as well as 
capital/revenue mismatches with regard to amounts that constitute interest in substance, section 
24J represents a significant improvement over the situation that existed prior to its introduction. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
78 
However, an examination of its operation will reveal that new anomalies have been created 
which are especially glaring within a group context. 
2.11.2 Operation of section 24J and the anomalies created thereby 
The operation of section 24J will not be discussed extensively in this work. Suffice to say that it 
mainly governs the incurral and accrual of interest, by applying a yield to maturity to the initial or 
adjusted initial amount of an instrument. The yield to maturity represents the internal rate of 
return of the cash flows associated with the instrument. Instruments, in relation to companies, are 
defined in very broad terms to include all interest-bearing arrangements. 
When an instrument is transferred between group companies, certain tax anomalies may arise. 
Section 24J(4) governs the incurral of an adjusted loss and the accrual of an adjusted gain on the 
transfer of an instrument, but does not determine the capital or revenue nature of such a loss or 
gain. The latter issue is still dealt with under the definition of gross income in section 1 and the 
general deduction formula in section ll(a), according to the principles established by the courts. 
Consequently, capitaVrevenue mismatches may still occur, as will be illustrated by the following 
examples. 
Assume that Holdco grants a loan of RI 00 000 to X, an unrelated party, at the end of year 0. 
Interest of R5 000 will be payable at the end of year 1 and year 2, while the loan will be 
redeemed by a payment ofRllO 000 at the end of year 2. Holdco 's cash flows in respect of the 
instrument are presented in Table 2.6, assuming that the instrument is held until maturity. 
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Table 2.6 
Cash flows in respect of section 24J instrument to Holdco, assuming that the instrument is 
held to maturity 
Year 0 Year 1 Year2 
I Amount (100 000) 5 000 115 000 
The yield to maturity equals 9,7672%, and the amortisation of cash inflows is presented in Table 
2.7. 
Table 2.7 
Amortisation of cash flows in respect of section 24J instrument 
Payment Interest portion Capital portion Capital 
outstanding 
YearO - - - 100 000 
Year 1 (5 000) 9 767 4 767 104 767 
Year 2 (115 000) 10 233 (104 767) -
The application of section 24J has the effect of deeming R9 767 of interest to accrue to Holdco in 
year 1, and deeming RIO 233 to accrue in year 2. The total amount of interest accrued is 
R20 000, which equals the net cash inflow to Holdco. 
Assume, now, that Holdco decides to transfer the instrument to a wholly owned subsidiary, 
Subco, at the end of year 1. If the instrument is transferred at a price ranging from Rl 00 000 to 
R104 767, the difference between the price and the adjusted capital amount of R104 767 will 
constitute a loss that is specifically deductible under section 24J( 4A)(i), the reason being that 
interest of R4 767 has been deemed to accrue to Holdco in year 1, while the net cash gain in 
respect of the instrument is less than that amount. For example, if the transfer price is Rl 02 000, 
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the adjusted loss will equal R2 767 (R104 767- R102 000). The net increase in Holdco's taxable 
income will therefore amount to R7 000 (R9 767- R2 767), which corresponds to the net cash 
gam. 
Where the transfer price is below R100 000 or above R104 767, section 24J(4A)(i) does not 
explicitly govern the deductibility ofthe adjusted loss below RlOO 000 or the adjusted gain above 
R 1 04 7 67. Section 24J ( 4) merely states that such loss or gain shall be deemed to have been 
incurred by or accrued to the taxpayer in the year of transfer, which is year 1. The capital or 
revenue nature of the loss or gain must still be determined in accordance with the principles 
established by the courts. 
If Holdco is not a trader in the instrument that is transferred, the loss or gain referred to in the 
preceding paragraph will be of a capital nature and therefore not deductible or taxable. Assume, 
for example that the instrument is transferred to Subco at a price of R1 08 000. The adjusted gain 
on transfer is R3 233 (R108 000- R104 767), and although it is deemed to accrue to Holdco in 
year 1, the gain will not be included in Holdco' s gross income because of its capital nature. 
The cash flows in respect of the instrument with regard to Holdco, Subco and the group are 
presented in Table 2.8. 
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Table 2.8 
Cash flows in respect of section 24J instrument with regard to Holdco, Subco and the 
group, assuming that it is transferred at the end of year 1 at a price of Rl 08 000 
Holdco: 
YearO Year 1 Year 2 
I Cash flow (100 000) 113 000 -
Subco: 
YearO Year 1 Year 2 
I Cash flow - (108 000) (115 000) 
Group: 
YearO Year 1 Year2 
[Cash flow (1 00 000) (5 000) (115 000) 
The yield to maturity of the instrument in Subco's hands is 6,4818%. The amount of interest 
deemed to accrue to Subco in year 2 equals R7 000 (108 000 * 6.4818%), which corresponds to 
Subco's net cash gain ofR7 000. 
From a group perspective, the cash flows in respect of the instrument are the same whether it is 
transferred or not, because the receipt of the R 108 000 by Holdco is cancelled by the payment of 
R108 000 by Subco. Nevertheless, the intra-group transfer will reduce the incremental taxable 
income in respect of the instrument from R20 000 (R9 767 +RIO 233) to R16 767 (R9 767 + 
R 7 000). The difference of R3 233 represents the capital gain made by Holdco on the transfer of 
the instrument to Subco. The scheme should escape an application of section 103(1) if the 
transfer occurs at market value and if a bona fide business purpose other than the obtaining of a 
tax benefit can be demonstrated. For example, it may be argued that the transfer was effected to 
alleviate cash flow problems experienced by Holdco. 
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If a group company is the issuer of an instrument, instead of its holder, a similar tax advantage 
can be obtained by transferring the instrument to another member of the group. Assume the same 
information as in the above-mentioned example, except that Holdco issues the instrument to an 
unrelated party, and that the liability is transferred to Subco at the end of year 1, with Holdco 
paying an amount of R98 000 to Subco in return. Holdco will be deemed to incur interest of 
R9 767 in year 1, while an adjusted gain on transfer of R6 767 (RI 04 767 - R98 000) will be 
deemed to accrue to it in that year. A portion of this gain, namely R4 767 (R104 767 -
RIOO 000), will be included in Holdco's gross income under section 24J(4A)(ii), as this 
represents the amount of interest deemed to be incurred by Holdco under section 241(2), which 
will never be paid by it as result of the transfer. If Holdco is not a dealer in the transferred 
instrument, the remaining portion of the gain will be capital in nature and therefore not taxable. 
Subco will experience a cash inflow of R98 000 in respect of the instrument at the end of year 1 
and a cash outflow of R115 000 at the end of year 2. The yield to maturity of the instrument in 
Subco's hands will be 17,3469% and the interest deemed to be incurred by it in year 2 will equal 
R17 000 (R98 000 * 17,3469%). This corresponds to Subco's net cash loss in respect of the 
instrument. Again, the group's cash flows in respect of the instrument are not affected by its 
transfer between the companies. Nevertheless, because the instrument has been transferred, the 
net deduction of the group amounts to R22 000 (R9 767- R4 767 + R17 000) instead ofR20 000 
(R9 767 + RIO 233). The reason is that a capital gain in the hands of Holdco is treated as a 
deductible expense in the hands of Subco. 
It should be noted that the transfer of instruments between group members that do not trade in 
such instruments could also produce unfavourable tax effects. This will happen when the holder 
of an instrument transfers it at a price below the initial amount, resulting in a capital loss which 
will be treated as interest income in the hands of the transferee. Similarly, unfavourable tax 
effects will be produced when the issuer of an instrument transfers it for compensation in excess 
of the adjusted initial amount, resulting in a capital loss that will effectively be excluded from the 
calculation of the transferee's interest expenditure. 
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The transfer of instruments between group members may therefore result in favourable or 
unfavourable tax effects, depending on the amount at which the instruments are transferred. On 
the other hand, the transfer of instruments between different operating divisions of a 
divisionalised company will produce no tax consequences. 
2.12 THE SHIFTING OF INCOME BETWEEN COMPANIES TO UTILISE ASSESSED 
LOSSES 
2.12.1 Introduction 
A divisionalised company will not experience difficulty in transferring an assessed loss from one 
branch of activity to another. In fact, section 20( 1 )(b) of the Act specifically states that a person 
shall set off an assessed loss incurred by him in carrying on a trade in the Republic against 
income derived from another trade carried on within the Republic to determine his taxable 
income for a year of assessment. 
On the other hand, if each of the trades is located in a separate group company, it may be difficult 
to utilise one company's assessed loss by transferring income from another company within the 
group. A deduction may not be allowed under sections ll(a) and 23(g) in respect of expenditure 
incurred by a profitable group company as result of a transfer arrangement. In addition, section 
1 03(2) may prohibit the set off of a group company's assessed loss against the income that 
accrues to it as result of such an arrangement. It is therefore necessary to examine the operation 
of sections ll(a), 23(g) and 103(2) within the context of intra-group income transfers to 
determine whether groups can effectively set off assessed losses against income on a group-wide 
basis. If this is found not to be the case, the conclusion can be reached that equity does not exist 
between groups and divisionalised companies with regard to the utilisation of assessed losses. 
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2.12.2 Sections ll(a) and 23(g) 
2.12.2.1 Introduction 
The deductibility of expenditure under sections ll(a) and 23(g) with regard to intra-group 
transactions in general has already been discussed. From that discussion, it is clear that 
expenditure with regard to an intra-group transaction will only be deductible to the extent that it 
relates to the trade of the particular group company incurring the expenditure. This principle is 
relevant whether an intra-group transaction is entered into for bona fide purposes other than the 
obtaining of a tax benefit, or whether an intra-group transaction is entered into with the express 
purpose of transferring income to a group company with an assessed loss in an attempt to 
accelerate the utilisation of that loss. 
Where income is transferred between group companies with the express purpose of accelerating 
the utilisation of assessed losses, the amount of the expenditure incurred by the profitable group 
company under the transfer arrangement may be excessive. As the deductibility of excessive 
expenditure under sections 11(a) and 23(g) has not yet been discussed, this section will address 
the issue by examining relevant court cases. 
2.12 .2.2 ITC 567 (1944) 
ITC 567 dealt with the deductibility of interest paid by a company to its shareholders. The 
company in question admitted that the sole reason why interest was charged on shareholders' 
loans was to diminish its tax liability. As this case considered the deductibility of expenditure 
aimed at shifting income between taxable entities, the principles established therein are relevant 
for purposes of this study, although the transaction was not concluded between group members. 
The facts of the case were as follow. The company in question borrowed substantial amounts 
from its shareholders and initially no interest was charged on the loans. During the 1943 year of 
assessment it was decided that interest of 8% should be credited to shareholders in respect of 
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their loans to the company. The Commissioner disallowed a deduction of interest in excess of 
6%, which was considered a fair rate by him, on the grounds that the excess interest was not 
expended in the production of the company's income and furthermore was not wholly and 
exclusively laid out for the company's trade. 
The Court stated that it is essential to ascertain the purpose for which expenditure is incurred, as 
laid down in Port Elizabeth Electric Tramways. Ordinarily, when money is borrowed for the 
purpose of investment in the taxpayer's business, the interest he pays represents expenditure 
incurred in keeping the loan afloat. However, the Court referred to the fact that the shareholder's 
loans in the case under consideration did not carry interest for a considerable period. 
Furthermore, there was no evidence of a contract or agreement between the shareholders and the 
company to the effect that the money would only continue to remain on loan in the future if 
interest was paid on it. The Court found that the dominant purpose of the interest was to reduce 
the taxable income of the company, a fact that was frankly admitted by the company. 
Consequently, it could not be said that the interest was incurred in the production of the 
company's income, and that it was laid out wholly and exclusively for purposes of its trade. The 
Court was of the opinion that the whole amount of the interest should have been disallowed as a 
deduction, but nevertheless confirmed the assessment of the Commissioner, which only 
disallowed the interest in excess of 6%. 
From this case the conclusion can be drawn that expenditure incurred by a group company will 
not be in the production of its income derived from trade, if the purpose of such expenditure is to 
secure a tax benefit for the group. 
2.12.2.3 ITC 621 (1946) 
The taxpayer in ITC 621 sought to deduct a sum of £500, which was paid for the insertion of an 
advertisement in a souvenir programme of a public event. The Commissioner, being of the 
opinion that a portion of the £500 was not expenditure incurred in the production of the 
taxpayer's income and was not laid out wholly and exclusively for the purposes of its trade, 
disallowed £440 of the total amount as a deduction. 
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The Court considered the application of the following dictum formulated by Watermeyer AJP in 
Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway Company Ltd v CIR: " .. . the words of the statute (in section 
ll(a)) are 'actually incurred' not 'necessarily incurred'. The use of the word 'actually' as 
contrasted with the word 'necessarily' may widen the field of deductible expenditure. For 
instance, one man may conduct his business inefficiently or extravagantly, actually incurring 
expenses which another man does not incur; such expenses therefore are not necessary, but they 
are actually incurred and therefore deductible." Bearing this dictum in mind, the Court stated that 
it was not its function to assess what would have been a fair amount of expenditure in the 
circumstances. Where, however, the amount expended is such that it creates an impression upon 
the mind of the Court that it is an extravagant amount, the Court will enquire as to what the 
motives were which may have led to the expenditure. In such a case, following the usual rules, 
the onus will be on the taxpayer to justify the expenditure as being in total expended in the 
production of income and wholly and exclusively for the purposes ofhis trade. 
Unlike the taxpayer in ITC 567, the company in question advanced commercial reasons for the 
total expenditure of £500. In attempting to prove that the amount was not extravagant, it stated 
that there was a paper shortage at the time and that, accordingly, advertising space was limited. 
Furthermore, although the rate was higher than the rate usually paid in the case of ordinary 
commercial publications, the event was a special occasion at which a large number of potential 
customers were expected to be present. The cost was therefore considered good value. 
Nevertheless, the Court was unconvinced that the £500 was not extravagant in the circumstances 
and proceeded to raise the enquiry as to why such an extravagant amount was paid. It concluded 
that the company, through the medium of an advertisement, intended to contribute a gift to the 
cause with which the promoters of the event were concerned. The Court held that the whole 
amount was not expended in the production of the company's income and wholly and exclusively 
for the purposes of its trade. The Commissioner's assessment was therefore confirmed. 
Although this case did not deal with an intra-group transaction, the principles formulated therein 
are nevertheless relevant with regard to techniques whereby income is transferred. Not only must 
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the transaction through which income is transferred be commercially justifiable, but the amount 
of the transaction must also be reasonable to be wholly deductible under sections 11(a) and 23(g). 
2.12.2.4 ITC 1530 (1990) 
The taxpayer in ITC 1530 sought to deduct interest expenditure ofR3 283 236 paid to its holding 
company. The holding company had borrowed the money at prime and lent it to the appellant at 
29,25%. During the 1985 year of assessment, when the loan was granted to the taxpayer, the 
average prime rate was approximately 23.2%. During the 1987 year of assessment, in which the 
deduction was claimed, the average prime rate was only 13,2%, providing the holding company 
with a profit margin of 125% on its interest expenditure. The Commissioner considered the 
interest incurred by the taxpayer excessive and disallowed the portion thereof in excess of 21.3% 
as not being in the production of income in terms of section 11(a) and as not being wholly and 
exclusively laid out for the purposes of trade in terms of section 23(g). 
The taxpayer contended that its business was risky and that all its assets were already pledged as 
security for other liabilities. The directors of the taxpayer were of the opinion that it would be 
unable to obtain further finance elsewhere in the market and that the rate of 29,25% was therefore 
not excessive. 
The Court referred to the fact that the taxpayer's holding company had a considerable assessed 
loss and stated that it was highly unlikely that the tax implications of the transaction were not 
taken into consideratiOn. According to the Court, such implications must have played an 
important part in determining the amount of interest that was charged. Thus, the interest 
expenditure not only had regard to the earning of income by the taxpayer from its own trade, but 
it also had regard to the tax position of the group. 
The Court concluded that the appellant had not discharged the onus to show that the rate of 
29,25% was just and reasonable. As the Commissioner for Revenue stated that a rate of 21,3% 
would be acceptable and the taxpayer did not advance an alternative rate, the Court allowed a 
deduction of interest calculated at 21.3 %. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
88 
2.12.3 Section 103(2) 
2.12.3.1 Introduction 
Section 103(2) of the Act comes into operation when the Commissioner is satisfied-
• that an agreement affecting a company has been entered into, or a change m 
shareholding of any company has been effected; 
• that, as a direct or indirect result of this, income has been received by or has accrued 
to that company during the year of assessment; and 
• that the agreement has been entered into, or the change in shareholding has been 
effected solely or mainly for the purpose of utilising any assessed loss or balance of 
assessed loss incurred by that company, in order to avoid liability on the part of that 
company or any other person for the payment of any tax, duty or levy on income, or to 
reduce the amount thereof. 
If all three of the above requirements are met, the set off of any such assessed loss or balance of 
assessed loss against any such income shall be disallowed. 
The section applies whether there has been an agreement affecting a company or a change in 
shareholding of that company. It is considered that a very wide interpretation must be given to 
the phrase "any agreement affecting any company" (Butterworths Electronic Publishers, 1996: 
26.4). Thus transactions whereby income is transferred between group members should fall 
within the meaning of the phrase. 
Generally the onus is upon a taxpayer to prove that a decision of the Commissioner is incorrect, 
but section 103(4) specifically deals with the matter of onus in relation to section 103(2). Section 
103(4) states that whenever in proceedings relating to an appeal under that section it is proved 
that an agreement or change in shareholding would result in the avoidance of a person's tax 
liability or in the reduction of the amount of that liability, it shall be presumed until the contrary 
is proved that the agreement had been entered into or the change in shareholding had been 
effected solely or mainly for the purpose of utilising the assessed loss or balance of assessed loss 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
89 
to avoid or reduce the amount of the person's tax liability. The underlying implication is that the 
Commissioner must prove -
• that there was an agreement or a change in shareholding; 
• that this directly or indirectly resulted in income being received by or having accrued 
to the company in question; and 
• that the agreement or change in shareholding lead to an avoidance or reduction of the 
amount of a liability for tax (Butterworths Electronic Publishers, 1996: 26.6). 
This affords only a small concession to the taxpayer, as the onus place upon the Commissioner 
relates to factual requirements that are relatively easy to prove. The issue that is usually difficult 
to resolve is whether the sole or main purpose of the agreement or change in shareholding was 
the utilisation of an assessed loss. In fact, most court cases focused on this question (Butterworths 
Electronic Publishers, 1996: 26.4), and the burden of proof in this regard is placed squarely on 
the shoulders of the taxpayer. Nevertheless, if a sound commercial purpose can be advanced for 
the agreement or change in shareholding, and it can be demonstrated that the existence of the 
assessed loss was merely incidental to that purpose, section 1 03(2) will not be applicable. An 
examination of relevant court cases will indicate the characteristics that such an agreement or 
change in shareholding must possess before it will escape an attack under section 1 03(2). 
2.12.3.2 ITC 983 (1963) 
The taxpayer in ITC 983 was a company that manufactured clothing, but subsequently closed 
down its business. It had a large accumulated assessed loss. Another company in the clothing 
industry experienced a significant expansion in its business and found it difficult to produce 
sufficient clothing to fulfil all orders. Consequently, it acquired the shares in the taxpayer 
company and production was recommenced on a cut, make and trim basis. Because of the 
recommencement of business, the taxpayer again received income, and the Commissioner 
disallowed the set off of its assessed loss against such income by applying section 1 03(2). 
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The Commissioner argued that the sole or main purpose of the change in shareholding of the 
appellant company was the utilisation of its assessed loss and referred to the following facts as 
motivation: 
• The appellant company had a substantial assessed loss. 
• It had ceased production at the time of sale and it had no employees at that time. 
• The consideration paid by the purchasing company for the shares exceeded the 
intrinsic value ofthe tangible assets and therefore included an amount in respect of the 
assessed loss. 
• The deed of sale provided for a lease of the premises on which the taxpayer conducted 
its business for a period of six months only. 
The Court, however, considered the following factors in deciding that, although the utilisation of 
the taxpayer's assessed loss was a purpose of the acquisition, the main purpose was to obtain a 
production unit that could go into immediate operation: 
• Only during negotiations for the acquisition of the taxpayer's shares did the acquiring 
company discover that the taxpayer had an assessed loss. 
• The taxpayer owned machinery, furniture and fittings, which were installed and ready 
for use. 
• The taxpayer occupied premises that had been approved by the authorities for use as a 
factory and because the premises were not for sale, the only practical alternative to 
secure the premises was to purchase the shares in the taxpayer. 
• Although it might have been possible to secure other premises, purchase new 
machinery and establish a factory, such a course of action would result in long delays 
before production could be commenced. 
• Although the purchase consideration of £2 750 exceeded the value of tangible assets 
by £1 750, certain valuable trade marks were also included in the purchase, and the 
remaining balance was not unduly large, having regard to the fact that immediate 
production would be possible. 
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From the judgement in this case it appears that if the utilisation of an acquired company's 
assessed loss is merely incidental to a plausible commercial purpose, section 1 03(2) will not be 
applicable. 
2.12.3.3 ITC 989 (1963) 
The company in question had carried on business as a timber merchant for a considerable period 
and incurred trading losses for several years. The total shareholding in the company was acquired 
by another company, whose activities consisted mainly of the manufacture of timber products. 
The acquiring company previously sold its products directly to builders. However, this resulted in 
the undercutting of timber merchants, who consequently refused to buy timber products from the 
acquiring company. By purchasing the taxpayer's shares, the acquiring company could channel 
its sales to final consumers through the taxpayer, which would enable it to sell timber to other 
timber merchants as well. 
After the acquisition the acquiring company effected all sales of timber to builders through the 
taxpayer. The latter purchased timber from the acquiring company at normal wholesale prices 
and sold it to builders at retail prices. The Commissioner disallowed the set off of the taxpayer's 
assessed loss against the income so derived by it, contending that the sole or main purpose of the 
change in shareholding was the utilisation of the taxpayer's assessed loss. 
The Court found that the main purpose of the acquisition was to obtain a separate channel 
through which retail sales could be effected in order to secure new wholesale outlets for the 
acquiring company, and to obtain other commercial benefits. It considered the following factors 
in arriving at this conclusion: 
• The taxpayer was recognized by the Timber Merchant's Association as a timber 
merchant. Had the acquiring company formed a new company, it would not 
necessarily be recognized by the Association. 
• The acquiring company provided figures substantiating its claim that wholesale sales 
would be increased through the separation of its wholesale and retail activities. 
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• The acquiring company was convinced that the taxpayer got into trading difficulties 
through mismanagement and that its business could be turned around. The taxpayer 
was therefore an attractive business prospect and would not merely serve as a vehicle 
for the absorption of income. 
• The taxpayer had an important quota for softwoods. This would enable the acquiring 
company to provide its customers with their softwood needs. 
Finding that the main purpose of the change in shareholding, as stated by the taxpayer, appeared 
reasonable, the Court held that section 1 03(2) did not apply to the change in shareholding. 
2.12.3.4 ITC 1123 (1969) 
The taxpayer in question had been engaged in the business of manufacturing, but it experienced 
financial difficulties and consequently went into liquidation. The liquidators systematically 
disposed of its assets until only the immovable property remained. R, a creditor of the taxpayer, 
made an offer for the property. The liquidators, however, suggested that he purchase the shares in 
the taxpayer instead of the property to save transfer duty and the costs of incorporating a new 
company to deal with the property. As a creditor of the taxpayer, R was fully aware of the 
taxpayer's financial position, including the existence of a considerable assessed loss, from the 
liquidators' documents. 
Two other persons were also interested in acquiring the property and intended to make a higher 
offer for it. To avoid this, R accepted them as eo-shareholders in the taxpayer, although it soon 
became apparent that the shareholders could not work together. Consequently, the other two 
persons purchased the property from the company. The net effect of the series of transactions was 
that R became the sole shareholder of the taxpayer, having paid nothing for its shares, at a time 
when it had no net assets, no premises and no business. However, it had a large assessed loss. 
R induced the taxpayer to commence trading activities, but not as a manufacturing concern. The 
trading activities fell into two categories, namely (a) transactions with companies under the 
control of R which produced income by way of commissions, interest, administration fees and 
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profit on the sale of certain articles purchased from such companies, and (b) transactions with 
outside parties which included the buying and selling of machinery and equipment, the lending of 
money at interest and the discounting of bills. 
The Court found that there were two changes in shareholding for the purposes of section 1 03(2) -
namely the acquisition of the taxpayer by B and his eo-shareholders, and the subsequent 
acquisition by B of the other shareholders' shares. During the first change of shareholding the 
shareholders had a dual purpose, namely to obtain control of the taxpayer's immovable property 
and to utilise its assessed loss by setting it off against rental income which would be produced by 
such property. It was not necessary to establish which of these purposes was the main purpose, 
because the sole purpose of the second change in shareholding was found to be the utilisation by 
B of the taxpayer's assessed loss. 
The Court further stated that section 1 03(2) not only applies to income diverted from other 
persons, as was the case with the income derived from category (a) transactions, but also applies 
to income produced by the company's own activities, as was the case with the income derived 
from category (b) transactions. According to the Court, the wording of section 1 03(2) is wide 
enough to encompass both types of income. Moreover, if section 1 03(2) were to apply to diverted 
income only, the intention of the Legislature would have been thwarted. 
2.12.3.5 Conshu (Pty) Ltd v CIR (1994) 
Conshu (Pty) Ltd v CIR differs from the previous three cases discussed, as the Court considered 
the timing of the application of section 1 03(2), instead of the purpose of an agreement or change 
in shareholding. 
The taxpayer in question conducted business as a tyre retreader and dealer. Its trade results were 
poor and it accumulated a substantial assessed loss. Towards the end of the 1985 year of 
assessment, a change in the taxpayer's shareholding occurred as part of a reorganisation of the 
group of which the taxpayer was a member. Furthermore, the taxpayer disposed of the bulk of its 
own assets and acquired all the trading assets and liabilities of another company in the group. The 
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result of this arrangement was that a profitable footwear enterprise was transferred to the 
taxpayer, which had an assessed loss and was previously engaged in an unrelated venture. 
The Commissioner applied section 103(2) to disallow the set off of the taxpayer's assessed loss 
against income derived from the footwear business, contending that all the requirements of the 
section had been satisfied. The taxpayer conceded that an agreement had been entered into, 
resulting in income being received by or having accrued to it, and that the agreement had been 
entered into solely or mainly to utilise its assessed loss to avoid liability for tax. Nevertheless, the 
taxpayer argued that the Commissioner was not entitled to apply section 1 03(2) in any year of 
assessment following the year during which the agreement was entered into. 
It should be noted that the agrgement in question and the ensuing acquisition of the footwear 
business took place on the last day of the 1985 year of assessment, which was a Sunday. 
Therefore, no income could have been earned by the taxpayer because of the agreement in 
question during that year of assessment. Furthermore, the assessed loss at the end of that year 
could not be set off against such income. 
The basis of the taxpayer's argument was that according to a strict interpretation of section 
1 03(2), it only prohibits the set off of the assessed loss as contemplated in the agreement. In the 
case of the taxpayer, this meant the assessed loss as at the end of the 1985 year. This argument 
was endorsed by the minority of the Court (Butterworths Electronic Publishers, 1996: 26.4). 
However, the majority of the Court held that the wording of section 1 03(2) entitled the 
Commissioner to disallow the set off of the assessed loss in any year subsequent to the year of the 
agreement and that to hold otherwise would destroy the purpose of the section. 
The implication of this decision is that the Commissioner is not limited to the balance of the 
assessed loss at the time when the agreement is entered into or the change in shareholding is 
effected. Should the balance of the assessed loss therefore increase in subsequent years, the 
increase in such balance may also be disqualified from set off against 'tainted' income (Huxham 
& Haupt, 1997: 310). 
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2.12.3.6 Reach of section 1 03(2) in practice 
Interestingly, none of the above cases dealt with the situation where an agreement is entered into 
between existing group companies, independently of a change in shareholding, whereby income 
is transferred to a group company with excess deductions to avoid the visible accumulation of an 
assessed loss. In all of the cases that were discussed, a change in shareholding occurred. 
Furthermore, income was transferred to utilise assessed losses that have accumulated visibly. 
The reason for this phenomenon is that a change in the shareholding of a company and the 
presence of a visible assessed loss are prominent signals that will alert the Commissioner to a 
possible application of section 1 03(2). On the other hand, where an existing member of a group 
begins to experience financial difficulties, the immediate transfer of income through intra-group 
transactions will absorb the excess deductions of such a member, thereby hiding the existence of 
an assessed loss. In these circumstances there will be no obvious warning directing the 
Commissioner's attention to the intra-group transfer of income. 
Thus, many intra-group transfers of income which satisfy the requirements of section 1 03(2) may 
escape an attack under that section because the tax authorities are not aware of the existence of 
such transfers. If this is indeed the case, the conclusion can be drawn that section 1 03(2) is 
merely a theoretical risk rather than a significant practical constraint to intra-group income 
transfers between group companies. 
2.12.4 Interaction between sections 11 (a), 23(g), and section 1 03(2) with regard to intra-group 
transfers of income 
As have been demonstrated in section 2.12.2 and section 2.12.3, income cannot be transferred 
indiscriminately between group members to accelerate the utilisation of assessed losses of certain 
companies. Expenditure arising from a transfer arrangement will only be deductible under 
sections 11(a) and 23(g) by the transferor if the expenditure is incurred for the purposes of its 
trade and not for purposes of group tax optimisation. Furthermore, the transferee may not set off 
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its assessed loss against the transferred income if the sole or main purpose of the arrangement 
was to avoid or reduce the amount of a tax liability through such a set off. 
The interaction of sections 11 (a) and 23(g) and section 1 03(2) with regard to intra-group transfers 
of income can be illustrated through an example. Assume that Holdco incurs an assessed loss of 
R100 for a particular year of assessment, while its wholly owned subsidiary, Subco, has taxable 
income of R100 for that year. In an attempt to harmonise the tax expense for the year with 
taxable income from a group perspective, Holdco charges an amount ofR100 to Subco in respect 
of management services rendered during the year of assessment. 
The tax positions of Holdco and Subco are presented in Table 2.9, if it is assumed that the 
management fee is deductible by Subco under sections ll(a) and 23(g), while section 103(2) 
does not prohibit the setting off of Holdco' s assessed loss against the management fee. 
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Table 2.9 
The shifting of income between group companies: tax positions of Holdco and Subco if 
Subco may deduct the management fee and Holdco may set off its assessed loss against such 
management fee 
Holdco Subco Group 
Taxable Net profit Taxable Net profit Taxable Net profit 
income I income I income I 
(assessed (assessed (assessed 
loss) loss) loss) 
Taxable (100) (100) 100 100 - -
income I 
(assessed 
loss) 
before 
manage-
ment fee 
Manage- 100 100 (100) (100) - -
ment fee 
Taxable 
- - - - - -
income 
As can be seen from the above table, the tax result from a group perspective is identical to the 
result that would have been obtained if the group had been a divisionalised company. 
The tax positions of Holdco and Subco are presented in Table 2.1 0, if it is assumed that the 
management fee is deductible by Subco under sections ll(a) and 23(g), while section 103(2) 
prohibits the setting off ofHoldco 's assessed loss against the management fee. 
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Table 2.10 
The shifting of income between group companies: tax positions of Holdco and Subco if 
Subco may deduct the management fee and Holdco may not set off its assessed loss against 
such management fee 
Holdco Subco Group 
Taxable Net Taxable Net profit Taxable Net profit 
income I profit income I income I 
(assessed (assessed (assessed 
loss) loss) loss) 
Taxable (100) (100) 100 100 - -
income I 
(assessed 
loss) before 
manage-
ment fee 
Manage- 100 100 (100) (100) - -
ment fee 
Unutilised (100) - - - (100) -
assessed 
loss 
Taxable 100 - - - 100 -
income 
As can be seen from the table, the tax result in this instance is virtually identical to the result that 
would have been obtained if no transfer of income had occurred between Holdco and Subco. The 
only difference is that Holdco instead of Subco is taxed upon an amount of R100. Thus, the 
transfer of income has not achieved immediate utilisation ofHoldco's assessed loss. 
The tax positions of Holdco and Subco are presented in Table 2.11, if it is assumed that the 
management fee is not deductible by Subco under sections 11(a) and 23(g), while section 103(2) 
does not prohibit the setting off ofHoldco's assessed loss against the management fee. 
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Table 2.11 
The shifting of income between group companies: tax positions of Holdco and Subco if 
Subco may not deduct the management fee and Holdco may set off its assessed loss against 
such management fee 
Holdco Subco Group 
Taxable Net profit Taxable Net profit Taxable Net profit 
income I income I income I 
(assessed (assessed (assessed 
loss) loss) loss) 
Taxable (lOO) (100) 100 100 - -
income I 
(assessed 
loss) 
before 
manage-
ment fee 
Manage- 100 100 (-) (lOO) - -
ment fee 
Taxable - - 100 - 100 -
income I 
(assessed 
loss) 
In this instance the taxable income of the group is greater that its net income, because the receipt 
of the management fee by Holdco has increased its taxable income, while the payment of the 
management fee by Subco has not decreased its taxable income commensurately. The transfer of 
income from Subco exhausts Holdco' s assessed loss, although Subco is not granted a deduction 
to compensate for such exhaustion. 
Finally, the tax positions of Holdco and Subco are presented in Table 2.12, if it is assumed that 
the management fee is not deductible by Subco under sections 11(a) and 23(g), while section 
103(2) prohibits the setting offofHoldco's assessed loss against the management fee. 
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Table 2.12 
The shifting of income between group companies: tax positions of Holdco and Subco if 
Subco may not deduct the management fee and Holdco may not set off its assessed loss 
against such management fee 
Holdco Subco Group 
Taxable Net Taxable Net profit Taxable Net profit 
income I profit income I income I 
(assessed (assessed (assessed 
loss) los~ los~ 
Taxable (100) (100) 100 100 (100) I -
income I 100 
(assessed 
loss) before 
manage-
ment fee 
Manage- 100 100 (-) (100) 100 -
ment fee 
Unutilised (100) - - (100) -
assessed 
loss 
Taxable 100 - 100 - 200 -
income 
As can be seen from the table above, the tax result in this instance is particularly adverse. Not 
only is Holdco's taxable income increased without a commensurate decrease in Holdco' taxable 
income, but furthermore Holdco may not set off its assessed loss against the increase in its 
taxable income. 
It is clear from the alternatives described above that the application of sections ll(a) and 23(g) as 
well as section 1 03(2) to income transfers between group companies can produce a variety of tax 
effects. The first alternative described above produces a tax effect similar to the effect that would 
have been obtained if the group had been a divisionalised company. Although equity is achieved 
between group structures and divisional structures in this instance, it may be at the expense of 
neutrality if the transfer arrangement has to be structured in a specific way to overcome the 
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pitfalls of section 23(g) and section 1 03(2). The second alternative produces a tax effect similar 
to the effect that would have been achieved if the transfer of income did not occur. Thus, in this 
instance neutrality may be compromised without achieving equity. Finally, the third and fourth 
alternatives produce tax effects which are not only less favourable than the effects that would 
have been obtained if the group was a divisionalised company, but which are also less favourable 
than the effects that would have been obtained if the transfer of income did not occur. The 
execution of a transfer arrangement may therefore involve a significant amount of risk if 
uncertainty exists about the possible application of sections 23(g) and 1 03(2). 
2.12. 5 Conclusion 
Sections 11(a) and 23(g) as well as section 103(2) hinder the transfer of income between group 
members in order to accelerate the utilisation of assessed losses of specific companies. Although 
these hindrances can be overcome, this does not imply that assessed losses of certain group 
members can be indiscriminately set off against other group members' income. Consequently, 
equity and neutrality are compromised. 
Arrangements whereby income is transferred between group companies may have other negative 
implications. Tax consultants and managers of enterprises expend considerable effort to plan and 
implement transfer arrangements which will overcome the obstacles created by sections 23(g) 
and 1 03(2). Such effort can be devoted to more productive purposes. Furthermore, transfer 
arrangements may interfere with measures intended to promote operational efficiency. For 
example, companies may be formed as autonomous units for the purposes of performance 
evaluation. Thg actual transfer of income between companies for tax purposgs may affect 
measures of operational performance, thereby demotivating managers who are evaluated 
according to such measures. Finally, transfer arrangements will unfairly prejudice or benefit 
minority shareholders within group structures if commensurate value is not received for the 
transfer of income between group companies. 
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2.13 SECTION 103(1) AND INTRA-GROUP TRANSACTIONS 
2.13.1 Introduction 
Section 1 03(1) of the Act serves as a general anti-avoidance provision, granting specific powers 
to the Commissioner in relation to certain transactions, operations or schemes which have the 
effect of avoiding, reducing or postponing liability for the payment of tax. 
The remedy available to the Commissioner under section 103(1) is to determine a person's 
liability for any tax, duty or levy imposed by the Income Tax Act, and the amount of that tax, 
duty or levy: 
• as if the transaction, operation or scheme in question has not been entered into or 
carried out; or 
• in such a manner as he deems appropriate in the circumstances of the case. 
The powers described above are available to the . Commissioner only when the following four 
requirements are satisfied: 
• a transaction, operation or scheme has been entered into or carried out; 
• which has the effect of avoiding, postponing liability for the payment of any tax, duty 
or levy imposed by the Act, or of reducing the amount thereof; and 
• having regard to the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or scheme 
was entered into or carried out -
(i) was entered into or carried out -
(aa) in the case of a transaction, etc. in the context of business, 
in a manner which would not normally be employed for 
bona fide business purposes, other than the obtaining of a 
tax benefit; and 
(bb) in the case of any other transaction, etc., being a transaction, 
etc not falling within the provisions of item (aa), by means 
of or in a manner which would not normally be employed 
in the entering into or carrying out of a transaction, etc. in 
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the nature of the transaction, etc. in question; or 
(ii) has created rights and obligations which would not normally be 
created between persons dealing at arm's length under a transaction, 
etc. of the nature of the transaction, etc. in question; and 
• was entered into or carried out solely or mainly for the purposes of obtaining a tax 
benefit. 
Section 1 03( 4) specifically addresses the matter of onus with regard to section 1 03(1 ). According 
to section 1 03( 4), where it is proved that there is a transaction, operation or scheme which results 
in the avoidance, postponement or reduction of liability for the payment of tax, it is presumed 
until the taxpayer proves the contrary that such a transaction, operation or scheme has been 
entered into or carried out solely or mainly for the purpose of obtaining a tax benefit. It is 
therefore considered that the onus of proving the first and second requirements of section 1 03(1) 
rests with the Commissioner, and that proof of such requirements by him places the onus in 
respect of the fourth requirement of section 1 03(1) on the shoulders of the taxpayer. Moreover, 
since it is the Commissioner who must form an opinion as to the nature of the transaction, 
operation or scheme, it seems reasonable that the onus of proving the third requirement should 
also rest with him (Butterworths Electronic Pubishers, 1996: 26.6). 
2.13.2 The application of section I 03(1) to intra-group transactions 
2.13.2.1 Intra-group transactions entered into to avoid unfavourable tax anomalies 
Group companies may specifically enter into certain intra-group transactions in order to avoid 
unfavourable tax anomalies. The tax effects of such intra-group transactions is therefore intended 
to achieve greater equity between group structures and divisional structures. However, if section 
1 03( 1) is applicable to such transactions, the tax effects which would have created a more 
equitable tax result will be neutralised. An example in case is ITC 1582 (1994). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
104 
ITC 1582 dealt with quantity discounts granted annually within a group, based on the 
sales/purchase volumes of group members. The group consisted of an ultimate holding company, 
E, its wholly owned subsidiaries, C and D, and C's wholly owned subsidiaries, A and B. 
C manufactured certain goods, 20% of which were sold to A, a wholesaler and retailer. A sold the 
goods to unrelated parties in turn. The remainder of C' s goods were sold to D, which provided 
certain services to the public. C sold its goods to A at cost price and to D at a marked-up price. At 
year end, C recovered an amount from A and granted a discount to D. The effect of the 
arrangement was to transfer income from A to D. The purpose of the transfer was to accelerate 
the utilisation of a large section 24C allowance available to D. Had the group been a 
divisionalised company, the allowance could have been utilised against its total income. It is 
therefore clear that the arrangement would have produced a more equitable tax result if it could 
escape an attack under section 103(1). 
The Commissioner applied section 103(1) to the arrangement and disregarded the recovery of 
amounts by C from A and the granting of discounts by C to D. The appellants conceded that the 
first, second and fourth requirements of section 1 03( 1) were met. The dispute therefore centered 
around the third requirement of section 103. 
The appellants advanced the following reason for the arrangement in question: goods were sold 
by C to A at cost and to D at cost plus a profit margin. Because of A's varied discount policy, the 
possibility existed that D could obtain goods from A at lower prices than the prices charged to it 
by C. The companies therefore agreed that the initial prices charged by C would be preliminary 
prices and that adjustments would be made at year end to achieve a more reasonable result 
retrospectively. Consequently, an amount was recovered from A to allow C a profit on its sales to 
A, while a discount was granted to D to make its cost structure more competitive. A schedule of 
computations was presented to substantiate this claim. 
The Court, after analysing the schedule, concluded that the calculations contradicted the 
appellants' contention, and that the amounts were calculated to enable a transfer of income from 
A to D. According to the Court, the true position resulting from the arrangement was that C 
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delivered goods to A and D without agreeing on a binding price for such goods. No contracts of 
purchase therefore existed. In effect, A and D sold goods that did not belong to them, the ultimate 
purchase price of which was indeterminable. Only at year end were purchase prices determined, 
not to establish reasonable transfer prices for the goods, but to achieve the most favourable tax 
result for the group as such. In the light of the above findings, the Court concluded that the 
transactions in question created rights and obligations which would not normally be created 
between persons dealing at arm's length. Therefore, the third requirement of section 103(1) was 
satisfied. 
Had formal agreements been concluded between the companies before delivery of the goods 
commenced, which clearly stated the methods by which prices would be determined at year end, 
and had these methods been devised to allow all parties a reasonable profit, the arrangement 
would have escaped an attack under section 103(1). However, such formal and binding 
agreements would have resulted in a considerable loss of flexibility in transferring income 
between group companies, as the commercial objective of reasonable profits for all group 
members would not necessarily have agreed with the tax objective of optimal utilisation of 
available allowances. 
2.13.2.2 Intra-group transactions entered into to exploit favourable tax anomalies 
In the case of intra-group transactions the economic interests of separate group companies often 
do not conflict. Nevertheless, such transactions are tax relevant. This creates a fertile ground for 
the exploitation of tax avoidance opportunities which are unavailable to divisionalised 
companies. In the absence of specific anti-avoidance provisions section 103(1) is the only 
obstacle in the way of such intra-group tax avoidance. As section 103(1) is a general anti-
avoidance provision, certain of its requirements are necessarily vague and subjective. This is 
particularly true of the third requirement, which relates to the nature of the relevant transaction, 
operation or scheme, and the fourth requirement, which relates to its purpose. Thus section 
1 03(1) inevitably creates loopholes through which intra-group tax manipulations may escape. 
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What has been said above can be illustrated by examining an intra-group scheme which is 
employed to effectively obtain deductions in respect of non-deductible capital assets such as 
office buildings. Assume that A has two wholly owned subsidiaries, namely B and C. A wishes 
to acquire an office building for the accommodation of its employees. The purchase of the 
building at a price ofR10 000 000 is effected through B, which operates as a trader in property. B 
grants the right of use and occupation of the building to A for a period of ten years in return for a 
premium of R8 000 000, which equals the present value of the estimated market rentals that 
would be obtainable from the property for the next ten years. Furthermore, B sells the bare 
dominium in the property to C at its fair value of R2 500 000. The tax implications of the 
transaction over the period of ten years are presented in Table 2.13. 
Table 2.13 
Tax implications of intra-group scheme in respect of a non-deductible office building 
A B c Group 
Lease premium (8 000 000) 8 000 000 - -
Bare - 2 500 000 - 2 500 000 
dominium 
Cost of - (10 000 000) - (10 000 000) 
building 
Net effect on (8 000 000) 500 000 
-
(7 500 000) 
taxable 
income 
The tax result from a group perspective is that a net deduction ofR7 500 000 will be obtained in 
respect of a capital assgt on which no deductions would otherwise have been granted. The group 
exercises full ownership of the asset at all times. During the period of the lease the bare 
dominium vests in C, while the right of use and occupation vests in A. After expiry of the lease C 
becomes the full owner of the asset. 
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Many variations of this scheme are encountered in practice, their central theme being the 
conversion of the non-deductible acquisition cost of an asset into a deductible lease premium 
through the transfer of the asset between different taxable entities. Although such schemes may 
be vulnerable to an attack under section 103(1) of the Act, the possibility will always exist of 
structuring them in a way which will escape successful application of the said section. 
Divisionalised companies cannot obtain a similar tax advantage, because transactions between 
divisions do not have tax consequences. Thus, by not indisputably addressing the intra-group tax 
manipulation discussed above, section 1 03(1) fails to maintain equity between groups and 
divisionalised companies. 
2.14 CAPITAL ALLOWANCES AND THE RECOUPMENT THEREOF WITHIN A GROUP 
CONTEXT 
2.14.1 Introduction 
Allowances in respect of the cost of capital assets are granted under various sections of the Act, 
such as sections 11(e), 11(gA), 12B, 12C and 13. If a deductible capital asset is disposed of, and 
the amount realised exceeds its tax value, the difference between the amount realised (up to the 
original cost of the asset) and the tax value is included in gross income as a recoupment under 
section 8(4)(a). If, on the other hand, the amount realised on disposal is below the tax value of the 
asset, a scrapping allowance may be granted under section 11 ( o ). In addition, special rules apply 
when certain assets are transferred between connected persons to prevent the artificial inflation of 
cost bases. 
It is not the purpose of this section to examine the provisions relating to capital allowances in 
detail. Rather, the anomalies produced by these provisions within a group context, as well as 
certain anti-avoidance measures aimed at countering these anomalies, will be studied. 
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2.14.2 Anomalies favourable to groups 
2.14.2.1 Inflation of cost bases and anti-avoidance measures in relation thereto 
The inflation of cost bases of deductible assets can be illustrated through an example. Assume 
that Holdco holds an asset, acquired at a cost of R300, on which total allowances of R200 have 
been granted in terms of section 12C. Ignoring any relevant anti-avoidance provisions, assume 
further that Holdco disposes of the asset to Subco, its wholly owned subsidiary, for R600. In 
terms of section 8(4)(a) an amount of R200 will be recouped by Holdco. The proceeds on 
disposal in excess of R300 will not be included in Holdco' s gross income, as the excess 
represents a capital profit. Subco uses the asset directly in a process of manufacture and will 
therefore obtain a section 12C allowance of 20% per year, based on its acquisition cost of R600. 
Thus, by merely transferring the asset within the economic unit of the group, a total net deduction 
ofR600 will be obtained on an asset which cost the group R300. 
However, the Act contains provisions that prevent such avoidance where certain assets are 
transferred between connected persons. The phrase 'connected person' is defined in section 1 of 
the Act. According to the definition, a connected person in relation to a company includes its 
holding company as defined in section 1 of the Companies Act, its subsidiary as so defined, and 
any other company, where both such companies are subsidiaries as so defined of the same 
holding company. Members of closely held groups will therefore be connected persons in relation 
to each other. 
Sections ll(e), 11(gA), 12B and 12C contain provisions which employ the concept of connected 
persons to prevent tax avoidance through the manipulation of cost bases of deductible assets. 
Sections 11(e), 12B and 12C determine that where an allowance has previously been granted to a 
connected person in relation to the taxpayer, the allowances granted to the taxpayer in respect of 
that asset shall be based on either the cost of the asset to the taxpayer, or the market value thereof 
on the date of acquisition by the taxpayer , or thg cost of the asset to the connected person, 
whichever is the lesser. It should be noted that the asset in question does not necessarily have to 
be acquired from the connected person. All that is required before these provisions will come into 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
109 
effect is that the connected person must have obtained an allowance in respect of the asset. 
Section 11 (gA), on the other hand, differs in this regard. Although the provision in section 
11 (gA) also limits the total allowances of the taxpayer to the lesser of the above-mentioned 
amounts, it will only come into effect if the asset in question is acquired from the connected 
person in relation to the taxpayer. Thus, by effecting the transfer through an intermediary, the 
anti-avoidance measure in section 11(gA) can be sidestepped, although an application of section 
103(1) may still be possible. 
Interestingly, similar anti-avoidance provlSlons are not found in section 13, which grants 
allowances on industrial buildings. Schemes aimed at the inflation of cost bases of industrial 
buildings are therefore only susceptible to an attack under section 103(1). As a general anti-
avoidance measure with vague and subjective requirements, section 103(1) may not be as 
effective as the specific anti-avoidance provisions contained in the sections ll(e), ll(fA), 12B 
and 12C. 
2.1 -i .2.2 Acceleration of allowances through the transfer of assets between group companies 
The acceleration of allowances through asset transfers can best be described by way of an 
example. Assume that Holdco acquires an asset costing R300. The asset qualifies for a deduction 
of 33 113% per year under section 12C. Holdco uses the asset in a process of manufacture for a 
period of three months during its year of assessment and then transfers the asset to Subco, its 
wholly owned subsidiary, at a price of R1 00. As the section 12C deduction is not prorated for 
portions of a year, Holdco will obtain a deduction of R1 00 under that section. If a scrapping 
allowance will be granted under section ll(o), Holdco will be able to deduct a further R100, 
representing the difference between the tax value of the asset and the amount realised on its 
disposal. If Subco uses the asset in a process of manufacture for the remainder of the year of 
assessment, it will be entitled to a deduction in terms of section 12C of R20, calculated as 20% of 
its acquisition cost ofR100. (Because the asset is not new and unused, the section 12C allowance 
will not be granted at a rate of33 1/3% per year.) 
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Assuming that the above scheme will not be attacked successfully under section 103(1), the 
group's tax cash flows in respect of the asset is presented in Table 2.14. 
Table 2.14 
Tax cash flows in respect of an asset transferred between group companies (scrapping 
allowance applicable) 
Year 1 Year2 Year 3 
Tax cash 66 (1) 6 (2) 6 
flow 
(1) [300 * 33 1/3% * 30%] + [100 * 30%] + [100 * 20% * 30%] 
(2) 100 * 20% * 30% 
Year4 Year 5 
6 6 
Applying a weighted average cost of capital of 20% to the cash flows in the above table, a 
present value ofR68 is obtained. 
Assumption that the asset is not transferred from Holdco to Subco, the group tax cash flows in 
respect of the asset is presented in Table 2.15. 
Table 2.15 
Tax cash flows in respect of the asset if it is not transferred between group companies 
Year 1 Year2 Year 3 
\ Tax cash flow 30 (1) 30 30 
(1) 300 * 33 1/3% * 30% 
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Applying a weighted average cost of capital of 20% to the cash flows in the above table, a 
present value of R63 is obtained, which is R5 less than the present value obtained if the asset is 
transferred from Holdco to Subco. Had the group been a divisionalised company, the intra-
divisional transfer of the asset would not influence the tax cash flows in respect thereof, and the 
present value of such cash flows would remain R63. 
It is possible that Holdco will not obtain a scrapping allowance in respect of the asset. The term 
'scrapped' as used in section ll(o) is not defined in the Act, and consequently it was left to the 
courts to determine its meaning. Unfortunately, the courts' definition of the term is by no means 
robust and many aspects of it are still uncertain. For example, in ITC 657 (1948) it was held that 
scrapping can only apply to assets which have been worn out or have suffered physical 
deterioration. Nevertheless, the Court stated that the question whether an asset has been scrapped 
is one of degree. In this regard it referred to Metropolitan Gas Company v Dodd where Rowlat, J. 
stated that it was not necessary for something to be worn out to become obsolete, and that it 
could become obsolete to one person while still being useful to another. It was further held in 
ITC 657 that scrapping can only occur in the ordinary course of business and not on the disposal 
of a business. This leads one to the question whether a venture in which an asset is employed 
forms merely a part of a business or whether it constitutes a separate business. In the first case, 
assets disposed of at the termination of that venture will be disposed of in the ordinary course of 
business, while in the second case they will not be disposed of in the ordinary course of business. 
However, in ITC 769 (1953) the principle that an article can only be scrapped if the business to 
which it relates is still continued was questioned by De Wet, J. In an obiter remark, he stated that 
nothing in section 11(o) indicates that a scrapping must be in the ordinary course ofbusiness. 
Because the meaning of the term 'scrapped' is uncertain, lucrative opportunities are created for 
the acceleration of allowances through the transfer of assets between group companies at prices 
below their tax values. 
Even if an asset is transferred at its tax value, with the result that a scrapping allowance will be 
out of the question, it is still possible to accelerate allowances granted under section 12C. This is 
so because section 12C deductions are not prorated if an asset is used for only a portion of a year. 
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Assume that Holdco purchases an asset costing RI 00 at the beginning of its year of assessment. 
The asset qualifies for a section 12C deduction of 20% per year. If the asset is transferred to 
Subco after three months of use at its tax value of R80, Subco will in turn be granted a 20% 
allowance for the year on its cost of R80. If the scheme is not attacked under section 1 03(1 ), the 
group's tax cash flows in respect ofthe asset can be presented in Table 2.16 as follows: 
Table 2.16 
Tax cash flows in respect of an asset transferred between group companies (scrapping 
allowance not applicable) 
Year 1 Year2 
Tax cash 10.80(1) 4.80 (2) 
flow 
(1) [100 * 20% * 30%] + [80 * 20% * 30%] 
(2) 80 * 20% * 30% 
Year 3 Year4 Year 5 
4.80 4.80 4.80 
Discounting the group tax cash flows at a weighted average cost of capital of 20% produces a 
present value ofR19. 
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If no transfer of the asset occurs, the group's tax cash flows in respect thereof can be presented in 
Table 2.17 as follows: 
Table 2.17 
Tax cash flows in respect of the asset if it is not transferred between group companies 
Year 1 Year2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 
Tax cash 6 (1) 6 6 6 6 
flow 
(1) 100 * 20% * 30% 
Applying a discount rate of20% to these cash flows, a present value ofR18 is obtained, which is 
R1 less than the present value obtained in the case of a transfer of the asset. 
It should be noted that the transfer of the asset from Holdco to Subco will not be advantageous in 
terms of the present value of tax cash flows, if the section 12C allowance was granted to Holdco 
at 33 113% per year. In such an instance, the transfer will result in deductions being granted to 
Subco at 20% per year, as the asset will not be new and unused after its transfer. Although a 
transfer in year 1 will increase the group ' s deductions in that year, this will be more than offset 
by the spreading of the remaining deductions over a period of four years instead of two years. 
If the cost of an asset qualifies for deductions under section 11 (e) or section 11 (gA), an intra-
group transfer of the asset at its tax value will not lead to an acceleration of tax relief, because 
section 11(e) and section 11(gA) deductions are prorated ifthe asset in question is only used for a 
portion of a year by its owner. 
Although section 12B deductions are not prorated if a qualifying asset is only used for a portion 
of a year, a special provision states that no deduction shall be granted under that section in 
respect of an asset brought into use during any year of assessment if such asset was previously 
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brought into use by any other company during such year, and both such companies are managed, 
controlled or owned by substantially the same persons, and a deduction was previously granted 
under that section to such other company. 
Section 13, which deals with deductions in respect of industrial buildings, is similar to section 
12C, in the sense that deductions are not prorated and no specific anti-avoidance measure exists. 
However, as the annual percentage of the section 13 deduction is relatively small (alternating 
between 5% and 10% of cost depending on the circumstances), the increase in the present value 
of tax cash flows obtainable through an asset transfer will be negated by the substantial transfer 
costs associated with such a transfer. 
2.14.2.3 Conclusion 
Although various anti-avoidance provisions exist with regard to capital allowances, the intra-
group transfer of certain assets still presents opportunities for the avoidance of tax by artificially 
inflating cost bases, or the postponement of tax by accelerating deductions. In this respect groups 
enjoy an unfair advantage over divisionalised companies, because the intra-divisional transfer of 
assets does not produce any tax effects. 
2.14. 3 Anomalies unfavourable to groups 
In certain instances, the provisions relating to capital allowances may prejudice groups relative to 
divisionalised companies. An example will serve as illustration. Assume that Holdco holds an 
asset with a cost price of RI 00, a tax value of R80 (deductions having been granted in terms of 
section ll(e)) and a market value of R60. For some commercially justifiable reason, Holdco 
wants to transfer the asset to Subco. It prefers not to effect the transfer at market value as it is 
uncertain whether a scrapping allowance of R20 will be allowed under section 11 ( o ). However, 
as Holdco and Subco are connected persons in relation to each other, the total allowances under 
section 11 (e) to Subco may not exceed the market value of the asset at its date of acquisition by 
Subco. Holdco is therefore forced to effect the transfer at market value, as it is certain that the 
group will sacrifice allowances amounting to R20 if the transfer occurs at the asset's tax value of 
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R80. On the other hand, the risk exists that Holdco will not obtain an allowance under section 
ll(o) if the transfer occurs at the asset's market value of R60. If the asset is transferred at its 
market value and a scrapping allowance is not granted by the Commissioner, the group will 
obtain total deductions of R80 in respect of an asset which effectively cost Rl 00. This puts the 
group in a disadvantageous position relative to a divisionalised company, which can transfer 
assets between divisions without any tax consequences. 
2.15 THE STC IMPLICATIONS OF INTRA-GROUP DIVIDENDS 
According to section 64B of the Act, secondary tax on companies (STC) is levied at the rate of 
12,5% on the net amount of a dividend declared by a company to its shareholders. The net 
amount of a dividend is the amount by which such dividend declared by a company exceeds the 
sum of any dividends which have accrued to the company during the dividend cycle in relation to 
the dividend declared. 
If a company declares a dividend to its holding company, STC will be paid on the entire amount 
thereof if it is assumed that no dividends have accrued to that company during the dividend cycle 
in question. When the holding company declares a dividend to the ultimate shareholders of the 
group, the dividend received from the subsidiary will be deducted from the dividend declared to 
arrive at the net amount on which STC is calculated. This means that STC will be levied only 
once on a dividend which is channeled through group companies before being received by the 
ultimate shareholders. Nevertheless, a timing disadvantage exists from the perspective of 
taxpayers, because STC is levied when a dividend is initially declared between group companies 
and not when it is declared to the ultimate shareholders. 
To counter this disadvantage, section 64B(5)(f) of the Act exempts intra-group dividends from 
STC if certain requirements are satisfied. If a dividend is so exempted, it will not be taken into 
account in determining the net amount of dividends declared by the receiver thereof. This prevent 
profit transfers to ultimate shareholders from escaping STC altogether. 
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One of the requirements that must be satisfied before the exemption will apply is that only 10% 
of the equity capital of every group company (except the ultimate holding company) may be held 
by certain outside shareholders. Such outside shareholders must consist of directors and full-time 
employees of such a company or an associated institution in relation to such a company; or a 
trustee who holds the shares for the benefit of such directors and employees under a scheme 
referred to in section 38(2)(b) ofthe Companies Act. 
Although the concept of groups is therefore acknowledged by the STC provisions exempting 
certain intra-group dividends, the required intra-group shareholdings are very demanding, and it 
may be necessary to ease this requirement if a system of group taxation is introduced in South 
Africa which provides for larger and more diverse minority shareholdings. 
2.16 UNREALISED PROFITS AND LOSSES IN RESPECT OF THE INTRA-GROUP 
TRANSFER OF TRADING STOCK 
Where trading stock is transferred between group companies at a profit and such trading stock is 
still held by the transferee at year end, the group will be taxed on a profit which has not been 
realised outside the economic entity. The transfer of trading stock between divisions of the same 
company will not attract any tax consequences, even if an internal profit is afforded to the 
transferer, with result that the tax on the intra-divisional profit is deferred until it is realised 
outside the company. 
Where minority shareholders exist within a group structure, the intra-group transfer of trading 
stock at cost price will not necessarily solve the problem of tax on unrealised profits, as value 
will be transferred between the shareholders in the different legal entities. For example, assume 
that Holdco sells trading stock manufactured by it at a cost ofR100 to its 75% owned subsidiary, 
Subco, at a price of Rl 00. The wholesale value of such stock is R200 and its retail value is R300. 
At year end Subco still holds all of the above-mentioned stock and subsequent to year end all of 
the stock is sold to outside parties. 
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By transferring the trading stock at its cost to Holdco instead of the wholesale value, the group 
will avoid the payment of tax on an unrealised profit of R1 00 during the year of transfer. 
However, shareholders in Holdco are now only interested in 75% of the total pre-tax profit 
between R1 00 and R200, whereas they would have been interested in 100% of such profit if the 
stock was transferred at its wholesale value. Thus, by delaying the payment of tax on the profit 
until it is realised outside the group, shareholders in Holdco have sacrificed R25 of profit in 
favour of minority shareholders in Subco. 
Where trading stock is transferred between group companies at a loss and such trading stock is 
still held by the transferee at year end, the group will obtain tax relief in respect of a loss which 
has not yet been realised outside the economic entity. However, divisionalised companies can 
also obtain tax relief in respect of unrealised profits on trading stock, even without transferring 
such stock between divisions. The reason can be found in the provisions of the Act with regard to 
trading stock. Section 22(1) states that the amount which shall be taken into account in the 
determination of a person's taxable income in respect of the value of trading stock held and not 
disposed of by him at the end of a year of assessment, shall be the cost price to such a person of 
such trading stock less an amount as the Commissioner may think just and reasonable as 
representing the amount by which the value of such trading stock has been diminished by reason 
of damage, deterioration, change of fashion, decrease in market value or any other reason 
satisfactory to the Commissioner. 
Thus, divisionalised companies, like groups, enJOY the benefit of tax relief in respect of 
unrealised losses on trading stock although groups, unlike divisionalised companies, do not enjoy 
the benefit of deferral of tax in respect of unrealised profits on trading stock. This is clearly not 
an equitable tax result. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
118 
2.17 ALLOWANCES IN TERMS OF SECTIONS 24 AND 24C ON QUALIFYING INTRA-
GROUP TRANSACTIONS 
2.17.1 Section 24 
Section 24( 1) of the Act states that if any taxpayer has entered into an agreement with any other 
person in respect of any property the effect of which is that, in the case of movable property, the 
ownership shall pass, or in the case of immovable property, transfer shall be passed from the 
taxpayer to that other person, upon or after the receipt by the taxpayer of the whole or a certain 
portion of the amount payable to the taxpayer under the agreement, the whole of the amount shall 
be deemed to have accrued to the taxpayer on the day on which the agreement was entered into. 
Agreements envisioned by section 24(1) will include hire purchase agreements, as well as sales 
where the customer only gets ownership against the payment of a deposit and credit is given for 
the balance of the purchase price (Meyerowitz, 1997: 21.3). 
Section 24(2) states that in the case of any such agreement in terms of which at least 25% of the 
said amount payable only becomes due and payable on or after expiry of a period of not less than 
12 months after the date of the said agreement, the Commissioner may make such allowance as 
under the special circumstances of the trade of the taxpayer seems to him reasonable, in respect 
of all amounts which are deemed to have accrued under such agreements but which have not 
been received at the close of the taxpayer's accounting period: provided that any allowance so 
made shall be included in the taxpayer's return for the following year of assessment and shall 
form part ofhis income. 
The allowance is made at the discretion of the Commissioner and is normally calculated by 
multiplying the outstanding amount under a qualifying agreement by the ratio in which the gross 
profit stands to the turnover with regard to that agreement (Meyerowitz, 1997: 21.1 0). Thus the 
profit in respect of the agreement is effectively taxed when it is realised in cash. 
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The allowance granted in terms of section 24(2) creates lucrative opportunities for the deferral of 
taxation within a group context. Assume that Subco, a wholly owned subsidiary, acquires 
machinery at a cost of R300 and immediately sells it to Holdco at a retail price of R600. 
According to the sales agreement, ownership of the machinery will pass to Holdco when the 
purchase price is paid three years hence. Holdco employs the machinery directly in a process of 
manufacture. 
If the Commissioner grants an allowance to Subco under section 24(2), the profit of R300 will 
only be taxed when Subco receives payment of the purchase price at the end of year three. 
Holdco will deduct R200 per year under section 12C in respect of its acquisition cost of R600. 
The connected person rule will not operate to limit Holdco's total deductions to Subco's 
acquisition cost, because Subco will not have received any deductions in terms of section 12C. 
Table 2.18 
Tax implications of section 24 agreement to Subco 
Year 1 Year2 Year3 
Acquisition cost (300) - -
Selling price 600 - -
Section 24: (300) (1) (300) (1) - (2) 
Allowance 
Section 24: - 300 300 
Income 
Taxable income - - 300 
Tax cash flows 
- - (90) (3) 
(1) 300 I 600 * 600 (Gross profit I Selling price* Amount outstanding at year end) 
(2) 300 I 600 * 0 
(3) 300 * 30% 
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Table 2.19 
Tax implications of section 24 agreement to Holdco 
Section 12C 
Tax cash flows 
(1) 600 * 33 1/3% 
(2) 200 * 30% 
Year 1 
(200) (1) 
60 (2) 
Year2 
(200) 
60 
Year 3 
(200) 
60 
Applying a weighted average cost of capital of 20% to the group's tax cash flows in respect of 
the agreement, a present value of R 7 4 is obtained at the beginning of year one. 
Had the group been a divisionalised company, section 24 would not have been applicable to the 
intra-divisional transaction, as it would not constitute an agreement with another person. 
Furthermore, the company's deductions in terms of section 12C would have been based on an 
acquisition cost of R300. The company would therefore have obtained an annual deduction of 
RlOO in year 1 to year 3, translating into annual positive tax cash flows of R30 (RlOO * 30%). 
Applying a discount rate of 20% to these cash flows, a present value of R63 is obtained. The 
difference of R11 in favour of the group can be explained by the fact that Holdco obtained an 
additional section 12C deduction of R100 annually in respect of the intra-group profit of R300, 
while this profit was only taxed in Subco's hands at the end of year three, due to the operation of 
section 24(2). 
It should be noted that the Commissioner may not grant a section 24 allowance where the terms 
of an intra-group credit agreement are not at arm's length. To return to the above example, it is 
unlikely that Subco will provide interest-free credit to other buyers of its machinery. However, 
the group may overcome this obstacle by agreeing that interest will accumulate on the 
outstanding amount at a market-related rate. The accrual of the interest to Subco and the incurral 
thereof by Holdco will be governed by section 24J. Because the inclusion of interest in Subco's 
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gross income will be neutralised by the deduction thereofby Holdco, the net present value ofR74 
in respect of the group's tax cash flows will remain unchanged. 
2.17.2 Section 24C 
Section 24C(2) of the Act determines that if the income of a taxpayer in any year of assessment 
includes or consists of an amount received by or accrued to him in terms of any contract and the 
Commissioner is satisfied that such amount will be utilised in whole or in part to finance future 
expenditure which will be incurred by the taxpayer in the performance of obligations under the 
contract, there shall be deducted in the determination of the taxpayer's taxable income for such 
year such allowance as the Commissioner may determine, in respect of so much of such future 
expenditure as in his opinion relates to the said amount. Note that the Commissioner grants the 
allowance at his discretion. It is the policy of the Commissioner to calculate the allowance with 
reference to the gross profit percentage on the relevant contract (Huxham & Haupt, 1997: 358). 
Section 24C(3) determines that the amount of any allowance deducted under section 24C(2) shall 
be deemed to be income received by or accrued to the taxpayer in the following year of 
assessment. Thus, in instances where income is received by or has accrued to a taxpayer before 
he has incurred the associated expenditure, section 24C delays the recognition of a portion of the 
income until the expenditure has been incurred. 
Section 24C, like section 24, creates opportunities for the deferral of taxation within a group 
context. Assume that Holdco enters into a contract with its wholly owned subsidiary, Subco, near 
their year ends, whereby Subco will deliver a service to Holdco with a market value of R200 and 
a cost ofR100. Holdco pays the amount ofR200 before the year end, but Subco only delivers the 
service and incurs the expenditure of R100 in the following year. Assuming that the R200 paid 
by Holdco is not refundable, it is submitted that, for the purpose of section ll(a) of the Act, 
Holdco incurs the expenditure when it is paid to Subco, irrespective of the fact that the service 
has not been rendered yet (Huxham & Haupt, 1997: 358). 
The tax implications of the above mentioned transactions are illustrated in Tables 2.20 and 2.21. 
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Table 2.20 
Tax implications of section 24C contract to Holdco 
Year 1 Year2 
Deduction (200) -
Tax cash flow 60 (1) -
(1) 200 * 30% 
Table 2.21 
Tax implications of section 24C agreement to Subco 
Year 1 Year2 
Gross income 200 -
Deduction of costs - (100) 
Section 24C: allowance (100) (1) - (2) 
Section 24C: income - 100 
Taxable income 100 
-
Tax cash flows (30) (3) 
-
(1) 100 I 200 * 200- 0 (Total contract cost I Total contract price* Cumulative gross income to 
date- Cumulative cost to date) 
(2) 100 I 200 * 200- 100 
(3) 100 * 30% 
The net tax cash flows in respect of the contract from a group perspective is an inflow of R30 at 
the end of year one. Had the group been a divisionalised company, the only transaction which 
would have attracted tax consequences would have been the incurral by Subco of the outside 
expenditure of R1 00 in year 2. The divisionalised company would therefore have obtained tax 
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relief of R30 at the end of year two. In the absence of section 24C, the tax result from a group 
perspective would have been identical to the above result, as the deduction of R200 by Holdco 
would have been neutralised by the inclusion in Subco's gross income of a corresponding 
amount. In the above-mentioned case, however, section 24C effectively transfers the deduction in 
respect of outside expenditure incurred by a group to the earlier year in which the intra-group 
transaction was concluded. 
2.18 CONCLUSION 
In Chapter 2 the tax effects of various intra-group transactions were examined. From this 
examination it is evident that the present tax treatment of groups often conflicts with the canons 
of taxation. 
In most instances the tax effects of intra-group transactions did not cancel out from a group 
perspective. On the other hand, transactions between divisions of the same company do not have 
tax consequences. The present tax treatment of groups therefore does not achieve equity between 
groups and divisionalised companies. 
Furthermore, neutrality may be compromised by the status quo. The following three reasons can 
be advanced as motivation. Firstly, groups may enter into certain intra-group transactions solely 
to obtain the benefit of favourable tax anomalies. Conversely, groups may not enter into intra-
group transactions which are otherwise commercially sound because of the unfavourable tax 
anomalies which will result from such transactions. Finally, groups may enter into intra-group 
transactions which have economic merit, but may structure such transactions in a specific way to 
avoid unfavourable anomalies which will otherwise occur. 
The present tax treatment of groups also brings about considerable administrative costs. Groups 
incur legal and other costs in planning and implementing intra-group transactions which aim to 
avoid unfavourable tax anomalies or exploit favourable tax anomalies, while the fiscus expends 
resources in monitoring and opposing such intra-group transactions. 
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It may be said that the lack of a system of group taxation prevents legislative complexity. 
However, because intra-group transactions are not addressed specifically in the Act, various tax 
issues with regard to intra-group transactions are not entirely settled. This has a negative impact 
on certainty. Furthermore, the fact that intra-group transactions are not exhaustively dealt with in 
the Act creates opportunities for tax planning, resulting in intra-group tax planning techniques 
which are often extremely intricate. Thus, one is presented with a situation where legislative 
simplicity may encourage complexity with regard to tax-driven schemes. 
Efficiency of collection is a matter which has not been addressed, either directly or indirectly, in 
Chapter 2. The matter is discussed in Chapter 4 through a comparison of the loss transfer system 
of group taxation with the consolidation system. As a loss transfer system is in essence a system 
that combines the present tax treatment of groups with the transfer of assessed losses between 
group companies, such a comparison will be appropriate for evaluating the present tax treatment 
of groups. For present purposes it is sufficient to say that a consolidation system of group 
taxation will lead to an improvement in the efficiency of collection of the intended tax burden 
(refer to section 4.4.4 for a more detailed discussion) . 
It is clear that the present tax treatment of groups does not satisfy the canons of taxation 
discussed in Chapter 1. A question that naturally arises is whether a system of group taxation will 
achieve greater compliance with such canons and, if so, whether a loss transfer system or a 
consolidation system will achieve the greatest level of compliance. Chapter 4 is devoted to an 
examination of these questions. But firstly, Chapter 3 considers three diverse issues which are not 
directly related to the canons of taxation, but which may render a system of group taxation 
unnecessary or undesirable, even if such a system satisfies the theoretical requirements of an 
ideal system to a greater extent than the status quo. 
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3 ISSUES WITH REGARD TO THE NECESSITY AND DESIRABILITY OF A SYSTEM 
OF GROUP TAXATION 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider the following three issues: 
• whether divisionalisation is a viable alternative to a group tax regime; 
• whether it is justified to subject groups and divisionalised companies to similar tax 
treatment, when group companies enjoy the benefit of limited liability while divisions 
do not; and 
• whether a group tax regime will lead to an increase in the concentration of economic 
control and ownership. 
The first issue relates to the necessity of a system of group taxation, while the second and third 
issues relate to the desirability of such a system. Although a group tax regime may produce a 
more satisfactory trade-offbetween the canons of taxation, the issues identified above may render 
a group tax regime unnecessary or even undesirable. Examination of these issues is therefore 
important. 
3.2 DIVISIONALISATION VERSUS A GROUP TAX REGIME 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Opponents of a group tax regime may argue that anomalies arising from the current tax treatment 
of groups can be avoided by structuring new enterprises as divisions of existing companies. 
Similarly they may argue that existing enterprises located within separate group companies can 
be divisionalised, particularly as section 39 of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act (1994) 
addresses the tax obstacles associated with such restructurings (Crisp, n.d. : 1). 
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It will demonstrated below that section 39 of the said Act is not a very accessible mechanism to 
facilitate the divisionalisation of existing group structures. In addition, there are various 
commercial and legal reasons why groups may be preferred over divisionalised companies. 
3.2.2 Section 39 of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act, No. 20 of 1994 
3.2.2.1 Operation 
Section 39 of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act (1994) provides for the exemption of stamp 
duty and transfer duty with regard to rationalisation schemes for groups of companies, and 
governs the income tax treatment pertaining to such schemes. It contains the following tax-
friendly measures: 
• the registration of transfer to a transferee company of marketable securities, the 
cession of bonds and the substitution of debtors shall be exempt from stamp duty; 
• the acquisition of property by a transferee company will be exempt from transfer duty; 
• any trading stock disposed of may be deemed to have been sold by the transferor 
company to the transferee company at a price equal to the value of such trading stock 
in the hands of the transferor company as determined under the provisions of section 
22(1) of the Income Tax Act, and shall be deemed to have been acquired by the 
transferee company as trading stock; 
• any building, machine, plant, implement, utensil or article so disposed of, the value of 
which is to be taken into account for purposes of the Income Tax Act, shall in so far 
as the transferor company is concerned, be deemed to have been sold by it at a price 
equal to the tax value in its hands; 
• the transferor company and the transferee company shall, subject to such provisions as 
may be necessary, be deemed to be one and the same company; and 
• where any sale, disposal, transfer, cession or substitution of any asset give rise to the 
distribution of a dividend, such distribution shall be exempted from Secondary Tax on 
Companies. 
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Section 39 therefore creates a tax neutral environment in which to effect rationalisation schemes, 
including the divisionalisation of group structures. Interestingly, many of the measures of this 
section will also be encountered in consolidation systems of group taxation. However, paragraph 
6(c)(ii) of section 39 may act as a disincentive to divisionalisation, by stating that a transferee 
company shall not be permitted to set off an assessed loss incurred by the transferor company. 
Thus where a group company with an assessed loss is to be incorporated as a division of another 
group- company, its assessed loss will be permanently sacrificed. 
3.2.2.2 Scope 
Section 39 is only applicable where a group of companies engages in a rationalisation scheme. 
Paragraph 1 of that section defines 'group of companies' and 'rationalisation scheme'. 
A 'group of companies' means a controlling company and one or more other companies which 
are controlled companies in relation to the controlling company. A 'controlled company' is 
defined as a company in relation to which another company is the controlling company. A 
'controlling company', in relation to another company, means a listed company that holds for its . 
own benefit, whether directly or indirectly through one or more companies in the group of 
companies of which all the companies in question are members, shares in such other company 
which, together with shares in that company held by a trustee under a scheme referred to in 
section 38(2)(b) ofthe Companies Act, constitutes no less than 75% ofthe equity share capital of 
the said company. 
The required shareholding level set by the definition cannot be faulted, as a holding of 75% 
implies a sufficiently close association between separate entities to warrant the easing of their 
rationalisation from a tax perspective. However, by restricting the definition of controlling 
companies to listed entities, the scope of section 39 is severely limited. This restriction was 
included to reduce the potential administrative burden of such legislation on the Receiver of 
Revenue (Crisp, n.d.: 3). As a result, many unlisted groups will not be able to utilise the 
provisions of section 39 to achieve a tax-friendly rationalisation. It can therefore be said that 
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section 39 is not a very accessible tool for the transformation of existing groups into 
divisionalised companies. 
A 'rationalisation scheme' is defined as any scheme for the rationalisation of the activities of 
group companies where -
• such scheme was devised solely or mainly (I) in order to achieve substantial and 
enduring savings in operational expenditure or substantial and enduring 
operational and administrative advantages within the said group; or (II) in the 
furtherance of and for the purpose of benefiting some or all of the activities of the 
said group which before the transfer thereof were carried out by one or more 
companies of the said group and after the transfer thereof will be carried out by 
one or more other companies of the said group; or 
• the Commissioner is, having regard to the circumstances of the case and subject 
to such conditions as he may impose, satisfied that such scheme was devised 
solely or mainly to effect an unbundling transaction as contemplated in section 60 
of the Income Tax Act of 1993. (For the purpose of this work, unbundling 
transactions are not relevant. They represent the exact opposite of grouping, by 
distributing shares previously held by holding companies to ultimate 
shareholders.) 
Section 39(7) determines that the provisions of the section shall not apply if the main or one of 
the main purposes of the rationalisation scheme is the avoidance, postponement or reduction of 
liability for the payment of any tax, duty or levy which, but for the provisions of section 39, 
would have been payable in consequence of such a scheme having been entered into. 
From the definition of rationalisation schemes and the provisions of paragraph 7, it is abundantly 
clear that the tax concessions of section 39 will only be granted if the scheme has a commercial 
purpose other than the achievement of a more favourable tax dispensation. As such, section 39 is 
therefore a poor alternative to a group tax regime that specifically aims to subject groups to a 
more equitable and reasonable tax treatment. 
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3.2.2.3 Conclusion 
Section 39 contains various measures intended to create a tax environment conducive to 
divisionalisation. However, the permanent sacrificing of assessed losses will serve to discourage, 
rather than encourage, the divisionalisation of group structures. Furthermore, by restricting its 
application firstly to groups with listed holding companies, and secondly to schemes where a tax 
motive is not predominant, section 39 is not an accessible mechanism for the avoidance of tax 
anomalies brought about by the present tax treatment of group structures. 
3.2.3 Reasons for groups instead of divisionalised companies 
Although section 39 of the Tax Laws Amendment Act, (1994) may ease the divisionalisation of 
existing group structures in very specific circumstances, various commercial and legal reasons 
may exist to inhibit such divisionalisation, including the following: 
• Valuable licenses and rights may be specifically linked to individual group 
companies (Suid-Afrika, 1987: 206). 
• In certain regulated industries it is required that companies be kept separate, such as 
in the pharmaceutical industry (Suid-Afrika, 1987: 206). 
• Various forms of loan covenants and agreements with bankers may prohibit the 
transfer of assets (Suid-Afrika, 1987: 206). 
• The group may not wish to disturb trade union agreements by merging or selling 
assets (Suid-Afrika, 1987: 206). 
• There may be contracts in existence with executives in the employment of individual 
group companies (Suid-Afrika, 1987: 206). 
• The corporate identity of individual group companies may have substantial brand 
value (Aginsky, 1984: 9). 
Other commercial and legal considerations exist which not only inhibit the divisionalisation of 
existing group structures, but also encourage the formation of separate group companies for new 
enterprises. These considerations are as follows: 
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(i) Director status 
Director status can be conferred on managers responsible for certain activities by locating such 
activities in separate companies. Demands for director status are increasingly being made by 
managers seeking job recognition, and by acknowledging these demands the motivation of 
managers will be improved (Aginsky, 1984: 9). 
On the other hand, divisionalisation of subsidiaries will cause the directors of such subsidiaries to 
lose their status as directors. This will be detrimental to staff relations and motivation. A possible 
solution in such instances may be the creation of divisional director posts. However, this may be 
perceived by staff as an artificial and therefore unsatisfactory compromise (Aginsky, 1984: 20). 
(ii) Separation ofbusiness operations 
When the sale of an enterprise is being negotiated, its assets, liabilities and profit potential is 
normally more easily identifiable ifthe enterprise is located within a separate company instead of 
a separate division (Aginsky, 1984: 20). Thus, by placing an enterprise within an independent 
legal entity, its marketability to other investors is improved. This provides the initiator of a new 
enterprise with an alternative course of action in respect thereof; instead of merely operating it 
indefinitely for profit, he can also dispose of it with relative ease and thereby realise a capital 
gain. The utilisation of separate companies may therefore encourage economic activity by 
providing entrepreneurs with more convenient exit options. 
The maintenance of a separate company for each business operation also facilitates the 
independent listing thereof on a stock exchange, thereby further enhancing its marketability to 
prospective investors. In addition, a listing may also increase the profile of the enterprise, and 
motivate its management and employees. The latter benefit is achieved in two ways: firstly, the 
prospect of intense public scrutiny may extract greater performance from management and, 
secondly, the increased marketability of the enterprise's shares enables the implementation of 
share incentive schemes. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
131 
Finally, by segregating enterprises using separate companies, the appropriate cost of finance for 
each enterprise may be easier to determine, as risks pertaining to enterprise-specific cash flows 
can be assessed more accurately. In the case of divisionalised companies, it may happen that 
composite risk levels are assigned to aggregate cash flows . This may lead to a situation where a 
particular project is not accepted, because its estimated rate of return is lower than the composite 
rate of return required for the divisionalised company, although the estimated rate of return is 
equal to or higher than the rate of return required for the particular venture. Conversely, a project 
may be accepted because its estimated rate of return is higher than the composite rate of return 
required for the divisionalised entity, although the estimated rate of return is lower than the return 
required for the particular project. 
(iii) Regional emphasis 
With an increased regional emphasis in South Africa, it may be preferable for an enterprise 
restricted to a specific geographical area to be structured as a separate subsidiary instead of a 
division of a company domiciled in another region (Suid-Afrika, 1987: 206). By directing 
attention to the separate identity of the regional company, local goodwill towards that enterprise 
may be increased. 
(iv) Less disruptive enforced dissolution 
Enforced dissolution, such as in a monopoly situation, will be achieved with less disruption if the 
enterprise in question is located within a separate company. Because the activities, assets and 
liabilities of that enterprise will already be segregated, the dissolution can be effected by merely 
disposing of the shares in the subsidiary. (Aginsky, 1984: 11) In the case of a divisionalised 
structure, it may be necessary to entangle a complex interlocking of activities, assets and 
liabilities in respect of the various divisions. 
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( v) Increased autonomy leading to improved management performance 
If the enterprises for which managers are responsible are located within separate companies, their 
motivation might be increased due to the perception of increased autonomy (Cronje, n.d.(a): 3). 
Furthermore, the concept of profit or investment centres may be emphasised if business ventures 
are separated by legal boundaries. In contrast, a divisionalised structure may lull managers into 
complacency if the perception exists that non-performing divisions will be supported by stronger 
divisions within the company. 
3.3 THE ISSUE OF LIMITED LIABILITY 
Opponents of a group tax regime may argue that groups should not be entitled to the tax 
advantages of divisionalised companies, as individual companies within a group enjoy the benefit 
of limited liability, while divisions within a company do not enjoy this benefit (Suid-Afrika, 
1987: 208). The sentiment that companies should accept the disadvantages of their separate 
identity along with the their advantages is echoed in court judgements. In Ochberg v CIR (1931 ), 
a case which dealt with the capital or revenue nature of capitalisation shares received by the sole 
shareholder of that company for services rendered, De Villiers, C.J. said the following: "I entirely 
degree with the view that the Court may look at the substance of the transaction. But that 
argument must be employed with judgement, more especially in company law. The law endows a 
company with a fictitious personality. The wisdom of allowing a person to avoid the natural 
consequences of his commercial sins under the ordinary law, and for his own private purposes 
virtually to turn himself into a corporation with limited liability, may well be open to doubt. But 
as long as the law allows it, the Court has to recognize the position. But then too the person 
himself must abide by that. A company, being a juristic person, remains a juristic person separate 
and distinct from the person who may own all the shares, and must not be confused with the 
latter. To say that a company sustains a separate persona and yet in the same breath to argue that 
in substance the person holding all the shares is the company, is an attempt to have it both ways, 
which cannot be allowed." Although the above Ochberg case considered the relationship between 
a company and its sole shareholder, rather than the relationship between companies within the 
same group, the principle enunciated therein is nevertheless relevant in the context of groups. In 
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fact, the dictum quoted above was referred to in ITC 629 (1933), a case which dealt with the 
setting offby a holding company of its wholly owned subsidiary's assessed loss. 
Several arguments can be advanced in opposition to the view that a company should endure the 
tax disadvantages of its separate identity along with the advantage of limited liability. 
Firstly, the concept of limited liability is a valuable tool for encouraging the formation of new 
enterprises, especially where such enterprises carry a significant level of risk. However, in the 
absence of a group tax regime, the location of new enterprises in separate companies may result 
in the accumulation of assessed losses within such companies that cannot be set off against other 
group income. Plans for new enterprises may be therefore be abandoned, as immediate tax relief 
for initial losses cannot be obtained without exposing existing operations to an increased level of 
risk. Thus, a system of group taxation will be a complementary measure to limited liability, 
which will increase its effectiveness in promoting economic growth. 
Secondly, limited liability is often incorrectly perceived as an instrument open to abuse. In 
practice, the limited liability of separate companies within a group is rarely exploited. Creditors 
often require guarantees from or claims on the assets of holding companies when transacting with 
subsidiaries. And even when this is not the case, a holding company will often assume 
responsibility for the unmet liabilities of a troubled subsidiary in fear that the group's image will 
otherwise be tarnished (Aginsky, 1984: 1 0). In practice, therefore, the concept of limited liability 
is extended in practice to groups instead of being restricted to individual group companies. This 
brings about a similar situation to that of single, divisionalised companies where the companies 
and not their individual divisions enjoy the benefit of limited liability. 
Finally, if the implementation of a group regime will represent a significant structural 
improvement to the tax system, the issue of limited liability should not stand in the way of its 
implementation. If it is deemed necessary, additional legislation can be introduced by means of 
the Companies Act to specifically address the issue of limited liability within group context (Du 
Toit & Matthews, 1990: 22). 
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3.4 CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC CONTROL AND OWNERSHIP 
Another reason advanced against group taxation is that it will encourage conglomeration. The 
issue of conglomeration has become highly politicised in South Africa and thus cannot be 
ignored in the context of a submission regarding group taxation. Bearing in mind the political 
storm that surrounds conglomeration, the concept seems to turn on the matter of economic 
control (Du Toit & Matthews, 1990: 23). In this regard the degree of association required for 
control is often confused with the degree of association required for group tax treatment. Control 
is usually exercised through little more than a 50% holding, and in many other instances through 
a much smaller holding. In contrast, most group tax regimes require a much higher degree of 
association before group tax treatment is applied. For example, the system employed in the 
United States of America requires an 80% holding, while the United Kingdom system requires a 
75% holding. Therefore, when investors seek to increase their holding beyond the maximum 50% 
plus one share that is usually necessary for control, they do so for reasons that have nothing to do 
with control (Du Toit & Matthews, 1990: 25). 
A more valid argument would be that the introduction of a group tax regime will lead to the 
expelling of minority shareholders from group structures as groups seek to increase their inter-
company shareholdings in order to qualify for group tax treatment. A group tax regime may 
therefore encourage the concentration of economic ownership, rather than the concentration of 
economic control. However, several convincing counter-arguments can be advanced. 
Firstly, minority shareholders can be accommodated within a group tax regime by specifying 
required shareholder interests of less than 100%. In Chapter 1 a minimum shareholder interest of 
75% was recommended, which will allow minority shareholders to participate in individual 
group companies to the maximum extent of 25% holdings. 
Secondly, groups may reduce their holdings in certain group companies in order to release funds 
which can utilised to increase holdings in other group companies to the level required for group 
tax treatment (Du Toit & Matthews, 1990: 25). Although the concentration of economic 
ownership in certain companies will increase, there will be a commensurate decrease in the 
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concentration of economic ownership in other companies. It is even possible that this process will 
reduce the concentration of economic control if shareholdings in certain companies are 
sufficiently reduced. 
Thirdly, under the present tax regime the only way in which an existing group can achieve a tax 
result similar to the result that would have been achieved under a group tax system, is to 
restructure the group into a divisionalised company. This requires that shareholdings m 
subsidiaries that are not wholly owned must be increased to 100% before such subsidiaries can be 
transformed into divisions of the holding company. In the process minority shareholders will 
inevitably be expelled from group companies (Cronje, 1995: 3). This can be avoided if a group 
tax regime is implemented which requires intra-group holdings of less than 100%. Furthermore, a 
group tax regime will encourage the formation of separate companies for new enterprises, and 
may cause existing divisionalised companies to restructure into groups to take advantage of the 
commercial advantages of group structures. In both instances minority shareholders can be 
introduced into such companies, enabling them to obtain direct interests in the enterprises in 
question. 
Finally, the implementation of a group tax regime will add impetus to the restructuring of various 
government-owned enterprises, which might bring sub-units of such enterprises to smaller 
emerging investors. Presently, such restructuring is inhibited by the absence of a group tax 
regime, because state and semi-state enterprises that organise themselves into multi-company 
structures will not be able to extend their typically large assessed losses to profitable pockets that 
have been spinned off (South Africa, 1995: 97). 
In summary, it can be said that a system of group taxation will not encourage the concentration of 
economic control. Although it may cause an increase in the concentration of economic ownership 
of certain group companies, this will probably be accompanied by a decrease in the concentration 
of economic ownership of other group companies. Furthermore, a group taxation system will 
enable minority shareholdings in subsidiaries that would otherwise be structured as divisions. 
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4 A GROUP TAX REGIME AND THE CANONS OFT AXA TION 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 2, it was concluded that the current tax treatment of groups is far from satisfactory 
when considered against the background of the canons of taxation. In this chapter the 
consolidation system and loss transfer system of group taxation will be measured against these 
canons to determine whether the implementation of one of the systems will represent a structural 
improvement to the South African tax regime. 
4.2 OPERATION OF LOSS TRANSFER SYSTEMS AND CONSOLIDATION SYSTEMS OF 
GROUP TAXATION 
When a system of group taxation is designed for a particular tax jurisdiction, it is adapted to the 
unique structure of that jurisdiction's' s tax legislation and to the specific policy considerations 
which are prevalent in that jurisdiction. Consequently, no two systems of group taxation 
encountered in practice are identical. In the same light, although important lessons with regard to 
detailed design may be learnt from studying foreign jurisdictions' group tax systems, it will be 
wholly inappropriate to clone a foreign system for South African use. This section will therefore 
not examine group tax regimes in other countries. Instead, it will briefly explore the general 
characteristics of loss transfer and consolidation systems. Such an exploration is necessary before 
the two systems' compliance with the various canons of taxation can be evaluated. 
Loss transfer systems treat individual group companies as separate taxable entities. 
Consequently, transactions between such group companies do have tax effects. In this regard loss 
transfer systems are very similar to the present tax treatment of groups in South Africa. In a loss 
transfer system the group is only acknowledged to the extent that assessed losses of certain group 
members may be set off against the income of other group members. 
Consolidation systems treat the group, instead of the individual group companies, as the taxable 
entity. Transactions between group companies are subjected to special rules so that they will have 
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no tax effects. The tax result will therefore be very similar to the result that would have been 
achieved if the group had been a divisionalised company. Because the taxable incomes of 
individual group companies are consolidated, loss transfers between group companies occur 
automatically. 
In the remainder of Chapter 4 loss transfer systems and consolidation systems will be compared 
under the headings of the various canons of taxation. Because loss transfer systems are so similar 
to the present tax treatment of groups (except that loss transfer systems allow the utilisation of 
assessed losses on a group-wide level), the current tax regime pertaining to groups will implicitly 
be includgd in the comparison. 
4.3 EQUITY AND NEUTRALITY 
With regard to equity as well as neutrality, a consolidation system is more satisfactory than both 
a loss transfer system and the present tax treatment of groups. A loss transfer system achieves 
greater equity between groups and divisionalised companies in only one respect - by allowing the 
transfer of losses between different legal entities within the same economic entity. However, in a 
loss transfer system transactions between group companies still have tax effects, which may lead 
to favourable or unfavourable tax results relative to the tax results of divisionalised companies. 
Chapter 2 illustrated several anomalies that may occur in this regard. A consolidation system, on 
the other hand, achieves a greater level of equity between groups and divisionalised companies 
by eliminating the tax effects of intra-group transactions. 
Because a consolidation system achieves greater equity than a loss transfer system, it promotes 
neutrality more effectively. As the tax results of a group under a consolidation regime will be 
virtually identical to the tax results of a divisionalised company, the economic activities of a 
group will not be influenced by its tax position relative to the hypothetical tax position that would 
have existed if the group had been a divisionalised company. A loss transfer system, by 
attributing tax effects to intra-group transactions, will still encourage transactions that are 
specifically aimed at the exploitation of favourable tax anomalies. Furthermore, it will discourage 
otherwise commercially sound transactions due to its potential for unfavourable tax anomalies. 
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It is an undisputed fact accepted by all interest groups in South Africa that economic growth is 
essential in addressing the economic imbalances existing in our country. Tax-induced economic 
activity results in a misallocation of resources and therefore has a detrimental effect on economic 
growth. By achieving a higher level of equity and neutrality than both a loss transfer system and 
the status quo, a consolidation system will deliver the greatest contribution to improving South 
Africa's precarious socio-economic situation. 
4.4 REVENUE NEUTRALITY, INCLUDING EFFICIENCY OF COLLECTION OF THE 
INTENDED TAX BURDEN 
4. 4.1 Introduction 
The South African government has committed itself to fiscal discipline as part of a macro-
economic policy aimed at sustained long-term growth. Nevertheless, it faces enormous demands 
from its main constituency for the redistribution of resources to address the inequalities created 
by South Africa's past dispensation. The conflicting pressures of fiscal discipline and increased 
welfare expenditure imply that tax reforms leading to a material reduction in the amount of tax 
revenue, will simply not be acceptable. If a system of group taxation is implemented in South 
Africa, it should therefore be revenue neutral at the least. 
The total amount of revenue collected by the fiscus is a function of three factors, namely the tax 
base of the jurisdiction, the tax burden intended by the system of taxation and the efficiency of 
collection of the intended tax burden. When the impact of a group tax regime on the amount of 
tax revenue is evaluated, it is therefore important to consider its effect on all three factors. The 
third factor, namely the efficiency of collection of the intended tax burden, is one of the canons 
of taxation discussed in Chapter 1. It will be addressed below as one of the sub-components of 
revenue neutrality. 
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4.4.2 Tax base 
In section 4.3 it was stated that a consolidation system would achieve a greater level of neutrality 
than a loss transfer system or the status quo. By not interfering with economic processes, a 
consolidation system will make the biggest contribution to economic growth, which in turn will 
lead to an increase in the tax base. 
4. 4. 3 The intended tax burden 
4.4.3.1 Introduction 
Factors to be considered when evaluating the impact of a group tax regime on the intended tax 
burden include: 
• the accelerated utilisation of current assessed losses; 
• the accelerated utilisation of historical assessed losses; and 
• the tax effects of intra-group transactions. 
4.4.3 .2 Current assessed losses 
Regardless of which system of group taxation is employed, the utilisation of current assessed 
losses will be accelerated. In the absence of a group tax regime, a group company with an 
assessed loss can only set it off against its own future income. Thus the tax relief obtainable from 
the assessed loss will be delayed. Within a group tax regime an assessed loss of one group 
company will be set off against the income of another group company when it is incurred, thus 
providing immediate tax relief. A group tax regime will therefore not reduce the ultimate amount 
of revenue collected by the fiscus. Nevertheless, the fiscus will suffer a timing disadvantage in 
respect of revenue inflows, due to the accelerated utilisation of assessed losses within groups. 
However, it is questionable whether the present tax treatment of groups leads to significant 
delays in the claiming of tax relief concerning current assessed losses of individual group 
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comparues. Many groups that had a potential for material profit/loss discrepancies between 
individual group companies will have utilised section 39 of the Tax Laws Amendment Act, 
(1994) to divisionalise their operations. And where such groups do not qualify for the relief 
provided by that section, or where they prefer not to divisionalise due to commercial or legal 
considerations, income transfer techniques are no doubt employed to achieve immediate 
utilisation of current assessed losses. Many of these techniques may be subject to an attack under 
section 1 03(2), but it is unlikely that more than a small percentage of potentially vulnerable 
situations are successfully pursued by the tax authorities. 
It must be remembered that section 1 03(2) contains a very useful escape clause for taxpayers, 
namely that the sole or main purpose of the agreement or change in shareholding must be to 
avoid, reduce or postpone the liability for tax. The flexibility created by the special relationships 
which exist between group companies makes it relatively easy to structure transactions aimed at 
the transferring of income in such a way that it appears to have a commercial purpose other than 
the avoidance, postponement or reduction of a liability for tax. And even if section 1 03(2) is 
theoretically applicable to certain arrangements whereby income is transferred between group 
members, the majority of such arrangements will not easily come to the notice of the tax 
authorities, by virtue of the fact that losses which would have attracted possible attention do not 
come about in the first place (Du Toit and Matthews, 1990: 12). 
In certain instances the implementation of a group tax regime may lead to an actual reduction in 
the amount of revenue collected by the fiscus, instead of a mere delay in the collection thereof. 
This is due to the fact that a company cannot automatically carry forward an assessed loss to the 
next year of assessment - section 20 of the Act contains certain implicit requirements which must 
be satisfied before such a carry forward can occur. Section 20(1)(a) states that "for the purposes 
of determining the taxable income derived by any person from carrying on any trade within the 
Republic, there shall be set off against the income so derived by such a person any balance of 
assessed loss incurred by the taxpayer in any previous year of assessment which has been carried 
forward from the preceding year of assessment." 
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According to the judgement in New Urban Properties Ltd v CIR (1966), the wording of section 
20(1)(a) envisages a continuity in setting off an assessed loss in each succeeding year in which it 
was originally incurred, so that in each succeeding year a balance can be struck which can be 
carried forward from year to year until it is exhausted. If this continuity is for any reason 
interrupted in any year (for example, because no trade is carried on in that year) so that the 
assessed loss cannot be set off and balanced in that year, then there can be no balance of assessed 
loss to be carried forward to the next year (Meyerowitz, 1997: 12-67). Thus, if a taxpayer has an 
assessed loss in year one but does not trade in year two, no balance of assessed loss will be struck 
in year two, which can be carried forward for set off against income of year three and succeeding 
years of assessment. In this instance the tax relief embodied by the assessed loss will be 
sacrificed permanently. If a group tax regime is implemented, the immediate utilisation of certain 
companies' assessed losses against other group income will prevent such losses from being 
subjected to the requirements for carry forwards contained in section 20(1)(a). This may lead to a 
reduction in the amount of assessed losses that will be sterilised. 
The mere fact that a company keeps itself alive during a year of assessment without trading is not 
enough for the carry forward of its assessed loss into the succeeding year (SA Bazaars (Pty) Ltd v 
CIR, 1952). However, this principle is not particularly protective of revenue collection, as it is 
easy in practice to satisfy the trade requirement set by section 20. For example, in ITC 777 
(1953) it was held that an unsuccessful endeavour to let fixed property constituted the carrying on 
of a trade. It was stated in that case that the extent of the effort or the amount of money expended 
cannot be the test whether a company is trying to get business, and that it is sufficient if there is 
merely an attempt to obtain business, even if no money is expended. A group company can 
therefore preserve an assessed loss for prolonged periods with relative ease, until an opportunity 
arises for the earning of income against which the loss can be set off. Unless such a company is 
wound up with an unutilised assessed loss (which is unlikely in the event of astute group tax 
planning), it cannot be said that the implementation of a group tax system will materially reduce 
the ultimate amount of revenue collected. 
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4.4.3.3 Historical assessed losses 
If a group tax system allows historical assessed losses that have accumulated until the date of its 
implementation to be utilised against the income of other companies in the group, the overall cost 
to the fiscus may be prohibitive. It should be noted that the potential tax relief inherent in 
accumulated assessed losses in effect represents float in the hands of the fiscus . This may be 
illustrated by the following example. Company A earns taxable income of Rl 00 in year 1 on 
which it pays tax ofR35. In year 2 the company sustains an assessed loss ofRlOO, which it may 
carry forward to the succeeding year of assessment. Company A's cumulative taxable income at 
the end of year 2 is zero, and yet it has paid tax of R35 . This constitutes a prepayment of tax by 
the company, which will only be fully reversed once it earns further taxable income in excess of 
RlOO. A group tax regime that allows the intra-group set off of assessed losses which have 
accumulated until its implementation, will cause a massive acceleration of the reversal of the 
fiscus's float. Such accelerated repayment of the float simply cannot be afforded by the fiscus at 
this stage. 
Most of the foreign jurisdictions that implemented group tax systems have encountered a similar 
problem and have devised measures to address it. For example, it can be determined that assessed 
losses existing within qualifying groups prior to the implementation of the group tax system may 
not be set off against any income other than that of the originating company (Du Toit and 
Matthews, 1990: 13). Alternatively, it can be determined that such assessed losses shall be closed 
off while group tax treatment applies to a particular group. If a company exits the group, the 
closed off assessed loss attributable to that company may once again be available for set off 
against its income. Similar measures may also be applied to the assessed losses of companies 
forming or entering a group after the implementation date of the group tax regime. 
4.4.3.4 The tax effects of intra-group transactions 
The distinction between consolidation systems and loss transfer systems is not important when 
the issues of historical and current assessed losses are considered, as both systems potentially 
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allow the transfer of such losses between group members. The distinction between the two types 
of systems becomes important, however, when the matter of intra-group transactions is 
considered. 
A consolidation system, by disregarding intra-group transactions for tax purposes, eliminates one 
of the fundamental instruments of group tax avoidance, namely the utilisation of separate legal 
entities within one economic entity to achieve favourable tax results that would not have been 
possible in a divisionalised company. Tax avoidance techniques that will be countered by a 
consolidation system include the following: 
Techniques that reduce the ultimate amount of revenue collected by the fiscus 
• CapitaVrevenue mismatches that result in one group member obtaining a 
deduction for its expenditure under section 11(a), while the corresponding 
receipt/accrual is not included in the gross income of the another group member 
(refer to section 2.2.5). 
• Losses on intra-group loans, where the loss is deductible by the lender and tax 
relief was obtained by the borrower in respect of the expenditure financed by the 
proceeds of the loan (refer to section 2.6.2). 
• The transfer of an asset, previously held as capital, to a separate trading 
company, so that the gain on disposal to an outside party can be split into a 
capital and revenue portion (refer to section 2. 7 .3). 
• Intra-group leases that obligate the lessee to effect improvements to the property 
of the lessor, where the lessee spends significantly more than is required of him 
and obtains a deduction of the excess under section 11 (t), section 13 or section 
13ter, while the lessor only includes in his gross income the amount stipulated in 
the agreement or the reasonable value of the improvements that the lessee was 
obligated to effect (refer to section 2.1 0). 
• The intra-group transfer of section 24J instruments m the following two 
instances. Firstly, the issuer of an instrument may transfer it to another group 
member, paying compensation below the initial amount. The gain below the 
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initial amount will be of a capital nature and therefore not taxable if the issuer is 
not a trader in such instruments. However, this gain will form a portion of the 
deductible interest expenditure of the other group company. Secondly, the holder 
of an instrument may transfer it to another group member at a price in excess of 
the adjusted initial amount. In this instance the gain made by the original holder 
may be of a capital nature and therefore not taxable, thereby replacing an amount 
of otherwise taxable interest (refer to section 2.11.2). 
• The intra-group transfer of fixed assets between group members to artificially 
inflate their cost bases in instances where the connected person rules do not 
apply (refer to section 2.14.2.1 ). 
Techniques that provide taxpayers with timing advantages 
• The intra-group transfer of fixed assets to accelerate allowances m respect 
thereof (refer to section 2.14.2.2). 
• The deferral of taxation by executing an intra-group transaction where the group 
company to which an amount accrues is granted an allowance in terms of section 
24 or 24C which will only be added to its taxable income in a following year of 
assessment, while the group company that incurs the amount as expenditure 
immediately obtains a deduction (refer to section 2.17). 
If it is assumed that section 1 03(1) is not applicable to the above-mentioned techniques, they will 
relate to the intended tax burden and not to the efficiency of collection of that burden. On the 
other hand, if it is assumed that section 103(1) is applicable to the above-mentioned techniques, 
but that it is not invoked due to oversight by the tax authorities, the techniques will relate to the 
efficiency of collection of the intended tax burden. In such an instance the discussion in section 
4.4.4 will be relevant. 
The present tax treatment of groups also gives rise to various tax anomalies which have a positive 
effect on the intended tax burden. These anomalies will remain if a loss transfer system is 
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implemented, as it treats the individual group companies as separate taxable entities. Some of the 
anomalies are as follows : 
Anomalies that increase the ultimate amount of revenue collected by the jiscus 
• General income/expenditure transactions, where the amount received by or accrued to 
one group member is included in its gross income, while the amount incurred by the 
other group member is not deductible because the production of income requirement 
of section ll(a) and the trade requirement of section 23(g) are not satisfied (refer to 
section 2.2.4). 
• CapitaVrevenue mismatches, where the amount received by or accrued to one group 
company is included in its gross income, while the other group company cannot 
obtain a deduction for the expenditure incurred by it (refer to section 2.2.5). 
• Costs incurred in respect of the provision of intra-group services, where the tax 
effects of the income and corresponding expenditure of the different group meobers 
neutralise each other, but where the group member receiving the income is not 
granted a deduction of its expenditure because the production of income requirement 
of section ll(a) and the trade requirement of section 23(g) are not satisfied (refer to 
section 2.3). 
• Transactions with unrelated parties whereby one group member incurs expenditure 
for the benefit of another group member, and a deduction is not granted to it because 
the production of income requirement of section ll(a) and the trade requirement of 
section 23(g) are not satisfied in relation to the group member incurring the 
expenditure (refer to section 2.4). 
• Interest on loans used to purchase shares in other group members, where such interest 
is not deductible because it is not incurred in the production of income as defined, 
although the shares are merely a legal interface between the acquiring company and a 
business that is to be actively managed by it (refer to section 2.5). 
• Losses on intra-group loans, where the loss is not deductible by the lender because it 
is considered to be of a capital nature, while no tax relief has been or will be obtained 
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by the defaulting borrower in respect of the expenditure financed by the loan (refer to 
section 2.6.2). 
• The acquisition of a capital asset by one group member from another and its 
subsequent realisation, where the proceeds of the realisation are considered as 
revenue in the hands of the realising company due to a history of trading in similar 
assets, while the disposal of the asset in group context is merely the realisation of a 
capital asset to the best advantage of the group (refer to section 2.7.2.2). 
• Intra-group leases where the lessee is obligated to effect improvements to the 
property of the lessor, and the lessee spends less than is required of him. In such an 
instance the lessee will obtain deductions on the actual cost of the improvements, 
while the lessor must nevertheless include in his gross income the amount stipulated 
in the agreement or the reasonable value of the specified improvements (refer to 
section 2.1 0). 
• The intra-group transfer of section 24J instruments in the following two instances. 
Firstly, the issuer of an instrument may transfer it, paying an amount in excess of the 
adjusted initial amount. If he is not a trader in instruments, the resultant loss will be of 
a capital nature and therefore not deductible. The capital loss will be excluded from 
the determination of the amount of deductible expenditure incurred by the other group 
member. Secondly, the holder of an instrument may transfer it at a price below the 
initial amount. Again, if the holder is not a trader in such instruments, the loss below 
the initial amount will be of a capital nature and therefore not deductible under section 
11(a). However, such capital loss will effectively be included in the determination of 
the taxable amount of interest accrued to the other group company (refer to section 
2.11.2). 
• The intra-group transfer of fixed assets in cases where there is interaction between the 
connected person rules and section 11 ( o ). If the market value of the asset so 
transferred is below its tax value, and a scrapping allowance is not allowed to the 
transferor, the group will not obtain a deduction of that portion of the cost of the asset 
representing the difference between its tax and market value on the date of transfer 
(refer to section 2.14.3). 
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Anomalies that cause taxpayers to suffer timing disadvantages 
• Conditional intra-group payments where the amount is received by one group member 
and therefore included in its gross income, although the corresponding expenditure 
has not yet been incurred by the other group member and consequently is not 
deductible (refer to section 2.2.3). 
• Intra-group lease premiums where the lessee's deductions in respect of the premium is 
spread over a number of years, while the lessor must include the entire amount of the 
premium in his gross income once it has accrued to or has been received by him (refer 
to section 2.9). 
• Intra-group leasehold improvements where the lessee's deductions in respect of the 
cost of the improvements will be spread over a number of years, while the lessor must 
include the entire amount thereof once the improvements are completed (refer to 
section 2.1 0). 
• The taxation of profits arising from intra-group trading stock transfers where such 
profits have not yet been realised outside the group (refer to section 2.16). 
Because a consolidation system will eliminate anomalies both favourable to taxpayers and 
favourable to the fiscus, the question arises whether it will produce a net increase or net decrease 
in the intended tax burden. In this regard it must be remembered that group structures are 
generally employed for sizable and complex enterprises and that the economic power of such 
enterprises affords a high level of sophistication in matters such as tax planning. It is therefore 
likely that groups will structure their activities in such a way that the anomalies producing 
unfavourable tax effects are avoided, while the anomalies producing favourable tax effects are 
fully exploited. The implementation of a consolidation system will therefore probably result in a 
net increase in the intended tax burden concerning intra-group transactions, whereas the 
implementation of a loss transfer system will merely maintain the status quo. 
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4.4.4 Efficiency of collection of the intended tax burden 
Du Toit and Matthews (1990: 18) are of the opinion that a consolidation system will be more 
efficient from an administrative perspective than both a loss transfer system and the present tax 
treatment of groups. This derives from three factors in particular: 
• A consolidation system involves fewer corporate tax returns than a loss transfer 
system. In the former system a group renders a single consolidated return that needs to 
be assessed, whereas in the latter system individual group companies continue to be 
assessed as separate taxable entities. Every return that must be assessed involves a 
certain fixed quantity of administration. The implementation of a consolidated system 
will avoid unnecessary duplication of such administration within a group, thereby 
achieving greater economies of scale. 
• A consolidation system regards intra-group transactions as tax irrelevant and therefore 
reduces the number of transactions requiring administration and policing. A loss 
transfer system, on the other hand, treats intra-group transactions as tax relevant. This 
causes the mirroring tax effects of taxability and deductibility, which does not 
influence the total amount of revenue due. Nevertheless, intra-group transactions must 
be administered and policed - once they are tax relevant they may become the object 
of intra-group manipulation towards changing an overall neutral tax result into a result 
that is beneficial to the group. 
• A consolidation system of group tax not only reduces the number of transactions that 
are tax relevant, but also aligns tax relevance with economic relevance. In a 
consolidation system the only relevant transactions for tax purposes are those 
concluded with outside parties. Transactions between entities that are owned by the 
same economic interests can be manipulated for tax reasons without affecting the 
overall wealth of those interests. On the other hand, transactions concluded between 
conflicting economic interests will have a real impact on wealth and therefore are 
much less likely to be employed for tax manipulation. Thus transactions executed 
across the borders of independent economic interests are self-policing to a certain 
extent, thereby assisting the tax authorities in their monitoring task. 
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The fact that group tax systems usually function on an election basis may further contribute to 
improved efficiency in the case of a consolidated regime. Groups that have more to lose from the 
exploitation of favourable anomalies arising from intra-group transactions than they have to gain 
from the accelerated utilisation of assessed losses, will not elect group tax treatment. This may 
alert the tax authorities to previously undetected group schemes that can be attacked successfully 
under specific or general anti-avoidance provisions (Dieperink, 1995: 1). Such a warning feature 
will not be available in the case of a loss transfer system, because intra-group transactions will 
still have tax effects. Non-election by group companies during a year of assessment will simply 
indicate that there are no assessed losses to transfer during that particular year. 
A further advantage of a consolidation system over a loss transfer system relating to efficiency of 
collection is that it will more effectively direct the attention of the tax authorities to avoidance 
schemes which involve parties unrelated to the group. In section 2.13 .2.2, it was stated that the 
non-deductible acquisition cost of a capital asset can be converted into a deductible lease 
premium, if the asset is acquired by a trading company within the group and the usufruct and bare 
dominium are subsequently transferred to other group companies. Assume now that a group 
company that acquired a non-deductible capital asset sells it to an unrelated trading company, 
whereafter the usufruct and bare dominimum therein are acquired by other group companies. A 
consolidation system will not counter the scheme through the elimination of intra-group 
transactions, as none of the transactions in question will have been executed between group 
companies. However, it may direct the attention of the Receiver to the scheme, contributing to a 
potentially successful application of section 103(1). The reason is that a consolidation system 
requires the clear tabulation of group structures as a fundamental component of its operation. The 
focus in such a system therefore falls on the group as a whole (Cronje, n.d.(b): 10). If outside 
parties are involved in group tax schemes, clues to such schemes are not only fragmented across 
various group companies, but also across outside entities. The holistic view of groups brought 
about by a consolidation regime will more likely lead to a piecing together of such fragments by 
the tax authorities than a loss transfer regime. 
It is possible to achieve a measure of group focus on the part of the tax authorities in the case of a 
loss transfer regime. For example, the transfer of losses between group members may be 
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monitored centrally by the assessor of the holding company of such a group. This may in turn 
lead to the centralised review of individual assessments. However, such central monitoring is not 
essential; the only intra-group coordination that is required in a loss transfer regime is in respect 
of loss transfers between group members that are parties to a particular transfer. Because an 
integrated group focus is therefore not essential for the operation of a loss transfer system, the 
achievement of such focus requires a certain degree of self-imposed discipline, which cannot 
merely be assumed as a given (Cronje, n.d.(b): 9). A consolidation system, on the other hand, 
demands a group focus by the very nature of its operation. 
4. 4. 5 Conclusion as to revenue neutrality 
The total amount of tax revenue is a function of the tax base, the intended tax burden and the 
efficiency of collection of that burden. A consolidation system is preferable to a loss transfer 
system as far as all three factors are concerned. 
Because a consolidation system disregards all intra-group transactions for tax purposes and 
virtually eliminates the possibility of tax anomalies within a group context, it is less likely to 
influence the economic process. As commercial activity will therefore not be inhibited by tax 
considerations, economic well-being will be promoted, with a resultant increase in the tax base. 
Both a consolidation system and a loss transfer system will reduce the intended tax burden 
through accelerated utilisation of historical as well as current assessed losses. With regard to 
historical losses, the impact may be particularly dramatic. However, it is possible to control and 
limit the impact by ring-fencing or closing off such losses. With regard to current assessed losses, 
the impact may not be as dramatic, because a significant number of current income transfer 
techniques that may be vulnerable probably go undetected by the tax authorities. The reduction in 
the intended tax burden due to the accelerated utilisation of assessed losses will be partially 
neutralised in a consolidation system through its disregard of intra-group transactions for 
purposes of taxation. In this way avoidance schemes based on the anomalous tax effects of 
certain inter-group transactions will be eliminated. 
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Not only will a consolidated system have a less negative impact on the intended tax burden than a 
loss transfer system, but it will also have a positive impact on the collection of that burden. This 
is achieved in various ways. Firstly, by reducing the number of assessments and transactions to 
be monitored and by focusing such monitoring on economically relevant transactions, the 
administrative burden on the tax authorities is eased, releasing resources for more effective 
policing. Secondly, non-election by qualifying groups in a consolidated system of group taxation 
will serve as a warning measure to tax authorities, indicating the possibility of intra-group 
arrangements that may be vulnerable to attack under the anti-avoidance provisions of the Act. 
Finally, the group focus required by a consolidated system may lead to the more effective 
detection of tax avoidance arrangements involving parties unrelated to groups, through the 
holistic consideration of fragmented clues to such arrangements. 
When the combined effect of the tax base, the intended tax burden and the collection of that 
burden on the amount of tax revenues is considered, it becomes clear that the implementation of a 
consolidated group tax system will not dramatically affect revenue neutrality. It is even possible 
that a consolidated group tax system will be marginally revenue positive. 
4.5 SIMPLICITY 
4. 5.1 Introduction 
Simplicity refers to the ease of operation of a taxation system from a technical perspective. A 
group tax regime should preferably not contain complex requirements and procedures, 
particularly as the administrative capacity of the South African Revenue Service is severely 
stretched (Du Toit & Matthews, 1990: 9). If a system of group taxation is so complex that it is 
beyond the administrative abilities of the tax authorities, it clearly cannot be implemented, even if 
it will produce significant advantages in other respects. Furthermore, a system of group taxation 
should not be so complex as to result in a material increase in taxpayer resources committed to 
tax compliance. 
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Whichever system of group taxation is implemented, increased complexity will result from the 
introduction of additional legislative provisions to govern the group tax regime. Differences of 
opinion exist as to which system will entail the greater level of complexity and various arguments 
have been presented in this regard. For example, Matthews and Du Toit (1990: 25) state that a 
loss transfer system will require a greater amount of adaptation as the South African tax 
environment does not presently acknowledge the concept of transferring assessed losses between 
group companies. A consolidation system, on the other hand, will largely be the application of 
currently known concepts to different entities, namely groups instead of divisionalised 
companies. In contrast, Du Plessis(1995: 1) states that a consolidation system will result in 
considerable complexity due to the myriad of intra-group adjustments that will have to be made. 
Several other writers also express the opinion that a full consolidation system is far more 
complex than a loss transfer system. Further systematic analysis of the two systems is therefore 
necessary to resolve these conflicting opinions. 
4.5.2 Loss transfer systems 
A loss transfer system is widely perceived to be simpler than a consolidation system, as it does 
not require special treatment of intra-group transactions to render them tax irrelevant. In essence 
a loss transfer system acknowledges the group only to the extent that the assessed losses of one 
group company may be transferred to another group company. As such, taxpayers and tax 
authorities are not burdened with consolidation exercises involving entire group structures. The 
only group companies that have to be considered for group tax purposes are those companies that 
are parties to loss transfers. Furthermore, the only transactions that have to be considered for 
group tax purposes are particular loss transfers. 
4. 5. 3 Consolidation systems 
A consolidation system is more complex than a loss transfer system, the principal reason being 
that intra-group transactions are subjected to special tax treatment to neutralise their tax effects. 
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As far as the intra-group transfer of assets is concerned, two approaches can be followed to 
render such transfers tax irrelevant. The first approach involves initially recognizing the tax 
effects of such transfers, as if the transactions in question were concluded with outside parties, 
and to make certain year-end adjustments to eliminate their tax effects. The second approach 
involves the initial recording of intra-group asset transfers at values that will ensure tax 
irrelevance from the outset. 
The two approaches can be illustrated through the example of intra-group stock transfers. 
Assume that Holdco manufactures trading stock at a cost ofRlOO and sells it to Subco, its wholly 
owned subsidiary, at a price of R200. At the end of the group's year of assessment, Subco has 
sold none of this stock. This means that the group has an unrealised profit of R 1 00 in respect of 
stock transferred from Holdco to Subco, but not sold outside the group. 
Under the first approach discussed above, the entire intra-group profit ofRlOO will be included in 
Holdco's taxable income upon the stock transfer. At the end of the year of assessment, however, 
Holdco's taxable income will be reduced by the unrealised profit of RlOO. This amount will be 
added back to Holdco's taxable income in the succeeding year of assessment. 
Under the second approach, the transfer of stock from Holdco to Subco will be deemed to have 
occurred at its tax value in Holdco 's hands. In other words, irrespective of the transfer price 
agreed by the two companies, the transfer price for tax purposes will be Rl 00. Although this 
alternative will eliminate the need for year-end adjustments in respect of unrealised profits, and 
thereby reduce complexity, it will also result in the entire group profit accruing to Subco for tax 
purposes. This may cause problems in the instance where historical assessed losses of the 
individual group companies are ring-fenced, and Holdco has a considerable historical assessed 
loss while Subco does not. The group may decide to effect future sales of Holdco's products 
directly to outside parties, although this may not be the most efficient distribution method. Where 
historical losses are ring-fenced, the choice between the alternative approaches for dealing with 
unrealised profits will therefore be determined by the relative importance attached to simplicity 
and neutrality. 
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If historical assessed losses of individual companies are closed off while group tax treatment 
applies, the issue of neutrality will be irrelevant in deciding between the alternatives. As 
historical losses will not be available for set off against group income, the apportionment of 
profits between such companies for tax purposes will not matter. As neutrality will not be 
compromised in this instance, the second alternative will be the obvious choice due to its greater 
simplicity. However, the effective sterilisation of historical assessed losses while group tax 
treatment prevails may be considered unduly harsh. 
With regard to the transfer of depreciable capital assets and financial instruments, it will be 
preferable for the sake of simplicity to deem such transfers to occur at their tax values. The 
complexity of the alternative consolidation approach will be realised when the example of an 
intra-group transfer of a capital asset at a tax loss is considered. The tax loss arising from the 
asset's transfer will have to be added back to taxable income during the year of the transfer. 
Furthermore, the tax allowances based on the transfer value will have to be adjusted upwards 
during each year in which the allowance is subsequently granted to reflect the tax value of the 
asset at the time of its transfer. Interestingly, a consolidation system deeming the intra-group 
transfer of depreciable assets to occur at their tax values will be much simpler to apply than the 
current anti-avoidance provisions in respect of the transfer of depreciable assets between 
connected persons. 
Complex adjustments are not foreseen in respect of income/expenditure transactions between 
group companies, such as management fees, interest and rentals. One approach is to allow a 
deduction to one group member and include a corresponding amount in the gross income of the 
other member. With regard to the expenditure leg of income/expenditure transactions, the 
production of income requirement of section ll(a) and the trade requirement of section 23(g) 
should be applied in a group context to avoid the anomalies referred to in Chapter 2. However, if 
historical assessed losses of individual group companies are ring-fenced, this approach to 
income/expense transactions will necessitate anti-avoidance measures to oppose schemes aimed 
at the accelerated utilisation of assessed losses. Such anti-avoidance measures will produce 
increased complexity. An alternative approach is to deem the value of such transactions to be 
zero for tax purposes. However, this may lead to umeasonable results in circumstances where 
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historical assessed losses of individual group members are ring-fenced and the transactions in 
question are concluded for bona fide purposes and at market values. 
From the above discussion it is clear that a consolidation system can be designed so as to 
eliminate the need for intricate year-end adjustments to neutralise the tax effects of intra-group 
transactions. By deeming transactions to occur at their tax values in the case of the transfer of 
assets or liabilities, or by deeming transactions to occur at no value in the case of 
income/expenditure transactions, they can be made tax neutral from the outset. When such an 
approach is followed, potential complexity will only arise from the identification and validation 
of intra-group transactions to which special values must be applied for consolidation purposes. 
The identification of intra-group transactions is an issue that relates mainly to taxpayers, as 
groups will have to identify intra-group transactions when compiling consolidated returns. 
Because groups are required by the Companies Act to compile group financial statements in the 
preferred form of consolidated financial statements, most groups already have systems in place 
for the identification of intra-group transactions. These systems will require little, if any, 
modification to identify intra-group transactions for tax purposes. 
The verification of intra-group transactions is an issue that relates mainly to tax authorities, as 
they will have to monitor the accuracy, completeness and validity of intra-group transactions in 
consolidated returns. The main difficulty that will be encountered in this regard is the verification 
of the completeness of intra-group transactions, as taxpayers may not disclose all such 
transactions in an attempt to illegitimately preserve intra-group tax avoidance schemes. However, 
the difficulty that may be encountered in verifying the completeness of intra-group transactions 
should not act as a deterrent in implementing a group tax regime - such verification is supposed 
to occur under the present regime to ensure the effective operation of sections 103(1) and 103(2) 
within a group context. 
In any event, the tax authorities will receive considerable assistance from the auditors of group 
companies in monitoring the completeness of intra-group transactions. The reason can be found 
in AC 126 and SAAS 550 of the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants, which 
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respectively deal with the accounting requirements and the auditor' s responsibility in relation to 
related parties and transactions with such parties. 
Paragraph .06 of AC 126 states that parties are related if one party has the ability to control the 
other party or exercise significant influence over the other party in making financial and 
operating decisions (South African Institute of Chartered Accountants, 1997). Control is defined 
as ownership, directly or indirectly through subsidiaries, of more than one half of the voting 
power of an enterprise; or a substantial interest in the voting power and the power to direct, by 
statute or agreement, the financial and operating policies of the management of the enterprise. 
Under the above-mentioned definitions of related parties and control, companies that are 
members of closely held groups will be regarded as related parties. 
Paragraph .23 of AC 126 determines that if there have been transactions between related parties, 
the reporting enterprise should disclose the nature of the related party relationships as well as the 
types of transactions and the elements necessary for an understanding of the financial statements. 
Paragraph .24 states that the elements of transactions necessary for an understanding of the 
financial statements would normally include an indication of the volume of the transactions, 
eithgr as an amount or as an appropriate proportion; amounts or appropriate proportions of 
outstanding items and pricing policies. From these disclosure requirements, it can be seen that the 
schedules detailing intra-group transactions for tax purposes will merely be an adapted version of 
the working papers prepared when compiling the individual group companies' financial 
statements. 
Paragraph 03 of SAAS 550 states that the auditor should perform procedures designed to obtain 
sufficient appropriate audit evidence regarding the identification and disclosure by management 
of related parties and the effect of related party transactions that are material to the financial 
statements (South African Institute of Chartered Accountants, 1997). 
With regard to the existence and disclosure of related parties, paragraph 07 states that the auditor 
should review information provided by management identifying the names of all known related 
parties and should perform appropriate procedures to determine the completeness of this 
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information. Appropriate procedures according to the statement will include the review of prior 
year working papers for names of known related parties, the review of the entity's procedures for 
the identification of related parties, the review of shareholder records to determine the names of 
principal shareholders and the review of minutes of meetings of shareholders and the board of 
directors of the entity. Furthermore, paragraph 08 states that the auditor should satisfy himself 
that the disclosure of related party relationships in the financial statements is adequate. 
With regard to transactions with related parties paragraph 09 states that the auditor should review 
information provided by the directors and management identifying related party transactions and 
should be alert to other material related party transactions. Paragraph 12 lists certain procedures 
that the auditor may employ to identify the existence of transactions with related parties such as 
performing detailed tests of transactions and balances, reviewing accounting records for large or 
unusual transactions or balances, reviewing confirmations of loans receivable and payable and 
confirmations from banks (such a review may indicate guarantor relationships and other related 
party transactions) and reviewing investment transactions. Furthermore, paragraph 16 states that 
the auditor should satisfy himself as to the proper disclosure of such material transactions with 
related parties. 
Thus it is clear that a consolidation system of will not place a significant additional 
administrative burden on either groups or tax authorities. AC 126 already requires the disclosure 
of transactions with related parties in financial statements, while SAAS 550 obligates auditors to 
review the completeness of disclosure in financial statements of related parties and transactions 
with related parties. The verification of the completeness of intra-group transactions in 
consolidated statements will require a relatively simple reconciliation of the audited financial 
statements and supporting schedules with the consolidated return and supporting schedules. 
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4.6 CERTAINTY 
Both the loss transfer system and the consolidation system will significantly diminish the present 
uncertainty concerning the legitimacy of transfer techniques between group members. No longer 
will such transfers be subject to the often vague and subjective provisions of sections 103(1) and 
103(2). Instead, objective procedural rules will govern the transfer of losses between group 
members. These rules may be intricate and therefore complex, but they will lead to greater 
predictability of tax results. 
However, a loss transfer system will not eliminate various uncertainties that currently exist with 
regard to the tax effects of various other intra-group transactions. A consolidation system, on the 
other hand, will prevent such uncertainties by treating intra-group transactions as tax irrelevant. 
Some of the uncertainties that have been more extensively discussed in Chapter 2 are as follows: 
• uncertainty whether expenditure in respect of intra-group transactions satisfies the 
production of income requirement of section ll(a) and the trade requirement of 
section 23(g) with regard to the particular group company that incurs the expenditure 
(refer to sections 2.2.4, 2.3 and 2.4); 
• uncertainty over the way in which expenditure should be apportioned in instances 
where inter-group expenditure is not wholly and exclusively laid out for the purposes 
of a particular group company's trade; 
• uncertainty whether an amount received by or accrued to one group member, which is 
categorised as either revenue or capital in nature, will be similarly categorised in the 
hands of the group member who incurred the corresponding expenditure (refer to 
section 2.2.5); 
• uncertainty whether interest on loans employed to finance the purchase of shares in 
another group company is incurred in the production of income derived from the 
purchaser's trade (refer to section 2.5); 
• uncertainty whether losses on intra-group loans will be considered as capital or 
revenue in nature (refer to sections 2.6.3 and 2.6.4); 
• uncertainty whether amounts paid in accordance with intra-group lease agreements 
will be categorised as lease premiums, resulting in asynchronous timing of accruals 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
159 
and expenditure, or bullet rentals, resulting in synchronous timing of accruals and 
expenditure (refer to section 2.9); 
• uncertainty whether transactions, operations or schemes executed to avoid 
unfavourable group tax anomalies or to exploit favourable group tax anomalies will 
overcome the hurdles of the rather general and vague section 103(1) (refer to section 
2.13). 
These uncertainties invariably lead to disputes between taxpayers and tax authorities that may 
deteriorate into costly and time-consuming litigation. Furthermore, in an attempt to deal with 
such uncertainties, highly skilled people with an in-depth knowledge of relevant court 
judgements must be employed by taxpayers as well as the tax authorities. These human resources 
can be more productively employed in expanding or improving economic production (in the case 
of taxpayers), or in more effectively monitoring transactions where tax relevance and economic 
relevance correspond (in the case of the tax authorities). 
4.7 ADMINISTRATIVE COST 
The administrative cost of a system of group taxation is intertwined with its effect on simplicity 
and certainty. Technical simplicity will lead to reduced compliance costs for taxpayers and 
monitoring costs for tax authorities. Greater certainty will lead to reduced consultation and 
litigation costs for both taxpayers and tax authorities. 
In section 4.5 it was stated that consolidation systems are more complex than loss transfer 
systems mainly because of the special treatment of intra-group transactions to render them tax 
irrelevant. Nevertheless, consolidation systems can be designed to avoid much of the potential 
complexity. Furthermore, much of the infrastructure necessary for the identification and 
validation of intra-group transactions are already in place due to the requirements of AC 126 and 
SAAS 550. 
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In section 4.6 it was remarked that a consolidation system achieves greater certainty than a loss 
transfer system by treating intra-group transactions as tax irrelevant, thereby eliminating the need 
to predict the tax effects of intra-group transactions. 
The fact that a consolidation system is more complex than a loss transfer system will result in 
increased compliance and control costs. On the other hand, by achieving greater certainty a 
consolidation system will result in reduced consultation and litigation costs. Consultation and 
litigation usually require more expertise and skill than compliance and control, and are therefore 
more expensive. A consolidation regime may therefore produce fewer administrative costs than a 
loss transfer system. 
4.8 CONCLUSION 
Chapter 4 demonstrated that a consolidation system of group taxation represents a more 
satisfactory trade-off between the various canons of taxation than a loss transfer system (and by 
implication, the current tax regime). It will achieve greater equity, neutrality, efficiency of 
collection and certainty. Furthermore, it may produce fewer administrative costs than a loss 
transfer system. In addition, a consolidation system should lead to a revenue neutral or a slightly 
revenue positive result because concessions are made to the taxpayer as well as the fiscus. A loss 
transfer system, on the other hand, makes concessions to taxpayers only by allowing the transfer 
of assessed losses between individual group companies without elirn :nating the potential for 
intra-group tax manipulation. The only disadvantage of a consolidation system is its technical 
complexity, but it is possible to design a system that will fall within the administrative capacity 
of the South African tax authorities. It will therefore be appropriate and desirable to introduce a 
consolidation system of group taxation into the South African tax environment. 
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5 AN EXAMINATION OF CERTAIN PROPOSALS OF THE KATZ COMMISSION 
WITH REGARD TO GROUP TAX 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Third Interim Report of the Katz Commission addresses the issue of group taxation in some 
detail. The purpose of Chapter 5 is to examine certain recommendations made by the 
Commission in this regard. 
5.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF A SYSTEM OF GROUP TAXATION 
The Commission recommended the implementation of a group tax regime for South Africa in the 
form of a consolidation system. The following reasons were cited for the preference of a 
consolidation system over a loss transfer system (South Africa, 1995: 98- 99): 
• On a conceptual level a consolidation system recognizes the economic unity of a 
group to a greater extent than a loss transfer system. 
• In a loss transfer system each company remains a separate taxpayer and much of the 
potential for manipulation of intra-group transactions remains, including the 
engineering of timing differences, manipulation of cost bases and exploitation of 
capital/revenue mismatches. A consolidation system prevents such manipulation by 
treating transactions between group members as tax irrelevant. A loss transfer system 
is therefore a system of "group relief' which benefits only taxpayers, as it allows the 
transfer of losses between group members without inhibiting intra-group 
manipulations. A consolidation system, on the other hand, represents a more 
acceptable trade-offbetween the interests oftaxpayers and the fiscus. 
• A consolidation system will improve efficiency of revenue collection in two ways. 
Firstly, as only transactions with outside parties are tax relevant, economic interests 
will serve to limit manipulations aimed at tax avoidance. Secondly, a consolidation 
system has the advantage that the full group's results are presented to the Revenue in 
a single submission. This makes for an easy audit trail and resolves the problem that 
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information for different companies is seldom available when companies are assessed 
separately. 
• Although it is sometimes contended that the consolidation system is a more complex 
alternative, this largely depends on the degree and manner of consolidation. 
The writer concurs with the Commission's recommendation that a consolidation system should 
be implemented, as this will lead to a more satisfactory trade-off between the canons of taxation 
than either a loss transfer system or the present tax treatment of groups. 
5.3 A GRADUAL APPROACH 
5. 3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 4 it was stated that a consolidation system might result in increased legislative 
complexity, but that this risk can be addressed during the design of the system. The Commission 
responded to the issue of complexity by proposing a gradual approach to the implementation of a 
consolidation system. The suggested initial system will not be a fully-fledged consolidation 
system, although it will be capable of growing in sophistication as those who participate in and 
administer the system gain experience of it (South Africa, 1995: 96). The writer is in agreement 
with such an approach, bearing in mind the limited resources currently available to the tax 
authorities. 
The Commission proposed that when a full consolidation system is eventually implemented, the 
following principle, which is widely followed internationally, should apply. Upon the entry of a 
company into a group, any assessed loss of the acquired company is ring-fenced and may only be 
set off against the income from that specific company. Any unutilised assessed loss subsequent to 
entry into the group may be carried forward as a consolidated assessed loss and will be available 
for set off against the consolidated taxable income of the group in future years. The same 
principle should apply at the commencement of consolidated filing by a group (South Africa, 
1995: 103). 
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In the simplified system proposed by the Commission, not only will initial assessed losses be 
ring-fenced, but also current assessed losses not fully utilised during the years of assessment in 
which they are incurred. In other words, any assessed loss incurred by a group company in a 
particular year of assessment may only be set off against income from another group company in 
that particular year (South Africa, 1995: 103). 
Furthermore, the Commission did not envision the elimination of all intra-group transactions in 
the initial system. The only adjustments that will be included in such a system are those that will 
not result in undue complexity (South Africa, 1995: 1 03). 
5.3.2 Proposed initial consolidation mechanism 
The Commission proposed a consolidation mechanism consisting of four steps (South Africa, 
1995: 103- 105). 
The first step would be to calculate the taxable income or assessed loss of each group member 
under the current tax regime. This calculation can be referred to as the sub-return. The sub-return 
should provide the information required in the standard corporate tax return as well as certain 
additional information on group-related transactions. 
The second step would be to make adjustments in respect of certain intra-group transactions: 
• Fixed assets transferred within a group should be deemed to be transferred at tax value 
and be subject to recoupment in the transferee up to the original cost of the assets to 
the group. 
• There should be no allowances in terms of sections 24 or 24C in respect of intra-group 
transactions. 
• There should be an adjustment to unrealised profits and losses on trading stock 
purchased from group members, which should be added back to taxable income in the 
following year of assessment. 
• The provisions of section 23(g) should be applied in a group context. 
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The Commission also proposed further adjustments that may be introduced at a later stage. 
Examples of such adjustments include the following: 
• adjustments for intra-group lease premiums and leasehold improvements; 
• adjustments to group transactions involving capital revenue mismatches; and 
• interest adjustments on intra-group loans governed by section 24J to the extent that 
there are mismatches. 
The third step would be to add back the assessed loss that is brought forward from the previous 
year of assessment in the case of each sub-return. The consolidation for group tax purposes 
would be based on this notional figure. 
The fourth and final step would be the determination of the consolidation results for each year of 
assessment. The Commission suggested the following simplified method: 
• A company which has taxable income for the current year of assessment but has an 
assessed loss for the previous year will be obliged to contribute income into the 
consolidated return only to the extent that it can be absorbed by current year losses of 
one or more other companies in the group. If there are no such current year assessed 
losses within the group, the income of the company will be available for the set off of 
its assessed loss brought forward from the prior year. 
• If an assessed loss balance remains after the procedure in the first bullet has been 
followed, it will be carried forward and will only be available for set off against 
income of that company's sub-return in the following year of assessment, once the 
procedure in the first bullet has been repeated. 
• Any current year assessed loss of a company will first be set off against current year 
taxable income elsewhere in the group and, to the extent that it cannot be deducted, 
will be carried forward in that sub-return as an assessed loss which will be available 
for set off only against the income of that company's sub-return in the following year 
of assessment, once the procedure in the first bullet has been followed. 
• If more than one company has a current year assessed loss, and the total current year 
assessed loss exceeds current year taxable income, a decision has to be made 
regarding which company or companies will carry forward assessed losses, and to 
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what extent. The Commission proposed that this decision should be left to the 
taxpayer. 
From the above procedure it can be seen that there will initially be no consolidated assessed loss. 
Assessed losses, apart from current year losses utilised within the group, will be ring-fenced and 
will only be available for set off against specific group companies' income. 
5.3.3 Comment on the proposed initial consolidation mechanism 
The consoli ·1ation method proposed by the Commission goes some way in eliminating intra-
group manipulations and allowing the utilisation of assessed losses within a group context, while 
simultaneously achieving a measure of simplicity. However, the writer disagrees with the specific 
approach followed in respect of adjustments for intra-group transactions, as well as the proposed 
treatment of entry and current losses. 
5.3.3.1 Adjustments for intra-group transactions 
The approach of the Commission with regard to consolidation adjustments appears to be that the 
taxable income of each company will be calculated in its separate sub-return without reference to 
the group tax regime, whereafter certain adjustments will be made to eliminate the tax effects of 
intra-group transactions. For example, it is proposed that unrealised profits on intra-group stock 
transfers should be eliminated, implying that such profits will be recognized in the sub-returns. 
However, it is proposed by the Commission that intra-group transfers of fixed assets should be 
deemed to occur at tax values. This implies an alternative approach, namely treating intra-group 
transactions from the outset in a manner that will not produce tax effects, thereby avoiding the 
need for later adjustments. 
Nevertheless, when the group tax recommendations of the Commission are read in their entirety, 
it appears as if an approach is suggested where consolidation adjustments are made after sub-
returns have been compiled wherein group companies are treated as separate taxpayers. This 
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approach is probably favoured to achieve a tidy transition from the existing basis on which 
taxable income of group companies is calculated. However, the fact that the tax effects of group 
transactions are firstly recognized and then eliminated through consolidation adjustments leads to 
unnecessary duplication and complexity. The Commission was probably influenced by the 
method followed in accounting to compile consolidated financial statements, where consolidated 
financial statements are derived from individual financial statements through accounting 
adjustments that eliminate the effects of intra-group transactions. This may be the most effective 
way to compile consolidated financials statements for accounting purposes, as separate financial 
statements for individual group companies are required by the Companies Act and must therefore 
be compiled in any event. On the other hand, separate returns in respect of individual group 
companies are not necessary for the purposes of group tax and the derivation of consolidated 
returns from separate sub-returns may therefore not be the most efficient approach. 
An alternative approach to consolidation adjustments mentioned in Chapter 4 would be far 
simpler. According to this approach, each group company will still compile its own sub-return, 
but special rules will apply for recording the number of intra-group transactions to prevent 
resulting tax effects. For example, the intra-group transfer of assets and liabilities such as trading 
stock, plant, machinery and financial instruments should be deemed to occur at their tax values. 
Furthermore, intra-group income/expense transactions such as management fees, interest, 
royalties and lease premiums should be deemed to occur at nil value. If such an approach is 
followed, more intra-group transactions can be addressed by the consolidation system during its 
initial implementation without unduly complicating the system. It will not be necessary, for 
example, to postpone adjustments concerning intra-group lease premiums, intra-group leasehold 
improvements and the intra-group transfer of financial instruments, because the neutralisation of 
such transactions under the alternative approach would be relatively simple. 
It is important that all intra-group transactions are addressed by the consolidation system as 
quickly as possible. The sooner this is done, the sooner maximum compliance with the canons of 
taxation will be achieved. The approach to consolidation adjustments suggested in this work will 
contribute to the speedy implementation of a fully-fledged consolidation system by simplifying 
the elimination oftax effects in respect of intra-group transactions. 
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5.3.3 .2 The treatment of entry losses and current losses 
With regard to entry losses the writer is of the opinion that they should initially be closed off 
completely instead of being ring-fenced for utilisation against the income of the particular group 
companies to which they pertain. With regard to current assessed losses the writer is of the 
opinion that no ring-fencing should occur and that a consolidated assessed loss should be created 
for set off against future consolidated income. 
The ring-fencing of entry and current assessed losses will encourage taxpayers to effect schemes 
whereby income is transferred from profitable group members to group members with ring-
fenced assessed losses. Increased complexity will result in two ways. Firstly, anti-avoidance 
measures will be necessary to address such transfers by requiring that all intra-group transactions 
should be conducted on an arm's length basis or by applying the provisions of section 103 to 
such transactions. Both of these alternatives will be difficult to apply in practice. Secondly, it will 
be necessary to keep track of ring-fenced assessed losses of individual group companies, 
resulting in more detailed record keeping. 
The sterilisation of entry losses while group tax treatment applies to a group may appear harsh. 
Yet such a measure can be justified in the light ofthe following arguments: 
• Simplicity is a fundamental condition for the initial implementation of a group tax 
regime. When the other tax benefits which groups will obtain are considered, the 
closing off of entry losses may be considered as an acceptable sacrifice. 
• Although entry losses will be sterilised for the duration of group tax treatment, current 
losses will be available for set off against consolidated income without restriction. 
This represents a more satisfactory trade-off from a conceptual perspective, as the 
economic unity of the group will at least be fully recognized concerning current 
losses. This will not be the case where current losses are ring-fenced. 
• Closed off entry losses can be made available to a particular group company once it 
exits the group. Such losses will therefore not be permanently sterilised. 
• The sterilisation of entry losses will only be a transitional measure. Once the impact 
of the initial consolidation system on revenue collection can be more accurately 
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assessed, entry assessed losses can be gradually phased m for utilisation against 
consolidated income. 
• Qualifying groups will be able to elect group tax treatment under the system proposed 
by the Commission. If a group considers the sterilisation of entry assessed losses to be 
unduly harsh, it can simply refrain from electing group tax treatment. 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
The Katz Commission recommended the implementation of a consolidation system of group tax 
in South Africa. Although such a system represents a more satisfactory trade-off between the 
canons of taxation than either a loss transfer system or the present tax regime with regard to 
groups, the Commission recognized that a consolidation system may lead to unacceptable 
complexity. A gradual approach to implementation was therefore suggested, with the initial 
system being relatively simple but capable of future refinement. The initial consolidation 
mechanism proposed by the Commission, with the modifications suggested in this chapter, will 
contribute to increased equity, neutrality and certainty, and lead to reduced administrative costs 
without being unmanageably complex. 
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6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In Chapter 1 the concept of groups was examined, the purpose of a group tax regime was 
explained and different systems of group taxation were described. Furthermore, the canons of 
taxation, which would serve as a tool for evaluation of the present tax treatment of groups and 
alternative systems of group taxation, were discussed. 
In Chapter 2 the present tax treatment of groups was examined by focusing on the tax effects of 
various intra-group transactions. It was concluded that the present tax treatment of groups does 
not promote equity, neutrality, low administrative cost and certainty. And although the absence of 
statutory provisions dealing explicitly with group taxation contributes to legislative simplicity, it 
simultaneously leads to complex tax-driven schemes aimed at exploiting favourable tax 
anomalies and avoiding unfavourable tax anomalies. 
In Chapter 3 certain issues were considered which might render a system of group taxation 
unnecessary or undesirable, even if such a system produces a more satisfactory trade off between 
the canons of taxation. None of these issues was found to have such an effect. With regard to 
divisionalisation as a possible substitute for a system of group taxation, it was concluded that 
section 39 of the Tax Laws Amendment Act (1994) does not establish an accessible tool for the 
divisionalisation of existing groups. In addition, there are various commercial and legal reasons 
why groups may be preferred over divisionalised companies. Concerning the limited liability 
enjoyed by individual group companies, a benefit which is unavailable to divisions of a single 
company, it was found that groups rarely abuse or even legitimately utilise this privilege in 
practice. Furthermore, a system of group taxation will complement the concept of limited liability 
in promoting economic growth. Finally, it was concluded that a group tax regime will not 
encourage further concentration of economic control, as the intra-group shareholding required for 
group tax treatment will be far greater than the shareholding required for control. It was also 
found that a group tax regime may reduce the concentration of economic ownership by 
facilitating direct outside shareholdings in business enterprises which would otherwise have been 
structured as divisions. 
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In Chapter 4 consolidation systems were compared with loss transfer systems, employing the 
canons of taxation as a theoretical framework. Because a loss transfer system is very similar to 
the present tax treatment of groups, in the sense that both systems treat individual group 
companies as separate taxable entities, the present tax regime with regard to groups was 
implicitly included in the comparison. A consolidation system of group taxation was 
recommended for South Africa as it represents the most satisfactory trade-off between the 
various canons of taxation. A consolidation system will lead to the greatest level of equity, 
neutrality, efficiency and certainty, while it will contribute to lower administration costs, both for 
taxpayers and the fiscus. Although a consolidation system carries the risk of compexity, it is 
possible to design and implement a specific system in such a way that it will not be 
unmanageable. 
In Chapter 5 certain key recommendations of the Katz Commission with regard to group taxation 
were investigated. The writer expressed his agreement with the Commission's proposal for the 
gradual implementation of a consolidation system. Certain modifications to the proposed system 
were suggested to further reduce its complexity and accelerate full implementation. 
When the anomalies of the present tax treatment of groups are considered, it becomes evident 
that the status quo is untenable. From both a theoretical and practical perspective, the 
implementation of a consolidation system of group taxation will represent a significant structural 
improvement to the South African tax regime. 
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